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Abstract
3The thesis is organized around two closely interlinked questions: (a) At a 
theoretical level, is it the case that diversification activities driven by economies 
of scope should lead to a positive correlation between diversification and 
profitability? (b) Empirically, can a theoretical model account for observed 
patterns o f diversification activities over time and across countries?
Following a general discussion of the main issues related to 
diversification in chapter 1, chapter 2 answers to the first question in the 
negative. In a model where diversification is induced by the presence of 
synergies, it is shown that diversified firms may be on average the less efficient 
firms on the market and may survive only due to the presence o f synergies. This 
is consistent with the results o f earlier empirical studies, showing no correlation 
between diversification and profitability. Therefore the empirical part o f the 
thesis focuses on patterns of diversification rather than on the link with 
profitability.
Models that attribute diversification to the presence o f ‘economies of 
scope’ suggest that diversification patterns are determined by technological 
factors, that are stable over time and over countries. In chapter 3 a specific 
sector (food and drink) is analysed in the U.K. over a long time period (1962- 
1986) and the U.K. experience is compared to that of Italy (in 1986) through a 
standard loglinear model and a separate analytical approach. The main results 
are as follows: (1) U.K. diversification patterns are remarkably stable over time; 
(2) Italian diversification patterns appear quite different from those o f the U.K., 
whether in 1962 or in 1986. Since overall diversification levels for the U.K. in 
1962 are similar to those in Italy in 1986, it seems that patterns of 
diversification may be induced by country specific factors.
In order to unravel the difference between U.K. and Italian experience in 
chapter 4 a series of case studies of specific industries and firms is carried out. 
They suggest that in the Italian economy, where the distribution sector is poorly 
developed, large firms can enjoy a strong advantage by building up their own 
distribution networks. While the case studies indicate the possible importance of 
several other factors, it is this factor that appears to be the single most important 
influence underlying the difference between the U.K. and Italy.
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The present thesis is organised around two closely interlinked questions. 
Both are concerned with the use o f a single theoretical model to explore both 
the way in which firms diversify their interests across different industries, and 
the possible links between such diversification activities and the profitability of 
the firm. Two questions arise:
(a) At a theoretical level, is it the case that diversification activities driven by 
economies o f scope should lead to a positive correlation between diversification 
and profitability?
(b) Empirically, can a theoretical model account for observed patterns of 
diversification activities over time and across countries?
In chapter 2 we answer to the first question in the negative. In a 
framework where diversification is induced by the presence o f synergies, 
formally described as cost correlation or economies of scope across industries, 
diversified firms may be on average the less efficient firms on the market. They 
would survive only due to the presence of synergies. (This result holds under 
particular assumptions on the underlying cost distribution of firms, and on the 
degree of "relatedness" among industries.)
The conclusion is that the theory is consistent with the null result 
familiar with earlier empirical studies, that there is no correlation between 
diversification and profitability. If any prediction can be derived from theory, it 
is o f a conditional kind, and can be tested only with extremely detailed data o f a 
kind which is not currently available. It was therefore decided to focus, in the 
empirical part of this thesis, on patterns o f diversification and not on the link 
with profitability.
Models that attribute diversification to the presence o f economies of 
scope suggest that diversification patterns are determined by technological 
factors, that are stable over time and over countries. The method used in chapter 
3 is to analyse one sector (food and drink) in the U.K. o.ver a long time period 
(1962-1986) and to compare U.K. experience to that o f Italy (in 1986).
A large program of data collection and analysis was undertaken in order 
to obtain comparable datasets for the U.K. and Italy. The data are analysed in 
two separate exercises:
(a) The application of a standard loglinear model shows a fair degree of 
stability in the patterns observed in the data. However these results are only 
superficially satisfying, since they do not capture in a satisfactory manner the 
nature of the theoretical restrictions that emerge from the model o f chapter 2.
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(b) For this reason, a separate analytical approach was developed. The new 
procedure is to simulate the evolution of diversification patterns under the 
maintained hypothesis of the theory. This method turned to be more satisfactory 
than the loglinear analysis. The main results are as follows: (1) U.K. 
diversification patterns are remarkably stable over time; (2) Italian 
diversification patterns appear quite different from those of the U.K., whether 
in 1962 or in 1986. Since overall diversification levels for the U.K. in 1962 are 
similar to those in Italy in 1986, it seems that patterns of diversification may be 
influenced by country specific factors. It is to this question that we turn in 
chapter 4.
In order to unravel the difference between U.K. and Italian experience, a 
series o f case studies of specific industries and firms were carried out. These 
suggest that in the Italian economy, where the distribution sector is poorly 
developed, large firms can enjoy a strong advantage by building up their own 
distribution networks. While the case studies indicate the possible importance 
o f several other factors, it is this factor that appears to be the single most 
important influence underlying the difference between the U.K. and Italy.
The implications of this for the theoretical and empirical analyses of 
chapters 2 and 3 would appear to be the following:
(1) The present theory assumes (as do other currently available theories) that 
scope economies operate independently of the firm's size. Here the theoretical 
model falls short o f providing an adequate description of these markets.
(2) However, once this effect has been allowed for, the overall patterns of 
diversification obtaining in the Italian industry appear broadly similar to those 
seen in the U.K.
C hapter 1
Diversification. Theoretical Considerations and 
Empirical Applications: a Survey.
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1. Introduction
The growth of a firm over time is often associated with an increasing 
degree of diversification in the firm’s interests. Though a substantial literature 
has addressed the phenomenon, the analytical basis o f studies o f diversification 
is notoriously thin, and the problem of finding adequate models o f the 
diversification process is acknowledged to be a difficult one. The aim o f the 
present thesis is to explore a number of specific issues within this area.
In this survey, the literature on diversification is reviewed in the light o f 
the aims of the present study. Most of the attention will be focused on the 
reasons for diversification and the relationship between diversification and 
firms' profitability.
Theoretical issues relating to the reasons for diversification are dealt 
with in section 2. The ‘economies of scope’ literature is concerned with 
defining conditions on the production technology which lead to the appearance 
o f multiproduct firms. Models of the ‘growth of firms’, and transaction cost 
theory complement this approach, showing in particular how the development 
o f excess capacity in an indivisible factor may induce diversification whenever 
there are obstacles to growth within the firm's own market. The empirical 
analysis developed in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis is based on these 
theoretical ideas.
In section 3 of this chapter it is shown how further reasons for 
diversification emerge once we remove the assumption of perfect competition.
Product differentiation and welfare issues are reviewed in section 4 and 
5 respectively. The product differentiation literature is concerned with the issue 
o f incentives to produce multiple products. Though relevant to diversification 
issues, this theme will not be addressed further in the thesis. Welfare effect may 
be o f concern if  increases in corporate size and diversification induce 
anticompetitive behaviour, but in practice, the significance o f this may be 
limited.
In section 6 some relevant empirical work is discussed. Here two main 
issues have been addressed, which will be central to the following chapters. A 
number o f empirical studies have looked at reasons for diversification using 
regression analysis. Most of these have no clearly specified theoretical basis, 
and the results obtained are often not robust. In the present study, a different 
approach will be pursued.
15
Empirical studies o f the effects of diversification on firms’ profitability 
have not found any robust and unambiguous relationship. Case studies show 
that firms diversifying into "related" markets perform better, but only over a 
long period of time. In chapter 2 of this study, this issue is addressed from a 
theoretical point o f view, and a possible rationale for these empirical findings is 
suggested.
2. Diversification
Throughout this study, I adopt a familiar definition of the industry as 
encompassing a set o f products that are "strong" substitutes, i.e., the cross 
elasticities of demand within the industry are positive and large, whereas cross 
elasticities with products outside the industry are small.
A firm is called diversified if  its products belong to different industries in 
this sense1. The usual underlying hypotheses are that each product market is 
homogeneous and that different markets are not related through demand 
interdependencies (the elasticity of substitution is close to zero). The questions 
concerning the reasons for entering new markets and the choice o f the direction 
of expansion are treated in terms of technological incentives, while little 
attention is given to strategic considerations. Strategic effects are discussed in 
section 4 below.
Most studies of diversification in the ‘business’ literature concentrate on 
describing various diversification strategies followed by companies, and on 
measuring the degree of success achieved (in terms of profitability, say). The 
approach in the economics literature, on the other hand, has been essentially 
econometric. It is usual to posit a number o f ad hoc hypotheses, rather than 
specify a formal model. For example, it is sometimes assumed that firms 
diversify to exploit synergies, or to obtain market power, and some implication 
for the relationship between profitability and diversification are tested.
In what follows, we begin by looking at some formal models.
In fact, a large number of definitions has been suggested for the diversification process: E. 
Robinson identified diversification with the "lateral expansion of firms neither in the direction of their 
existing main products, as with horizontal integration, nor in the direction of supplies and outlets, as 
with vertical integration, but in the direction of other different but often broadly similar activities"; 
M.Gort (1962) observed that diversification implies the "heterogeneity of output from the point of 
view of the number of markets served by that output"; in Connor et al. (1985) "a firm diversifies its 
operations when it begins to sell in more than one market"; M Utton distinguishes between narrow 
spectrum diversification, which implies diversification into industries closely related to a firm primaiy 
production, and broad spectrum diversification. All of these definitions assume however that a market 
is a well defined concept.
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2.1 Economies of Scope
The economies of scope approach, developed by Panzar and Willig in a 
series o f articles (see, for example, Panzar and Willig (1981)), derives the 
conditions for the existence of a multiproduct firm in a competitive/contestable 
equilibrium.
Economies of scope are defined as cost savings resulting from 
production o f several outputs in a single enterprise. They are generated by the 
presence o f sharable inputs, which implies subadditivity of the cost function 
with respect to the services of the sharable input2, if  the market cannot 
efficiently allocate the services of the input3.
Assume there are N products, and label as (y,,...,yw) the quantities 
produced o f each. If S is a subset of N, define y s as the vector o f y 's  such that 
y ; > 0 if  / e S  and y , = 0 if  / e S .  Let C(ystw)denote the cost o f producing the 
vector i e S  o f products in the set S at factor prices w. If  T is a partition o f S, 
then there are economies of scope at y s, at factor prices w, with respect to the 
partition T if:
Y.C (yTi,w)>C(ys ,w)
1=1
Economies of scope are defined, then, for a certain subset o f the total set 
of products, and for given factor prices.
If  N=2, for example, and the factor market is perfectly competitive, we have 
economies of scope at production levels qu q2 o f products 1 and 2 if  
(suppressing w for ease of explanation):
C(qltq2)< C(q,,0)4-C(0,q2)
If  this hypothesis is satisfied, it can be shown that in a competitive 
equilibrium there will be multiproduction (Panzar and Willig (1981)), i.e., 
economies o f scope are necessary and sufficient for the presence of diversified 
firms.
An input is sharable between the productions of product sets S and T, if  the joint production 
of these outputs allows some of the input to be conserved, with respect to separate production, while 
the use of the other inputs is not increased.
3 An efficient market allocation of the services means that end users o f  the services face an 
input price equal to its marginal cost. In this case the effect of the economies of scope arises one step 
back, at the level of suppliers of sharable input services. With arbitrage problems (which do not allow 
different market prices for different users), in a competitive equilibrium there will necessarily be self­
production of the sharable input services and multiproduction of final goods.
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Economies of scope have become a fundamental concept to explain 
diversification, and can be considered as an abstract notion for the commonly 
used term ’’synergies".
Some examples that help in giving a content to the formal definition are 
the following (Bailey and Friedlaender (1982)):
(a) we have economies o f scope when the joint production of two goods allows 
to use one input for both, and this is less costly than using it twice (economies 
o f scope can arise even if  scale economies are lacking): the ability to share the 
factor of production among products is however dependent on both prices and 
available technology;
(b) the presence of a fixed factor of production is another source o f economies 
o f scope. Suppose there exist an indivisible asset which leads to economies of 
scale, but at the current level of demand for a single product is not fully 
utilised: this might still generate economies of scope;
(c) economies of scope could be a consequence of economies o f networking, 
where economies of scale advantages can be reaped only with larger scope of 
operations;
(d) the presence of a public input that can be reused for more than one product 
is another source of economies of scope.
Two major objections to the economies of scope approach have been 
raised. In the first place, the reference to economies o f scope in explaining 
multiproduct operation is somehow tautological: when it is cheaper to produce 
more products in a single firm, then firms are diversified4. This would require an 
analysis o f the conditions that make the hypothesis true. Second, the theory is 
static and does not explain the actual, dynamic diversification process.
These two points can be approached introducing considerations proposed 
in the literature on the growth of firms and in the literature referring to 
transaction costs.
2.2 Theories on the growth of the firm
The above definitions of economies of scope point to the presence of 
some form of excess capacity at given levels of demand. The literature on the 
growth of firms (Penrose (1959)) postulates precisely the idea that 
diversification is induced by the presence of excess capacity. It first explains
4 Even if this is only shown to hold under the hypothesis of perfect competition.
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first how excess capacity develops and, in a second step, finds conditions under 
which excess capacity leads to diversification. The development o f excess 
capacity is the result of: (i) indivisibilities o f fixed (physical) capital, (ii) 
accumulation of technological know-how within the firm (which can be used 
without the cost that should be supported if  acquired on the market), (iii) a 
dynamic process o f learning (and creation o f routines) especially at the 
managerial level, which make "spare time" available for alternative uses5.
The presence of excess capacity is not a necessary condition for 
economies o f scope (and thus multiproduct operation). The firm has in fact the 
choice between (a) not using the excess capacity, (b) "reinvesting" the excess 
capacity in the current production line, (c) selling/renting it on the market, (d) 
diversifying, i.e., using excess capacity in a different market. The third 
possibility is excluded in the cases of high transaction costs (see below). 
Diversification is the preferred choice between alternatives (b) and (d) if  some 
conditions relating to the relative profitability o f the two alternatives hold. 
These are:
(1) The presence of particularly good profit opportunities in some markets. 
Penrose calls these specific opportunities and lists them as: a growing 
demand for specific products, discoveries and inventions, the exploitation 
of which seems particularly promising; or specific opportunities to obtain a 
better market position or achieve some monopolistic advantage.
(b) Conditions which reduce profit opportunities in the firm’s own product 
market. Penrose refers to these as specific problems: temporary fluctuations 
in demand, which lead to periodic underutilization o f resources, the 
presence of market imperfections that generate a decline in the profitability 
of the existing market as output increases (market demand is rigid, the main 
product o f the firm is at a mature stage, or horizontal expansion is limited 
by the presence of antitrust regulations).
2.3 Transaction Costs
The presence of economies of scope is a necessaiy and sufficient 
condition for the existence of multiproduct firms only if  the multiproduct cost 
function summarises both production and organisational costs. Otherwise, some 
relevant economic factors which influence the scope of the firm may be missed.
For a linear programming approach to Penrose theory, see P.Rubin (1973).
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The transaction cost literature deals mainly with these organisational 
issues. According to Teece (1980, 1982) the presence o f economies o f scope is 
not sufficient to generate multiproduction, as firms could simply rent the 
services of the common input. A second necessary element is therefore the 
presence of high transaction costs which do not allow the establishment or the 
use of these rental markets.
The relevance of transaction costs depends essentially on the input which 
generates the economies o f scope i.e., which is sharable or has public good 
characteristics. They are higher when the common input is represented by 
indivisible and specialised physical capital or by human capital. I f  physical 
capital can be used only to produce a veiy limited number o f products, the 
market for the services of capital might be very thin, and this can generate 
transactional difficulties. In the case of human capital, transaction costs could 
be very high due to the tacit component o f organisational knowledge and to the 
problems of recognition and disclosure6.
2.4 A Theory of Diversification?
Those three approaches complement each other and can be usefully 
combined. Such an approach will form the basis for the empirical work 
developed chapter 3. Suppose firms own some indivisible factors7 and on which 
they have excess capacity (the factor may be managers, machines etc.). If  the 
factor is specific to the market, the firm tries to expand in its original market, 
since there the factor earns higher rents. However there may be obstacles to this 
expansion (because the firm is large relative to the market, or because there are 
antitrust regulations etc.). If  this is the case the firm might sell the capacity (if 
transaction costs allow), use it in other markets (if there are some markets that 
are "close’ to its original ones) or simply not use it. In this case diversification 
is driven by a push factor: the firm is forced out of its market. We should expect 
to observe this when the firm is growing more rapidly than its market and 
reaches some threshold market share (possibly 100%). The direction of 
diversification will be determined by the possibility of exploiting some 
economies of scope.
These amount to problems of non recognition of the opportunity by other firms; problems of 
disclosure of value to buyers, in a way both convincing and such that does not destroy the basis for 
exchange; and possibly the necessity of a "consulting team" to assist the start up.
7 Which may be specific and unique to the firm (in this case the firm earns Ricardian rents on 
it) and/or to the market.
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There may be cases where economies of scope are strong enough to 
induce diversification even in the absence of any push factor: this will occur if  
the firm has an advantage over incumbents and potential entrants in some 
market due to its ability to exploit scope economies. This might arise for 
example if  there are by products of some production process that can be used in 
other lines. In this case diversification is driven by a pull factor.
3. Imperfect Competition
3.1 A Cournot Example
In an imperfect competition framework, additional incentives for 
multiproduct operation may arise. Wolinski (1986) introduces demand side 
considerations8. In his analysis imperfect competition could be in itself an 
incentive to diversify. He considers a model in which two products can be 
produced with two different technologies: each technology allows one product 
to be produced more efficiently than the other. Technologies are such that the 
cost function exhibits diseconomies of scope (two firms with different 
technologies, each producing one product, are more efficient than one firm with 
a single technology producing both products)9. It is not therefore surprising that 
Wolinski is able to show that in perfect competition (price taking behaviour) 
firms are specialised. The interesting result is that with imperfect competition 
(Cournot competition), profit maximising firms in equilibrium might be 
diversified.
The result is driven by the presence of a sort o f "excess capacity", 
generated by the self imposed restraint in production that Cournot competition 
generates. Prices exceed marginal costs and it might be profitable to sell also in 
the second market, even if  the technology owned is less efficient. In general the 
result will depend on the cost function and on the equilibrium number o f firms 
in a free entry equilibrium (which in turn is a function of the fixed entry costs). 
The smaller is the number of firms, the higher are the incentives to produce in 
the second market as well, given that price cost margins are higher.
Dixon (1992) presents a very similar model and reaches analogous conclusions.
9 Dixon (1992) considers the possibility for firms to choose between a flexible technology, 
which allows them to produce both commoditites, and a dedicated technology, which allows to 
produce only a single commodity. There are diseconomies of scope, so that flexibility may imply a loss 
of efficiency in terms of marginal costs as well as fixed costs.
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Wolinski claims that excess capacity is a sign o f the presence of 
economies of scope10. However, this statement is somewhat misleading. I shall 
show in what follows how excess capacities arising through imperfect 
competition lead to diversification even in the presence o f diseconomies of 
scope. The idea is similar to that of reciprocal dumping argument o f Brander 
and Krugman's (1981) international trade model. The transport costs in that 
model translate here into the costs of adapting a technology to another product.
Assume there are two different products, A and B, and two firms, 1 and
2. Cost functions for the two products exhibit diseconomies o f scope:
C{qA,qB)> C(qA, 0) + C(0, qB )
where: C(qA,0) = aqA
C(0,qB) = bqB 
c(qA>qB)=<*qA+bqB+tqB
Let t denote the cost of adapting the technology to a different production. 
Assume the firms face identical linear demand schedules in each market, as 
follows:
Pa = A - B Q a 
Pb = A - B Q b
Then, if  each firm is active only in one market (the one in which it is more
efficient, say), we have at equilibrium:
A - a
qA~ qB~ 2 B
Pa = p* = ^ y -
, _ W - « >7T, — 7T-,—
4 B
However, if  the price in the second market (where production is less 
efficient) is higher than the marginal cost of the product, each firm will also
produce for the second market. This is the case if:
A - at <-------
2
i.e., if  t  is not too large, both firms have an incentive to be active on both 
markets, and it is easily shown that in a Coumot-Nash equilibrium:
This would imply that there are diseconomies of scope at the competitive equilibrium level of 
production and economies of scope at the Cournot equilibrium level of production.
22
A - a  + t 
3B 
A - a - 2 t  
qA2 "  qm _ 3B
with:
2 ( A - a f  - 2 ( A - A)t + 5t2
7ty “  ^    '
1 2 9B
(which is lower than the monopoly profits).
This simple example shows, in the spirit o f the 'reciprocal dumping' 
results, that imperfect competition generates further incentives to diversify into 
other markets as long as the additional costs are not too large. Thus the 
imperfectly competitive setting generates a further source o f inefficiency (as 
compared to a perfectly competitive framework) due to the existence of 
multiproduct firms, despite the cost advantages of specialisation.
3.2 O ther Strategic Considerations
In an imperfectly competitive framework Lai and Matutes (1989) 
identify incentives to multiproduction when consumers differ in income and 
transportation costs. This allows price discrimination by means of a bundling 
strategy. Consumers with low reservation price and low transportation costs 
shop around, while consumers with high reservation prices and high 
transportation costs prefer to buy bundles of goods at the same time. In a (pure 
strategy) Nash Equilibrium (when it exists), firms set the same price for the 
bundle o f goods but different prices for each of them. One firm sets a lower 
price for good 1, and a higher price for good 2, while the other firm reverses 
this procedure in order to extract consumer surplus from rich consumers. In a 2- 
stage game, where firms first choose how many products to sell and then the 
prices to charge (fixed locations), it is never in the interest o f any firm to 
withdraw any product (assuming a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists).
3.3 Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information, Incomplete C ontracts
The previous discussion related to a world without uncertainty. In a 
framework characterised by the presence of uncertainty (on the demand side),
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other types of incentive to diversification arise. These are mainly associated 
with the idea of risk spreading. A sizeable literature addresses this issue.
If  demand fluctuations occur, firms producing different goods, the 
demand for which is uncorrelated, will enjoy lower variance about their 
expected rate of return. It has been argued that this provides a motive for 
diversification. This argument has been subjected to some criticism. If  capital 
markets are perfect and if  firms maximise market values, then a separate 
rationale for firm diversification does not exist. The market value criterion 
implies that the sole concern of managers is with the stream of expected profits, 
and considerations of stability of returns may be left to shareholders, who can 
diversify their own investment portfolios.
Some of the responses to this criticism have been: (a) to assume that 
firms do not maximise shareholders’ welfare, and to assume instead a separate 
managerial objective function which includes a risk variable, (b) to assume that 
capital markets are imperfect. If shareholders experience wealth constraints or 
high capital and transaction costs, then firm diversification might be 
rationalised on the grounds of lowering the market price or risk to shareholders 
and reducing the probability o f corporate bankruptcy.
However, the (relatively limited) empirical evidence does not support 
these theories: no significant negative link between diversification and the 
variability o f returns is in fact observed11.
In general, the level of risk is associated more with the product life-cycle 
rather than the span of the product portfolio. The best strategy involves 
diversifying into "new generation products" which can offset declining sales or 
profitability of the old ones (see Rumelt, 1974).
Further reasons for diversification may arise due to asymmetric 
information and agency problems12. When ownership and control o f firms are 
separated, managers may pursue strategies to further their own interests at the 
expense of the firm's owners. Mergers, particularly conglomerate mergers, may 
be a convenient vehicle for doing so13. Besides the empire building reason, other 
motives have been proposed to explain why a self-interested manager might 
pursue excessive expansion. A manager might direct a firm's diversification in a 
way that increases the firm's demand for his or her particular skills (managerial 
entrenchment). Moreover, as said above, managers may try to pursue 
diversified expansion as a means of reducing total firm risk, thus improving
See Beattie (1980) for references and the evidence in Marshall, Yawitz and Greenberg (1984).
See Montgomery (1994) for a survey.
See Jensen's "free cash flow" theory.
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their personal position while not necessarily benefiting the firm's stockholders14. 
These possibilities arise as a consequence of the asymmetry o f information 
between insiders (managers) and outsiders (shareholders) and the impossibility 
o f devising contracts covering all possible events.
4. Product Differentiation and Multiproduct Firms
The incentives to expand production within the same market (i.e., into 
products with high elasticity of substitution with respect to the initial product 
set) are of a different kind and are more directly related to demand 
interdependencies.
One incentive to multiproduct operation within the same industry is to 
deter entry and reduce competition. Schmalensee (1978) explains product 
proliferation as a rational entry deterring strategy (his example refers to the 
ready to eat breakfast cereal industry)15. In a model with increasing returns at 
the brand level, spatial competition and some costs o f repositioning brands, an 
optimal entry deterrence strategy implies high prices, brand proliferation and 
some degree of overspending in advertising.
The Schmalensee paper raises a number of questions as to what kind of 
factors lead, within this type of model, to 'multiproduct firms' outcomes as 
opposed to 'single firm' outcomes. The factors involved include (a) demand side 
factors, (b) cost side factors, (c) the form of price competition assumed and (d) 
the presence or absence of the kind of strategic asymmetries captured by 
'sequential entry' as opposed to 'simultaneous entry' formulations.
The role of demand side factors was raised in Scherer (1982) and in 
Wolinski (1986), which has already been discussed above. Other treatments 
include Brander and Eaton (1984). Shaked and Sutton (1990) attempt a general 
characterisation of results in this area. Their analysis is couched in general 
terms, independent of the form of price competition (Bertrand/Cournot), and is 
applied to both the simultaneous entry and sequential entry settings. Within the 
simultaneous entry setting, the set o f equilibrium outcomes depends on two 
effects: a competition effect and a market expansion effect. The first effect 
refers to the degree of substitutability between products: the closer are the
14 See Montgomery (1994). However, as stated above, this theory has received limited empirical 
support.
15 Reverse results are obtained by Judd (1985) who shows that, if multiproduct firms could in 
fact exit in response to entry, this might attract further entry and product proliferation might not be 
credible. This is of more relevance if goods are better substitutes, if entry costs are low, and as 
competition in the market is more intense.
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products the higher is the competition and therefore the incentives for a firm to 
enter the second market. The market expansion effect concerns the new demand 
that the introduction of new product creates: for a given intensity of 
competition, a higher expansion effect makes it more profitable to allow a 
second firm on the market.
These models, as they stand, do not address the diversification issue. In 
principle, the introduction of cost considerations into this kind o f framework 
might open the door to some interesting questions. If  tough price competition in 
the core industry makes diversification more attractive, then the question of 
which industry the firm diversifies into becomes central. The models developed 
in Chapter 2 may be seen as an attempt to begin such an investigation.
5. Welfare Effects of Diversification
One of the main concerns generated by the increase o f corporate size, 
which is generally accompanied by an increase in diversification levels, has 
been about possible anti-competitive behaviour.
The relationships between diversification and market power or, more 
generally, between diversification and welfare, have been studied by Encaoua, 
Jacquemin and Moreaux (1986) and Waterson (1983). These relationships are 
shown to exist only when products are linked by 
substitutability/complementarity on the demand side.
Waterson (1983) uses a framework developed by Spence (1976) and 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to explore the welfare aspects o f the trade-off between 
the exploitation of market power and economies of scope.
Perfect contestability guarantees that private incentives to exploit 
economies of scope generate socially optimal market configurations. However, 
i f  markets are imperfectly competitive, it might not always be the case that 
attaining economies of scope is optimal from a social, welfare viewpoint. In 
general a trade-off exists between market power and a better exploitation of 
economies o f scope.
This may be the case if economies o f scope arise between products 
which are to some extent substitutable on the demand side. When products are 
complements or alternatively have no relationship on the demand side, 
multiproduct operation is always ’’better” in terms of social welfare.
A formal illustration may be helpful here. Waterson uses two models to 
analyse the question. The first considers only two product markets, where no
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entry is allowed. Here, the author compares a monopolistic configuration where 
one firm produces both products with a duopoly where each firm produces one 
product. The second model assumes monopolistic competition with free entry 
and compares a one-product firm equilibrium with a two-product firm 
configuration.
In both models market demand for product i is given by:
P i = a - 2bxt - 2 d ^ X j  b > d
where e is a positive parameter measuring economies o f scope (it is assumed 
that economies of scope are shared between at most two products).
It is easily shown that the net surplus arising from the production of the 
industry as a whole is:
S(n,x;l) = n(ax-bx2- d { n - \ ) x 2) - n c x - n f  
with a single product firm configuration, and
S{ntx;2) = n(ax-bx2 - d ( n - \ ) x 2) - n c x - n f  ( \ - —)
2
with a two product firm configuration.
The welfare analysis distinguishes two cases:
The cost function is given by:
C(l) = c*( + /
C(2) = cxh+cxk + 2 / ( l - | )
if the firm produces only one product, 
if  the firm produces two products together,
Case (i):
If  no entry is allowed on the market, the net surplus when a monopolist jointly 
produces two products is:
If  two duopolists each produce one product, the net surplus is:
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The results of this comparison are sensitive to the parameters o f the 
model; it can be shown that a monopoly is desirable:
- if  competition in duopoly is not too strong, e.g., i f  the duopoly is collusive, a 
two product monopolist is socially better;
- i f  fixed costs are relatively high (in the model a fixed proportion o f them is 
shared across products);
- i f  b is high (a high own price elasticity somehow limits the exploitation of 
monopolistic power);
- if  d  is low (d  measures the degree of substitution between products: if  d  is 
high, the monopolist has an incentive to produce too little of each product);
- if  e is high.
Case (ii):
Here free entry is allowed on monopolistic competitive markets. A 
configuration with single product firms and one with two-product firms are 
compared with a social optimum, where the number of products and output 
levels are chosen simultaneously and economies of scope are exploited.
It is shown (using numerical examples) that again d  is a relevant parameter in 
the comparison. A configuration with two-product firms implies a lower output 
of each product, with a larger total number of products (and a smaller number 
of firms) than the single product firm case. If  d  is large, even if  economies o f 
scope are substantial, it is likely that a one-product firms configuration is 
socially preferred. The level of fixed costs has instead a limited impact.
Those results of the comparisons which are relevant to competition 
policy issues depend essentially on the parameter d  and of its relationship with 
the value of b (own price elasticity). The closer the degree o f substitution 
between the products the higher the distortions introduced by joint production, 
i.e. firms reduce production of each good below its socially optimal level. The 
larger this effect is, the stronger must economies o f scope be in order to offset 
it.
The results of Encaoua et al. (1986) are based on the same sort of 
argument: they identify the relationship between an aggregate index of 
diversification from industry j  to industry k16 and an aggregate Lemer index
16 As defined by Beny (1975). They define the aggregate index of diversification from industry j 
to industry k as:
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(used as a measure of market power expressed in terms o f the ability to 
maintain a price above marginal costs) in a Cournot setting. If  diversification 
occurs between substitute products, diversification reduces competition; 
economies of scope amplify the effect.
If  firms diversify into industries whose products are complementary, the 
market power index is reduced. Finally, if  industries are "unrelated" on the 
demand side, no link with the Lemer index exists.
In summaiy, when markets are not perfectly contestable, and economies 
o f scope arise between substitute products, the positive effects o f economies of 
scope must be compared with the distortions generated by the increase in 
market power. These imply a lower than optimal level o f production and higher 
prices (with a reduction in total welfare). If products have no relationship on the 
demand side (except through income effects), the impact o f the presence of 
multiproduct firms on welfare is dominated by the effect o f scope economies.
A number of authors have considered the way in which private 
incentives to diversify relate to welfare considerations. For example, in 
Wolinski (1986) diversification may occur in the presence of diseconomies of 
scope. If this is the case, a welfare trade-off arises because diseconomies of 
scope are a source of inefficiencies when firms produce multiple products, but 
these may be compensated for by a reduction in market power with respect to 
the situation of complete specialisation (monopoly on each market).
Bemheim and Whinston (1990) identify further conditions under which 
diversification may be associated with negative welfare effects. They consider 
the impact o f multimarket contact o f conglomerate firms encountering each 
other in various markets: this may improve firms’ abilities to sustain collusive 
behaviour. In particular they show that, if  the number o f firms or their discount 
factors differ across markets, there are potential gains frorn multimarket contact.
'LL)ijk(Pj(i,j +Pk<ik)i
Djk E (7 ’d + P k d ) 2
i
where: P j = price of product j
q'j ^quantity of product j produced by firm i
j y  _ l {P f l ) f
A ( p r i  + /w i ) 2
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In these cases collusion might take place in markets where, in isolation, it 
would not occur. Moreover, if  firms have different efficiency levels, 
multimarket contact allows the development of 'spheres o f influence1. Each firm 
specialises in some subset of the market, where it is more efficient, and this 
may help to maintain high prices. In cases where collusion would arise in a 
single market, multimarket contact improves welfare as the movement towards 
spheres of influence reduces costs and prices. If  collusion would not arise in 
single markets, then welfare decreases with multimarket contact. The same type 
o f results occurs when there are fixed costs of production (economies of scale) 
which induce some sort of specialisation.
In summary, the positive effects of diversification in terms of higher 
efficiency (when it is induced by the search o f synergies) may be more than 
compensated by negative welfare effects arising either through the demand side 
- incentives to produce less than the optimal quantity - or through 
anticompetitive behaviour.
6. Empirical Evidence17
6.1 Empirical Analyses of Determinants of Diversification
Much of the empirical literature on the determinants o f diversification 
explores the relationship between diversification levels and various candidate 
explanatory variables. A limited number of these studies looks also at patterns 
o f diversification.
The literature appears to have achieved some degree of consensus 
regarding the relevance o f a small number of factors which seem to affect the 
level and pattern of diversification. These factors include18:
(1) the characteristics of the industry where diversification originates (origin 
industry);
(2) the characteristics of the industry into which where diversification occurs 
(target industry);
(3) the degree of relatedness between the two industries.
Issues of measurement are dealt with in the Appendix to this chapter.
Following the distinction made by Lamelin (1982) and MacDonald (1985).
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While the various studies reach broad agreement on the relevance of 
such factors, they do so on the basis of a number of ad hoc hypotheses rather 
than on the basis o f any theoretical model. Typical o f many studies is the 
remark of MacDonald (1981), who notes that the choice o f candidate 
explanatory variables relies "to some extent on previous case studies o f firms 
and statistical analyses o f diversification" (MacDonald (1981)).
Here we give a brief account of the relevant variables introduced rather 
than describing each study in turn.
The first group of variables refer to characteristics o f the origin industry. 
Notice that these are in nearly all cases measured at industry level. They are19:
(a) the size of diversifying firms (Berry (1975); Lamelin (1982); MacDonald 
(1981,1985); Sembenelli et al. (1995)): firms of larger size are supposed to have 
access to better financial resources which allow investments in new activities. 
This variable is found to be significant in all these studies.
The motivation for introducing this variable lies in the theory of growth of 
firms: when firms grow, they might be constrained by the size o f the market, 
due to rigid demand. If  this is the case, the best use for the excess capacity 
developed might be diversification. However, it is not the firms' size by itself 
which determines diversification, but its relationship with the size of the firms' 
core market: this issue is not usually considered.
The indices of diversification and the datasets used in the studies are the following:
Berry (1975): diversification index = - ^ p f  where pt is the share of firm's sales in industry i;
dataset = 460 of the 494 largest U.S. companies included in Fortune Plant and Product Directory, 
1960, 1965.
Gorecki (1975): diversification index = non-primary to total employment of firms in the industry 
considered;
dataset = Census data, 1958 and 1963, U.K. Manufacturing sector.
Hassid (1975): diversification index = proportion of output of enterprises classified in a SIC order,
accounted for by activity in other orders;
dataset = Census data, 1963 and 1968, U.K. Manufacturing sector.
Teece (1980): diversification index = number of activities the firm is engaged (within the same area); 
dataset = oil producers in Fortune's 500,1975.
Lamelin (1982): he studies "patterns" and uses a dummy which takes value 1 if  the firm is involved in
more than one 4-digit U.S. SIC activity;
dataset = Canadian manufacturing sector (D&B dataset), 1974/75.
MacDonald (1981): diversification index = entropy index; 
dataSet = 200 largest U.S. food manufacturers' sales, 1975.
MacDonald (1984): diversification index = Aemployment in the industry of companies whose main 
activity is outside the industry/total employment of the industry = expansion of diversification; 
dataset = Enterprise statistics of the Census of Manufacturers, 1972 and 1977.
MacDonald (1985): dummy which takes value 1 if a firm is active in more than one industry; 
dataset = Enterprise Statistics of the Census of Manufacturers, 1963 and 1977.
Sembenelli et al. (1995): diversification index = they study patterns and use a dummy which takes 
value 1 if firm i, whose primary activity is in industry j, is diversified in industry k; 
dataset = top 5 European manufacturing firm in at least one 3-digit industry.
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(b) the number of firms: It is sometimes postulated that the presence o f a larger 
number of firms in a market should increase the probability o f diversifying 
outside. The variable is generally found to be not significant (Lamelin (1982)). 
This is not surprising: from a theoretical viewpoint, it has little basis. Wolinski 
(1986), for example, predicts the opposite result, namely that higher 
diversification should be expected when concentration is higher.
(c) the share of exports: it is sometimes suggested that exports may represent an 
alternative to diversification, if  the latter is driven by constraints on domestic 
market demand. Under this assumption exports should be negatively related to 
diversification. However a large share of exports might also be correlated with 
large firms size, and would induce a positive impact on diversification. In the 
data a positive significant relationship is usually found (Lamelin, 1982).
(d) inbound diversification in the industry. It has been argued that a high level 
o f diversification into the industry should lead to more diversification out o f the 
industry. While Lamelin reports a positive coefficient, no model is specified. 
The theoretical rationale for any relationship here is unclear.
(e) the profitability of the industry: Berry (1975) believes that more profitable 
firms tend to diversify more; MacDonald (1981) on the other hand, suggests 
that low (ex-ante) profitability in a firm's principal activity leads the firm to 
reallocate inputs and production away from that industry, which ultimately 
leads to an increase in the diversification index. MacDonald finds a significant 
negative relationship. Notice that profitability is measured at the industry level. 
Again, there seem to be no theoretical reason for expecting any relationship. 
Testing this hypothesis, moreover, is usually problematic, both in terms of 
measurement issues relating to profitability, and in regard to econometric 
problems associated with unravelling the direction of causality.
(f) the growth of the industry: a low rate o f growth should induce outside 
diversification; on the other side it might be correlated with poor financial 
resources. Again what matters is the relationship between the growth o f the firm 
and the size o f the market. The variable is usually found to be insignificant 
(Gorecki (1975)).
(g) R&D investment: R&D generates new knowledge which represents an 
indivisible asset, which is difficult to transfer through the market. There is
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general agreement on the plausibility o f this hypothesis, and the variable is 
usually found to be significant (Gort (1962); Gorecki (1975); Hassid (1975); 
MacDonald (1985); Lamelin (1982); Teece (1980)). The use o f the variable is 
derived from theoretical findings (economies o f scope and transaction costs 
theory): R&D investments are a source of excess capacity o f the type that may 
induce diversification. Severe problems arise in testing this hypothesis. Data are 
usually available at the industry level, rather than at firm level. This makes it 
necessary to identify industry characteristics which may be expected to relate to 
the presence of specific assets in firms classified in that industry.
(h) the level of concentration (MacDonald (1981); Gorecki (1975)): see the 
point (b) above.
The main characteristics of the target industry which are usually included are:
(a) growth: high growth industries should attract more entry. This hypothesis 
seems plausible, since higher growth implies less competition and hence more 
room for new entrants (but not only diversifying entrants) and the variable is 
usually found to be significant (Lamelin (1982); MacDonald (1981)).
(b) the share of imports/exports: a large share o f imports may indicate low 
profitability and should discourage entry. The variable is found to be not 
significant (Lamelin (1982)). The reverse should hold for exports, which are 
found to be significantly related with diversification (Lamelin (1982)).
(c) concentration (Lamelin (1982); MacDonald (1981)): some authors have 
suggested that high concentration in the target industry might induce firms to 
diversify into that industry. The rationale for including this variable is not clear, 
however. If  high concentration is associated with high profitability, it begs the 
question as to why entry has not occurred, or it does nqt occur, independently 
o f the diversification activities of firms.
While the above sets of variables essentially try to capture motivations 
for entry or exit from specific industries, the third set looks at diversification 
patterns per se. Lamelin (1982) and Sembenelli et al. (1995) in particular 
studies the effect and importance of the degree of "relatedness" between the 
industries. The variables used are:
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(a) industrial complementarity: this is measured by the correlation coefficient 
across industry input structures between the amounts o f commodities directly 
required per dollar o f industry output20. The coefficient will be high if  one firm 
which buys one input is very likely to also buy the other. This variable should 
describe the relationship between the two industries in terms of markets served 
and distributions systems (which should generate a common pattern o f product 
differentiation). The variable is found to be significant (Lamelin (1982)).
(b) similarity in production techniques: Lamelin introduces three dummies 
identifying three groups of industries: producer good industries, consumer 
convenience goods industry, consumer non convenience goods industry. The 
dummy is equal to 1 if  the two industries are of the same type. This variable is 
found to be significant.
(c) reliance on science bases research or on advertising in both industries, 
which is used as another index of similarity21. It is significant (Lamelin (1982); 
Sembenelli et al. (1995)).
The main impression gained from an examination of this literature is that 
the usual method of investigation has been to postulate a number o f candidate 
explanatory variables, often on the basis o f informal arguments, and to test their 
significance. The pitfalls involved in this approach are evident, and even though 
it may be difficult to specify a fully adequate theoretical model in the present 
state o f knowledge, it may nonetheless be helpful to try to proceed along such 
lines. This will be the main aim of Chapters 2 and 3.
6.2 Effects on Market Structure and Performance
Multiproduct firms are sometimes accused of anticompetitive behaviour 
(cross-subsidisation, exclusive dealing, tie-in selling, predatory pricing). The 
theoretical foundations for these hypotheses are very limited (see above), and 
the empirical evidence is still too limited to permit any strong conclusion.
Measured through input/output tables: it allows to see which industries make products which 
are inputs for the same industries.
21 It is measured with a dummy variable which takes value 1, if both industries are science- 
based.
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Utton (1979) offers one of the most detailed analyses of the 
diversification process (in U.K. manufacturing in 1972) and o f its impact on 
competition. Other studies of this question include those o f Caves (1981) and 
Scott (1982).
Utton tests, first, the hypothesis that "one possible consequence of a high 
degree o f diversification by the largest firms in a concentrated manufacturing 
sector” is a "weakening of competitive forces" (Utton, 1979), due to 
multimarket contact. Moreover, when large firms enter an industry, they might 
be able to "restructure it to their own advantage", increasing the concentration 
in the industry.
Both hypotheses receive weak support: changes in market concentration 
do not appear directly related to the presence of large diversified firms22.
More specifically, Utton finds a negative relationship between profit 
margins and entry by diversifying firms: "the greater the share o f an industry 
accounted for by large firms primarily engaged elsewhere, the lower 
profitability tends to be on average, ceteris paribus". A detailed analysis of 
examples taken from the Monopolies Commission Reports on alleged 
anticompetitive behaviour of large firms does not show any clear evidence that 
diversifying firms adopt cross-subsidising policies with predatory in ten t23.
Finally, Caves (1981)'s study (based on U.S. Enterprise Statistics) does 
not find a significant relationship between changes in diversification and 
changes in concentration levels form 1963 and 1972.
Hence, none of the common presumptions concerning the 
anticompetitive consequences of widespread diversification seems to be 
supported by the data. However, these results cannot be taken as conclusive. 
First, the data are not very detailed. Most of the accounting systems do not 
allow us to distinguish between lines of businesses within firms: this limits the 
amount o f information available necessary to study the issue. Second, the 
analyses are mainly static rather than dynamic. The studies suggest, 
nonetheless, that the causal relationships are at least more complex than is 
usually assumed.
Beriy (1975) finds that diversification into low concentration industries raises the level of 
concentration. However, he also finds that diversification in highly concentrated industries has pro- 
competitive effects.
23 In fact the cases reported to the Monopolies and Merger Commission were taken from a 
sample restricted to concentrated industries, and referred to cases of firms in leading positions in their 
respective markets.
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6.3 Diversification and Firms' Profitability
The hypothesis usually tested in the literature is that diversification 
generates synergies, and this increases the profitability o f firms. These 
synergies are obtained essentially through two channels: (i) an increase in 
market power, or (ii) an increase in efficiency.
Two types o f approach have been followed: the first involves regressing 
some measure of profitability on a diversification index, and this is usually 
done using industry level data. The second adopts a 'case study' method, and 
looks at the effect of different patterns o f diversification on the firms profit 
stream over time.
6.3.1 Regression Approaches
The regression approach is usually justified by reference to the 
traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Bain, 1956): 
diversification is considered an element o f the industry's structure which has a 
systematic influence on industry profits24. The hypothesis is that diversification 
increases barriers to entry (Rhoades, 1973) and hence profits25. In practice, 
however, only the relationship between diversification and profitability is 
studied.
Much attention has been paid in the recent Industrial Organization 
literature to the inadequacy of the structure - conduct - performance paradigm. 
A full discussion of this point lies outside our present scope. See for example 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Tirole (1989).
The results of regression analyses based on this hypothesis are mixed: 
Rhoades (1973) uses data on 241 4-digit manufacturing industries from the 
1963 Census of Manufactures and finds a positive correlation between profits 
(at the industry level) and a diversification index, when the classification is at 
the 4-digit level26. However, there is a negative correlation if  another kind of
24 See Needham (1978): "The term "structure of industry"... refers to a selected number of 
characteristics of the output of a firm or group of firms. These include, for example, cost conditions, 
concentration, vertical integration, diversification and entry barriers." Or Scherer (1980): 
"Diversification can be viewed statistically as an element of market structure at some moment in time 
or as a dynamic process of movement by companies into new and different lines".
25 Again no formal theoretical model supports this consideration and possibly this accounts for 
the ambiguity of results.
26 The profit measure used is (value of shipments-direct costs)/(value of shipments). Two 
specialization indices are proposed: the first measures the extent to which firms primarily classified in
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diversification index is used, which evaluates the extent to which the largest 
firms in a 4-digit industry diversify outside the corresponding 3-digit industry.
In a later study, Rhoades (1974) introduces different diversification 
indices, which take into account the number of industries where a firm is active, 
using an updated dataset with a modified industry classification. He finds a 
negative correlation between industry profitability and diversification. This 
suggests that the results are not robust to different specifications o f the 
diversification measure27.
A structure-conduct-performance model is used also by Carter (1977) to 
test for the presence of synergies arising from diversification. He suggests that 
profits in the i-th industry depend not only upon the characteristics o f the 
industry, but also upon the extent to which a firm is diversified into other 
activities. With data on 374 firms from the 500 industrial firms listed in The 
Fortune Directory 1963, Carter regresses a measure of return on equity on 
concentration ratio, plant economies of scale, advertising, growth o f demand, 
and several indices of diversification.
His results support the synergy hypothesis only in the case o f one special 
diversification measure, the Herfindahl numbers equivalent. Carter also tries to 
distinguish between different types of diversification (vertical integration and 
closely related diversification versus conglomerate diversification)28. The 
synergistic effect is found to be greater for firms diversifying into closely 
related areas than for conglomerate.
Again results are veiy sensitive to the measure used, but they seem to 
indicate that diversification into closely related markets is more profitable than 
conglomerate diversification.
Lichtenberg (1992) considers how total factor productivity at the plant 
level is impacted by the degree of corporate diversification. Using plant-level 
Census Bureau data, he finds that the more diversified the firm (in this case, the
a 4-digit industry are specialized in that industry (using employment figures); the second measures the 
extent to which the largest firms in a 4-digit industry are primarily classified in the corresponding 
enterprise industiy category (approx. a 3-digit classification), i.e., the extent to which the industry is 
the secondary activity of leading firms. Both measure the extent of diversification but not the number 
of industries in which diversified firms are active. The other variables used in the regression are: 
concentration, demand growth, capital/output ratio, a producer-consumer good dummy, a geographic 
market index.
27 However, one possibility would be to interpret these findings as support for the view that 
diversification into closely related fields (outside the 4-digit classification areas) leads to higher 
profitability, while diversification into distant areas (outside 3-digit classification areas) reduces it.
On the basis of the hypothesis that conglomerate firms will adopt an M-form type of 
organization (decentralized multidivisional) while the other will have a U-form (multidepartmental 
form).
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greater the number of industries in which a parent firm operates), the lower the 
productivity of its plants. However, the relationship between these variables is 
significant and negative only after controlling for the total number o f parent- 
firm plants in all industries (itself an indication of diversification) which has a 
significant positive sign. These results suggest that a firm divesting an unrelated 
unit would benefit from the reduction in the number of business lines, but be 
hurt by the reduction in total number o f plants, making the net effect 
ambiguous.
Scott (1982, 1989, 1993) adopts a different approach: he suggests that 
multimarket activity increases price-cost margins. He defines as multimarket 
grouping the phenomenon of "groups of diversified firms whose activities span 
to a significant extent the same markets". This could in principle induce a 
higher degree of co-ordination (see par. 5), and could explain why diversified 
firms following the same pattern of expansion will enjoy higher market power 
and higher profits29.
The argument is relevant only for large companies, which are active in 
concentrated markets, where co-ordination is feasible, but not for small firms 
operating in highly competitive markets, where they have minor shares. This is 
precisely the hypothesis tested by Scott who analyses the effect of both 
concentration and multimarket contact on profitability. A problem with this 
approach is that a higher profitability for firms which meet on the same markets 
might be simply the consequence of efficiency gains linked to diversification 
across those markets. The observed patterns of diversification might just be the 
result o f these efficiency enhancing possibilities. The two hypotheses (market 
power versus efficiency) are very difficult to disentangle.
Scott investigates, in the first instance, whether diversification occurs 
randomly or with the intention of generating multimarket contact, i.e., he tests 
whether contact among firms is in some markets significantly higher than 
should be expected under the hypothesis o f pure chance contact. A significant 
multimarket contact is found in 51 cases (51 pairs of firms) over 246 cases 
considered30 31. Scott tests whether the level o f advertising and R&D 
expenditures is significantly different for markets where contact occurred than
For this reason not only horizontal mergers but also conglomerate mergers may enhance 
market power.
30 Where significant means that it would occur by chance less than once in every 100 cases, if 
the null hypothesis of random diversification were true.
31 The dataset is represented by 437 firms among the largest 1000 U.S. manufacturing firms.
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for an archetypal conglomerate32. This should clarify the potential for 
'economies’ o f multimarket operations. The results show that purposively 
diversified firms have lower expenditures, which Scott interprets as evidence of 
multimarket economies. The 'matching procedure' seems however quite 
dubious: rather than with the sum of randomly chosen firms33, the purposively 
diversified firms should be matched with the "sum’’ o f non-diversified ones or 
with diversified firms which do not experience multimarket contact.
Finally, Scott tests the hypothesis that profits (measured for "lines of 
businesses") are higher when there is multimarket contact and markets are 
concentrated. Average profits are highest when both these variables are high, 
which in turn is taken as a support for the theory advanced previously34. Again 
the results are obtained regressing the profitability o f a line o f business of a 
firm on the level of contact and the concentration level in that market35: 
diversification is again taken as a characteristic of the market structure.
The results suggest that it is implausible to attribute higher profitability 
to higher market power achieved by facilitating collusion through multimarket 
contact. In fact at the empirical level, die two factors (market power and 
increased efficiency) are not easily disentangled and the correlation between 
high contact and high profits may be a spurious one, with the direction of 
causality going from increased efficiency to higher contact and higher profits.
A different perspective on these issues is taken by Wemerfelt and 
Montgomery (1988a, 1988b). Their results, though novel in some respects, do 
not contradict the thesis that diversification is only profitable if  it occurs in 
closely related areas.
In the Wemerfelt - Montgomery approach, diversification is taken as the 
profit maximising response to the presence of excess capacity36. Positive profits 
arise from the ownership of a 'specific factor' (Ricardian rents). There are costs
The test consists of taking a pair of firms among the 51 (for which contact was more than 
random), check in how many markets the two firms meet, choose randomly an equal number of 
markets, and in each of these choose, again randomly, a firm: an archetypal conglomerate is defined 
as the sum of the firms in these markets; the comparison is between the advertising or R&D 
expenditures of the purposively diversified firms and those of the archetypal conglomerate.
33 Which in fact might include those experiencing multimarket contact as well.
34 Even if the fact that when concentration is low, a low value of multimarket contact generates
higher profits than high contact has* no obvious explanation.
35 Rather than matching profits of diversified and non diversified firms
36 In their framework nothing explains how excess capacity arises, and why does it lead to
diversification rather than internal expansion. Demand considerations should be introduced referring 
to limits to expansion in the industry (industry shrinking, impossibility of eroding other firms' market 
share) and explaining why it is instead possible to expand into another industry (growing demand, 
incumbent firms with costs of creating new capacity higher than costs of readaptation by firms with 
excess capacity).
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involved in adapting the excess capacity to alternative uses, which are a 
function of the specificity of the asset (s ) and of how closely related the new 
market is ( r ):
C = C(s,r) C, > 0,C2 < 0
The mostly diversified firms are those with lowest readaptation costs, 
that is those with less specific factors. Specialised firms are instead those 
endowed with factors so specific that the cost o f using them in alternative 
industries is too high. It follows that diversification is performed by firms 
whose specific factors rents are lower. Moreover diversification itself will 
lower rents that can be earned on specific factors (as they are used in industries 
where they are less efficient). The total value o f the firm should depend 
negatively on the optimal extent of diversification.
However in this model there is no cost o f holding excess capacity (which 
would lower the average profitability of specialised firms) and, more important, 
there is no economies o f scope effect, even when diversification occurs into 
related industries.
The authors test empirically for the relationship between the presence of 
positive rents (approximated by a high q value of the firm) and the 
diversification level of firms. Two equations are estimated: the first relates q 
directly to diversification37, the second uses industry dummies as instruments to 
estimate the diversification variable38, which amounts to using average industry 
diversification.
The results show a significant negative relationship between q and 
diversification only in the first equation, where no correction for measurement 
errors is introduced. When a correction is applied, the relationship becomes non 
significant. The best results are obtained with the second equation; the authors 
take this as evidence of the homogeneity o f asset specificity within industries. 
This does not seem consistent with the assumption that rents for the firm are 
generated by the ownership of a specific factor, which would give it an 
advantage over the other firms in the industry, but rather with the presence of 
an industry specific factor, which might induce barriers to entry.
The main conclusions from these studies can be summarised as follows:
(i) even given substantial methodological limitations, the analyses suggest that 
diversification does not occur randomly. The positive correlation between
The other variables are firm's advertising expenditures, R&D expenditures, concentration in 
firm's market, growth in firm's market, market share, firm's foreign sales.
38 This procedure is used as rents and diversification are not linked directly, but only through 
the variables 'factor specificity' and 'relatedness', not observable.
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diversification and firms’ profitability found in some studies might be driven by 
a third variable, the firm’s efficiency level. We shall develop this point at length 
in the following chapter;
(ii) the channels by which improved performance is achieved cannot be 
unambiguously identified.
The latter point seems a particularly relevant issue in terms of policy 
considerations.
6.3.2 A ’’Case Study" Approach
The second type of approach treats diversification as a strategy used to 
achieve growth or to increase profitability. The focus is on the type of strategy 
followed in the diversification process, and its effects on performance. The 
method used is a 'case study’ approach (Biggadike (1979); Rumelt (1974)). This 
literature suggests that diversification may improve the performance o f firms, 
but only if  it is the result o f a specific type of strategy. In particular, the 
importance of diversification into 'related' industries is stressed.
The results of Biggadike's (1979) analysis on PIMS39 data, which 
allowed him to follow firms over a period of several years, suggest that it takes 
some years before diversification pays off. The financial performance of firms 
in the first eight years o f the new activity is not very successful. In the first 
period (first 4 years) after diversification, firms usually show a negative return 
on investment and very low gross margins over sales. Cash flows only become 
positive after 8 years.
Concerning the effect of variables such as relatedness, market 
characteristics, and entry strategies, Biggadike finds that firms exploiting 
'marketing relatedness', choosing moderate growth markets, moderately 
concentrated, performed better. Moreover an aggressive (i.e., low prices, better 
quality, higher marketing expenditures) and broad entry strategy was more 
rewarding. The worst results are obtained by firms pursuing a forward 
integration strategy and by those diversifying into technology related fields. 
However this only concerns the financial performance40 - not the market
The Profit Impact of Market Strategy program collected data on firms through interviews and 
other sources for a series of years.
40 Measured by return on investment, cash flow to sales, gross margins to sales ratios.
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performance41- and is mainly due to the higher cost disadvantage, while the 
market share performance of this group is rather good.
Rumelt (1974) studies the diversification strategies of large industrial 
corporations (500 Fortune firms in the period 1949-1969) and finds that the best 
performance is associated with a strategy of 'controlled diversity1, while again 
the worst performers are firms following strategies of vertical integration. Firms 
“that have diversified to some extent but have restricted their range o f activity 
to a central skill or competence have shown substantially higher rates of 
profitability and growth than other types o f firms“ and “the pattern of 
differences observed indicates that is it not diversity itself, but the central 
organising principle used to manage diversity that is the crucial factor in 
explaining performance differentials” .
Lecraw (1984) defines his approach as half way between the 'economists' 
type of analysis (the regression approach) and the 'business researchers' one (the 
case approach). The first approach uses industry characteristics to explain 
diversification and to study the effects on performance, whereas the second 
emphasises firm characteristics. In his study the success o f diversified firms is 
allowed to depend on industry characteristics, the strategy chosen by the firm, 
the appropriateness of this strategy, the extent to which it follows this strategy 
and the profitability of the industry.
Four distinct diversification strategies are defined, based on the 
relationship “in production and marketing between the industries in which the 
firm operated and the proportion of its activities that were located in each 
industry” (Lecraw (1984)).
Each firm (the 200 largest firms in terms of sales in the manufacturing 
sector in Canada) is assigned to one of four possible strategic groups (single 
business, vertically integrated business, related business, unrelated business), 
by means of discriminant analysis on the basis o f the characteristics both o f the 
industry and of the firm42. The result o f this analysis suggests that the 
characteristics of the base industry and of the firm have a strong influence on 
the strategy followed by firms.
Measured by market shares.
42 E.g., he assumes that the strategy 'single business' is associated to the fact that the industiy is
fast growing, with profitability above average, and to the absence of intangible assets from high levels 
of R&D or advertising expenditures; a 'related business' strategy on the other side, might be followed 
if firms have high levels of R&D or advertising expenditures, which generate intangible assets 
(expertise in other products, brand names, skills in marketing and distribution), and if the industiy is 
not concentrated and has low barriers to entiy.
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The analysis of the profitability issue is performed in three steps:
(i) First the hypothesis is tested, that conforming to group behaviour is the best 
strategy. Firms which behave according to their predicted strategy have better 
performance than the others. However, firms that were predicted to follow an 
unrelated business strategy but followed another strategy did not have 
significantly lower profits than firms predicted to follow an unrelated business 
strategy who actually did so.
(ii) Second, the influence of industry profitability is taken into account. The 
performance of firms is found to be better relative to a weighted average of that 
o f the industries where they operated if: (a) firms followed a strategy o f ’related 
diversification', (b) firms followed an ’appropriate’ strategy (they conformed to 
group behaviour), (c) firms had higher market shares.
(iii) Finally, the effect of the extent o f the activities is tested, and again a 
strategy of related diversification induces a positive effect on profits whereas a 
strategy of unrelated diversification does not.
Thus a feature shared by all these studies is a positive effect o f a strategy 
o f related diversification on profits.
In general, the definitions of 'relatedness’ given by the various authors 
can be grouped into two types: one refers to the presence of economies o f scope 
in production (the presence of manufacturing processes and equipment 
sufficiently flexible to be used in alternative ways; the presence o f a 
distribution network, that similar products can exploit); the other to the 
presence of management skills (or more generally firm specific skills) which 
can be transferred to another market. In Rumelt’s terminology, a firm enters a 
'related product' if  “it adds new activities that are tangibly related to the 
collective skills and strengths possessed originally by the firm”. Biggadike 
explains that “relatedness to the parent company refers to the likelihood that an 
entrant launched by an established company inherits skills form the parent 
which it tries to transfer to the entered market” and that “new product 
introductions are more likely to succeed if  they demand skills that managers 
already have”. He then classifies different types o f relatedness: technology 
relatedness (“technology is the most likely basis for entry into other markets 
because corporate research often creates additional opportunities”), scale 
economy relatedness (“manufacturing processes and equipment sufficiently 
flexible to permit, with some modifications or extensions, entry into nearby 
markets” so that “the sharing of existing facilities permits economies through 
higher plant utilisation and lowers both the scale economy and the absolute cost 
barriers to entry”), marketing relatedness (“expertise in serving a certain type of
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customer, in differentiating products, in developing low cost distribution and 
customer service systems, in exploiting famous brand names”).
7. Conclusions
The subject o f this survey is a broad one. The absence o f an adequate 
theoretical framework has led to the proliferation of ad hoc hypotheses and the 
econometric testing of these hypotheses. A few regularities do emerge, 
however, and it seems clear that a more systematic theory-based approach 
might be worth pursuing.
The breadth and complexity o f the issues rule out a comprehensive 
attack, however, and in the remaining chapters, attention will be focused on 
attacking some limited parts of the problem.
The two aspects of the problem which are addressed in Chapters 2 and 3 
are as follows. In Chapter 2, the issue of diversification and profitability is 
addressed in the setting of a model of diversification. The aim here is to 
examine whether any theoretical basis exists for the common hypothesis that 
the level of diversification should be correlated with profitability. The chapter 
answers this question in the negative: there is no good a priori basis for such a 
hypothesis. It is unsurprising, in the light of these results, that attempts to 
establish such statistical relationships have led to no clear consensus.
In Chapter 3, we turn to the problem of modelling patterns of 
diversification. Here, the aim is to look specifically to (technical or other) 
linkages between industries, in trying to account for a strong statistical 
regularity, viz. the fact that both across countries and over time, certain patterns 
o f cross industry diversification appear and persist.
Thus both these chapters concern the link between theory and statistical 
regularities. The first seeks to account for the 'mixed' and 'disappointing' results 
in the diversification - profitability literature by pointing to the fact that theory 
does not suggests any basis for such a relationship. Chapter 3, on the other hand 
aims to use theory to explore carefully the mechanism underlying the 
appearance of a clear and substantial statistical pattern. Chapter 4 complements 
the approach of the previous chapter with a case study analysis of 
diversification processes of large firms in Italy.
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Appendix: Measurement Issues
Most of the empirical literature assumes that a firm diversifies if  it 
expands into another 4-digit/3-digit/2-digit industry. The classification refers to 
differences in production processes; the products may nevertheless be close 
substitutes in demand. However, there may be problems due to the fact that 
similar production processes are classified to different industries because of 
differences in buyers. In order to overcome this problem, some studies develop 
subjective classification systems (see Rumelt, 1974).
Desirable properties of a diversification index (see MacDonald, 1981) 
include:
(a) that the index increases with the increase in the number of industries where 
the firm is active,
(b) that the index responds to the distribution of a firm's sales across industries,
(c) that it accounts for the "distance" between pairs o f activities.
The most used indices are:
(1) N =  the number of different 2/3/4-digit industries in which a firm is active. 
The problem with this index is that it ignores the distribution of sales across 
industries.
(2) P  = the share of firm's sales accounts for by non-primary industry. This 
ignores the number of secondary activities and the distribution of sales.
(3) G = P N ,  which tries to account for both the distribution of sales and the 
number o f activities.
N j
(4) E  = V  Sf In — = the entropy index (5, is the share o f firm in industry i). The
i=i si
index is sensitive to the number of activities, and the distribution o f sales 
across markets, and can be decomposed into additive parts representing 
diversification across 2-digit industry groups and weighted average 
diversification across 3-digit industries within each 2-digit group.
(5) H  = = inverse of Herfindahl index. It responds to both distribution and
X sf
number of activities. It is affected by primary industry's share o f sales. It is 
insensitive to the addition of a large number o f small shares.
N  j
(6) C = ^ S ,  • ^ StdtJ, where dtj is a distance parameter and is equal to 0 if  i=j,
<=i »=i
equal to 1 if  i and j are in the same 3-digit industry, equal to 2 if  i and j  are 
in the same 2-digit industry, equal to 3 otherwise. It is strongly affected by
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primary industry sales. It attempts to take account o f the distance between 
industries.
n
(7) D = 1 -  S? = the Berry index (£, is the ratio of the firm’s sales in the i-th
»=i
industry to the firm’s total sales).
The seven indices are in general highly correlated. Each is better suited 
for particular analyses of diversification. When one is interested in describing 
diversification across a wide range of firms, simple industry counts may be a 
poor measure of diversification but the other measures are highly correlated. 
When one is interested in making finer distinctions among groups o f diversified 
firms, there may be significant differences among indices.
In the following chapters, the only available measure is a count of 
products, due to data availability. However, since we are particularly interested 
in patterns of diversification the problem of choosing a suitable index is less 
serious than it might otherwise be.
Chapter 2
Diversification and Synergies: 
Effects on Profitability
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1. Introduction
The usual type of theoretical approach to explaining diversification 
patterns assumes that diversification is an optimal response to the presence of 
synergies, which allow reductions in total cost, or the possibility o f achieving 
higher market power through multimarket contact (see Scott (1982, 1989)). It is 
commonly argued in the business literature that diversified firms perform better 
i f  they expand into related markets, where they can exploit common skills. It is 
suggested that this should lead to an increase in the average profits of 
diversified firms, relative to undiversified competitors.
On the other hand econometric work does not in general confirm (or at 
least gives only very weak support to) the hypothesis that diversified firms are 
more profitable (see Rhoades (1973, 1974); Carter (1977))1.
Should this lead to the rejection of the type of theory mentioned above?
In what follows, we develop a very simple idea which can account for 
the apparent inconsistency between theory and empirical observation.
We begin by noting that the results o f empirical work (relating 
profitability to diversification) may be biased due to the omission o f factors 
other than diversification which affect the efficiency of firms. It might then be 
the case that the performance of diversified (but relatively inefficient) firms is 
worse than the performance of specialised (but relatively efficient) firms: the 
advantages o f the synergies might not be sufficient to offset the disadvantages 
of being inefficient. At first glance, it might seem that such effects were simply 
’random’, and that they would merely lead to ’noise’ in the data. This, however, 
is not so. We shall identify conditions under which, in equilibrium, efficient 
specialised firms are not willing to diversify. In particular this is the case when 
it is "better" to be very good in one product only, rather than sufficiently good 
in all o f them.
Specialised firms may be very efficient in one line o f production, but 
relatively inefficient in the others. At the same time, some highly inefficient 
firms may only be able to survive in the market due to the presence of 
synergies.
Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988a, 1988b) suggest that diversified firms might have lower 
average returns, as diversification is generated in their framework by the presence of excess capacity, 
and positive profits are the consequence of the ownership of a specific factor, whose efficiency is 
reduced when applied to other fields. However, in their context, the possibility of exploiting synergies 
is ignored.
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Hence, the observation of higher average profits for the undiversified 
firms is not a sufficient argument against the theory that the diversification 
process was driven by synergies.
Indeed, the usual ad hoc assumption that diversification and profitability 
should be correlated across industry groups does not have any robust theoretical 
basis.
2. The Basic Framework
Consider an economy with an infinite number o f potential firms, 
endowed with a random efficiency parameter which affects their cost function 
and which they can learn after paying a fixed entry cost (see Lippman, Rumelt 
(1982)2). Once on the market they act as price-taking profit maximisers and face 
increasing marginal costs3.
The model we consider is static, and diversification in this framework 
will be generated only by attempts to exploit synergies across markets.
From the empirical and business literature, it emerges that, among the 
factors driving diversification and having a considerable impact on its success, 
the degree to which markets are 'related' is particularly relevant.
The concept o f 'relatedness' is variously defined in this literature. 
Definitions vary in terms of two sets of factors. The first includes technological 
elements, which amount to the possibility o f sharing fixed costs between 
different products (economies of scope). These can be either fixed plant costs 
(whenever one product technology is sufficiently close to another), or other 
types o f fixed costs, such as marketing costs (whenever marketing networks can 
be at least partially shared across series o f products), distribution costs 
(products used by the same type of consumer will be probably distributed 
through the same channels, e.g. durable consumer goods,, food products etc.), or 
the exploitation of a brand image.
They explain in this framework the presence of positive and heterogeneous rents across firms 
with price talcing behaviour and free entry: firms enter the market if their expected profits are positive; 
entry occurs until the price is driven down to the point where expected profits are negative. The 
surviving firms will have positive profits on average, even if free entry is allowed.
3 Given that the Bertrand models of competition lead either to zero profits for the firms or to 
severe existence problems, any alternative specification should rely either on an entry-exit version of 
Cournot competition or on a product differentiation model with entry costs. However these 
specifications would create unnecessary technical difficulties for our problem. We are in fact confident 
that our argument would carry through to these alternative models, since it only relies on some general 
statistical properties of the profit function.
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The second factor playing an essential role in the diversification process, 
and having a considerable influence on its effects, is what we might label 
'managerial ability'. In the words of Biggadike (1979), "relatedness to the parent 
company refers to the likelihood that an entrant launched by an established 
company inherits skills from the parent, which it tries to transfer to the entered 
market" and "new product introductions are more likely to succeed if  they 
demand skills that managers already have". The relatedness across markets 
arises then from the familiarity with manufacturing methods used in the market 
to be entered, and from expertise in serving a certain type o f customer, in 
differentiating products and in developing low cost distribution and customer 
serving systems. Hence, the best strategy, when diversifying, is to enter 
businesses where the managerial skills can best be used (Peters and Waterman 
(1982)).
We shall represent these two elements in terms o f the cost functions of 
firms as follows.
(i) The 'managerial skills' hypothesis will be represented through the presence 
o f a positive correlation between costs in two industries, so that i f  a firm 
has relatively high costs in one product, it is likely that costs will also be 
high in the second product. This could be taken to describe two markets 
which are 'related' because they have the same type of production structure: 
if  a firm, active in both markets, has a 'good' manager, his ability will show 
equally in both and generate the same level of efficiency. Specifically, we 
shall consider a firm-specific efficiency effect, which can be modelled in 
terms of a random 'cost draw' (see below).
(ii) The economies of scope possibility will be represented by a reduction in 
total cost that any firm enjoys if  it actively produces in both industries. 
Here, we are concerned with a feature of the production or distribution 
technology, per se, which all firms face equally.
This introduces in a very simplified way both industry characteristics 
(summarised by economies o f scope or cost correlation across them) and firm 
specific factors (a 'cost draw') in the diversification decision.
We want to concentrate on the issue of how diversification arises and the 
relation between diversification and profitability. In what follows, we examine 
in turn each of the two types of model. The 'managerial skills' model is 
explained in Sections 3-5, while the 'economies of scope' model is examined in 
Section 6. For simplicity we shall consider only two industries: firms will
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decide whether to enter neither industry, only one industry (specialised firms), 
or both industries (diversified firms).
3. The 'M anagerial Skills' Model
We assume that:
- The products produced by the various firms are homogeneous within each of 
the two markets considered.
- The demand for each product i is fixed and known:
- Firms differ in their efficiency: for each of the two products the cost function 
for firm j  is a simple quadratic function (so the marginal cost schedules of 
the firms are linear), and differs across firms by a vertical shift parameter,
where c{ is the realisation of a random variable c/. c /  and c[ are i.i.d. with 
respect to j  and have commonly known distribution functions. The 
realisation of c, is observed by firm j  only on paying a non-recoverable 
entry cost M>04;
- The profit function, once in market i, is therefore:
- Firms behave as price-takers. Their profit maximising choice of output given 
the market price pi is:
- If  nt is the total number of firms active in market i, in equilibrium it must be 
the case that
Qi=A-Pi
v iz .
< = # ? / - ( ( ? / )2+c/)
Ei
q! = \ 2 
o
if —  > c{ 
4 '
otherwise.
S{pi) = ni ^  = A - p i =D(p,)
The entiy cost M is the cost of setting up the firm, and it is the same whether one wants to be 
able to produce on market 1, market 2 or both markets.
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where S(p() denotes total industry supply. Hence the equilibrium price is: 
2 A
Pi -  7T  w. +2
- We assume that firms are risk neutral: they enter the industry as long as the 
expected profits are larger than M.
An equilibrium is defined as a vector:
where: p* is the market price;
nT is the number of firms entering the market (i.e., paying M and 
observing cost draws); 
n* is the number of active firms on each market i (i.e., those with non 
negative profits).
We assume the following conditions:
1. Free Entry E(n\pltp2) = M
2. Price Taking Behaviour ^ /(c /,p f) = &  if & > c (  2 4 '
0 otherwise.
Condition 1 is the optimal entry decision rule, given market price. 
Condition 2 is the profit maximising output decision for price taking firms. We 
are thus assuming perfect competition in product markets, and condition 2 
ensures that supply equals demand. Here we confine ourselves to symmetric 
equilibria (p* = p*2,n* = «*).
Within this basic model we want to consider two possible functional 
forms of the random variable c/ in order to study the effects o f diversification 
on the performance of firms5. These will be used to represent the presence of 
cost correlation and economies o f scope respectively.
5 Differences in cj are taken to summarize different levels of efficiency in an extemely simple 
way, without evaluating potential strategic interactions internal to the firm. For example, if we also 
assume perfect competition in the input markets, the rents from greater efficiency of one input would 
be appropriated by that input (the managers, if we are considering their efficiency) and we would not 
observe different efficiency levels for the firms themselves.
52
4. Correlated Costs: is it Possible that Specialised Firm s Perform  Better?
We shall first consider the case where cost draws are correlated. This 
may be interpreted as the effect o f 'relatedness' or similarity o f markets: i f  a 
firm is efficient (its costs are relatively low) in one market, it is likely that it 
will be similarly efficient in another with analogous characteristics.
Imagine for example that the efficiency o f the firm is essentially 
determined by the manager’s ability. If a firm is active in two markets, with a 
relatively similar structure (e.g. in terms of type o f consumers, or in terms of the 
competitive structure, so that a strategy successful in one would probably also 
be successful in the other), then if  the manager o f the firm is 'good' in one, he 
will probably be 'good' in the other. Another source o f 'relatedness' may relate 
to input costs: if  two industries use similar inputs, then a firm with access to 
low cost supplies will benefit in both markets.
We represent these possibilities by assuming a simple functional form 
for the firm specific element o f cost cf:
c1 = ( J - p ) v 1+pv12 
c2 = ( l - p j v 2 +pv12
where v7,v2,v72 are i.i.d. random variables. This allows us to describe the 
'degree of relatedness' across markets in terms o f the parameter p.  I f  p = 0  the 
markets are completely unrelated, and c7 = vJtc2 = v2, i.e., the cost draws are 
independent. If p  = 1 the cost draws are perfectly correlated, i.e., c2 = vJ2 -  c2 .
We might consider, for example, the cost o f undertaking an advertising 
campaign. If the two markets are similar, a marketing manager who has 
organised a successful advertising campaign in one market will presumably be 
able to reproduce that success in the other. If  the industries are not related, the 
success in one may be poorly correlated with success in another.
Now, as we noted in the introduction, it is often argued that diversified 
firms should have higher profits than undiversified firms, since the synergies 
they exploit should create higher profits. This intuition however does not 
account for the ambiguity and non-robustness o f the empirical results on 
diversification and profitability.
In this section, we present a simple example which is consistent with the 
absence of a relationship between diversification and profitability.
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We assume:
0 with probability 1 /2
1 with probability 1 /2
vj ,v2 are associated with the share of fixed costs which is independent in the 
two markets (which we shall define the "market specific cost draw"), while v12
is associated with the share o f costs which affects both markets together (the 
"common cost draw"). The random variable c = (q,c2)  will thus be distributed
as:
ci___________ £2__________ probability
0 0 1/8
p p 1/8
0 1 - p 1/8
p 1 1/8
1 - p 0 1/8
1 p 1/8
1 - p 1 - p 1/8
1 1 1/8
It is easy in this case to solve explicitly for the equilibrium outcome 
(nT,p\,n\,p*2,n2) . We simplify by confining attention to symmetric equilibria, 
that is p * = p\ -  p \  and n[ = wj = n .  Hence our equilibrium is a triple (n*,n,p*) 
where nT = art ( a  ^  1). In order to solve the equilibrium conditions 
E{j\p)=U  and D = S,  we first compute E (^p ) .  Given the distribution of the 
cost pairs, we have:
2
if <> m in (p ,l-p )
4
2
if m in (p ,l-p )< —  < m ax (p ,l-p )
4
2
if max(p, 1 -  p) < —  < 1 
4
To obtain the expression we proceed as follows. In the first interval
2
(—  < m in (p ,l-p )), observe that only firms with cost draws 
4
(c,,c2) = (0,0),(0,p) or (p,o) are active in at least one market and would earn
E(n\p) =
1 2- p
8
^ - -■ im in (p ,l-p )  
3 2 1
- p  —
8 2
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p 2 / 4 in each. Finns with all the other possible cost draws earn, in this price 
interval, zero profits. Taking the expectation over the eight possible 
combinations leads to the above expression.
In the second interval (assuming we are in the case p < \ - p , i.e., 
/?< 1 /2 6) firms active in both industries are those with cost draws 
(c, ,c2) = (0,0) or (p,p). In each market the former have profits p 1 /4 , the latter 
p 1 1 A -  p. Firms active in one market only are those with cost draws 
(ci ,c2) = (0,1),(1,0),(a 0 )  or (®,p)- In the first two cases they have profits equal 
to p 2 /4 , in the second two, p 21A-p .  In all the other cases firms would earn 
zero profits. A straightforward computation of expected profits leads to the 
above expression.
Expected profits in the third zone are computed in a similar way7. Now, 
E(n\p)  is monotonically increasing in p . As long as E(n\p)> M ,  firms enter
the market. Entry reduces market price, thus decreasing expected profits o f 
entering firms, until E ( t\ p ) = M  (as stated in condition 1 above). We can now
solve for the equilibrium {n*T,n ,p*) in terms of the exogenous parameters M  
and p  by substituting for E{v\p)  in the equilibrium conditions. There are four 
different cases depending on the values of M  and p  (here the two cases p<  1/2 
and p>  1 /2  have been split).
Case (i): M  < m i n ( — — —)
2 2
* 4^ 2v2M  * i * «n = --------= = —  p  = 2 v 2 M  nT -  &n
yf2M
Case (ii): M <  P<^ ~P
n =  ■.— - - 2 p* -  J A M + 2p n* -  2n*
i jAM + 2p
Case(iii):-?—- < M < —p ~ — 1 - p < p
2 2 2
The case p >  1 /2  is treated in the same way.
Details of the computations will be found in Appendix 1.
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n - 2 A
+ 2 ( \ - p )
-2 p '  = yl4M + 2 ( l - p )  nT =2n
Case (iv): max(— p - —, 1 - —p)< M  < 1 
2 2 2
n =
i
-2
- M  + -  
3 3
* 4 •wT = —n
To illustrate the derivation of these results, we outline the calculations for case
(i). The two equilibrium conditions, E(7^p) = M  and S = D, can be now solved
explicitly:
E(*\p) = ^ P 2 = M  
2 A
Solving for p* and n leads to the above expressions. nT is determined by 
computing the fraction of firms which will not produce. We can also substitute 
the value of p  in terms of the exogenous parameter M  into the condition 
( p 2 / 4) < min ( p , l - p ) .
We now turn to the performance o f firms, by considering the profits of 
active firms, conditional on being diversified or non diversified.
Specifically, we compare expected profits conditional on being active in 
both markets, E(7^cx < p] / 4,c2 </?* / 4), with expected profits conditional on 
being active in one market only, E(n\c{ < p f  /4 ,cy > p)  /4 )8. In what follows we 
shall simply denote the former by £(/r|l& 2), and the latter by E(n\i).
In order to make an appropriate comparison, we should either compare 
the total profits of a diversified firm with the sum o f the profits o f two 
specialised firms (active in different industries), each o f size equal to the 
corresponding product line of the diversified firm, or compare the ratio (total 
profits/total sales revenue) of a diversified and a specialised firm. However, in
8 Pj are the respective equilibrium prices.
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our model the size of each product line, both for specialised and diversified 
firms, is always p l l .  It is therefore irrelevant whether we compare profits per 
industry, profits/sales ratios or the sum of the profits of each product line. In 
what follows we compare the first variable.
To ease exposition, all derivations have been placed in the Appendix. 
Here we merely state the results. We again distinguish several cases, depending 
on the parameters o f the model.
2
Case (i) min (p, 1 -  p) > —
4
This case corresponds to a situation in which the observed equilibrium price is
so low that only very efficient firms are active. Here, both specialised and
2
diversified firms have the same expected profits, £ ( ;r1|l& 2) = = £ (;r ,|l) .
This case arises when the entry cost M is very low (M  < p /2 , ( l - p ) /2 ) .  This 
drives the equilibrium price down and allows only the most efficient firms to 
survive.
2
C ase(ii) 1 -  p  > —  > p  
4
This case corresponds to a higher level of equilibrium price than case (i), with a 
very low correlation factor. Only firms with a low market specific cost draw 
(v, = 0) are able to survive (as their total costs will be at most p), and this
creates a ’symmetry' between diversified and non diversified firms, such that 
£ ( ;r1|l&2) = E ( n x |l).
2
C ase(iii) p >  — > l - p  
4
This case differs from the previous one only in the presence o f a high 
correlation factor. In this case all firms will be active in both markets. Only 
firms with a 'good' common cost draw (v12 = 0) will be able to survive, as v12 = 1 
would imply cltc2 > p > p ,  but having a 'low' common cost draw and high
correlation implies being able to survive in both markets (as costs on each 
market will be smaller than 1 -  p  < p).
2
Case (iv) 1 > —  > max(p,l -  p)
4
We turn now to the most interesting case: the observed equilibrium price is high 
enough that many firms, with different cost draws, will enter. In this case the
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price is sufficiently high to allow all the firms, except those with cost draw = 1, 
to survive on the market. We have:
£ (* |l& 2 ) = ^ -  + ± p - |
£ (* i | =
so that:
£(/r|l& 2) > E{7tx\\) if p>  1/3
£(;r|l& 2) < £ (^ , |l )  if /?< 1/3
This is the most interesting case for our purposes: if  the price is sufficiently 
high, (which will be the case, whenever M  is large enough, i.e., M  > 1 -  3 / 2p)  
diversified firms are more profitable only if  the cost correlation is high enough. 
When it falls below 1/3, i.e. when markets are not very 'close’, diversified firms 
are less efficient on average than specialised firms.
An intuitive interpretation of the results is as follows. When we observe 
that a firm is specialised, this raises the probability that its common cost draw9 
is 'bad' (if it were good the firm would have entered both markets). However, 
the fact that the firm is active in one market implies that the market specific 
share of the cost must have been relatively good. Accordingly, diversified firms 
must have a good common cost draw: this allows them to enter the market even 
if  the market specific cost component is high.
If the correlation between the two industries is high, this synergy 
generates better average performance for diversified firms. However, if  the 
industries do not have too much in common, the "good management" effect 
does not have a substantial effect on costs and profitability and diversified firms 
are less profitable than specialised ones.
Notice that it is not diversification per se which negatively affects firms' 
performance. Rather, being diversified is simply correlated with relative 
inefficiency.
The discreteness in our example makes it somewhat difficult to 
characterise the necessary conditions for the result. We therefore turn now to a
We shall imagine, in the following, that the common cost draws depend on managerial skills, 
so that if Vj2 = 0 we say the firm 'has a good management', and if v12 = 1 then 'it has a bad 
management'.
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continuous distribution function, by reference to which we can give a complete 
characterisation of the properties o f the cost functions and the correlation 
factors which generate the outcome.
5. A General Characterisation
The result in the above example, that diversified firms may be less 
profitable, relies on a particular relation between the parameters M  and p.  
First, the correlation p  must be relatively low, so that efficiency is mainly 
affected by the firm specific element in the cost draw. Second, the distribution 
function of that cost element must be 'very steep’ at some point (in fact, at the 
point corresponding to the equilibrium market price). This last characteristic 
will favour the entry of a large number o f relatively inefficient diversified firms 
(i.e. those with a high firm specific cost element) since they can exploit a lower 
value of the common cost element, which 'just' compensates for the high 
realisation of the firm specific cost element.
In this section we show that, if  the distribution o f the firm specific cost 
factor has sufficient mass at some point, equilibrium configurations exist where 
a large number of diversified firms with high market specific cost draws enter 
the market.
This effect dominates the positive influence of the synergies when these 
are not too strong, i.e., when the correlation factor is sufficiently small.
In the remainder of this section we shall show that these two features are 
in fact necessary and sufficient to make diversified firms less profitable than 
single product firms.
To fix ideas, consider the random variables v7,v2,v72, with continuous
density functions (resP- distribution functions FX1F2,FX2) and support
[0,l ]10, and define as before:
C j  = (J -p j fv j+ pvJ2 
c2 = ( l - p j v 2 +pv12
Proposition: There exists a p  and an equilibrium price p ,  such that for all
p< p: E(cj\cj < p,c2 < p)>  E ( cj\cj < p,c2 > p ) 11
The result would go through with any support.
11 Here we are comparing the expected cost in industry 1 for diversified firms with the expected 
cost for firms specialized in industry 1. The same applies for the expected cost in industry 2.
59
(where p  -  -y- ), if  and only if  there exists x  e[0, l] such that the 
following condition is satisfied:
X X
J / , O',)dvt < /,(* )  J (x -V ,) / , (v,)dv,
0 0
Intuitively, this condition requires that the density o f the market specific cost 
component is sharply peaked at some point. This is satisfied, for example, in the 
case o f a continuous distribution on [0,l] with f ( v ) - *  oo as v —»1. It is not
satisfied, for example, by uniform distributions.
The proof of the proposition is set out in Appendix 2.
It may be helpful to note here that this proposition is couched in terms of 
the equilibrium market price p ,  and not in terms of M .  It is easy to show, 
however that p  is a ’possible’ equilibrium price, depending on the value of the 
entry cost M . To see this, notice that E ( ^ p )  is a continuous increasing function
o f the equilibrium price:
and p  is a continuous decreasing function of n (the number o f active firms):
The entry of firms on the market will therefore generate a reduction in expected 
profits. At equilibrium,
E(AP)= ) / ( CI ) ^ Cl + J ( 4 - “ C2 ) / ( C2 ) * 2
A  *  A  *0 ^ 0
E[x(p{n))\ = M
so that it is possible to solve for equilibrium values of n and p  \
n = n \ M )  n <  0
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p* = p* (M)  p* >0
It is therefore always possible to find a value of the entry sunk costs that 
generates an equilibrium price p.
6. The "Economies of Scope" Model
We turn now to the possibility that diversification is driven by 
economies of scope. This implies that if  a firm produces two 'related' goods, the 
total cost of producing them jointly is lower than the sum of the costs of 
producing them separately. This possibility is usually attributed to the presence 
o f shared inputs, which are imperfectly divisible (so that manufacturing a subset 
o f the output leaves excess capacity), or of human or physical capital which is a 
public input12.
If economies of scope exist, we would intuitively expect (and in fact this 
is the common presumption in the literature) that diversified firms, being those 
which benefit from this possibility, perform better on average. We shall see 
below that this might not be so. We shall illustrate this possibility by means of a 
simple example in the spirit of section 4.
The assumptions are identical to those of the first model, except for the 
determination of the fixed element in the cost function. Assume that the total 
fixed cost for firm j  is given by:
c J = vj if it is only active in industry i
c j  = V j + V 2 - S  if it is active in both industries
where s represents the proportion of the fixed costs which can be 'shared' 
between the two products and where v,,v2 are discrete i.i.d. random variables, 
viz.
v, =«
1 withprobab. 1 / 3
2 with probab. 1 / 3
3 withprobab. 1 / 3
See Panzar and Willig (1981).
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(with s < 1) so that the random variable c will be distributed as: 
v, v2 c = v,+v2- 5  probability
1 1 2 - 5 1/9
1 2 3 -5 1/9
1 3 4 - 5 1/9
2 1 3 - 5 1/9
2 2 4 - 5 1/9
2 3 5 -5 1/9
3 1 4 - 5 1/9
3 2 5 -5 1/9
3 3 6 - 5 1/9
When there are economies of scope, the entry decisions for the two 
markets are not independent (as was instead the case with correlated costs). The 
'entry criterion' for a firm will involve a comparison of the profits that can be 
achieved by entering only one market with those that can be achieved by 
entering both markets.
A firm will enter only one market if the expected profits in that market 
are positive but smaller than those that could be earned entering two industries 
and thereby benefiting from the economies o f scope.
We shall again have several cases depending on the value of the 
equilibrium price13 (see the Appendix for the derivation of results).
(a) — > 3 - s  
v '  4
This corresponds to the case of a high market equilibrium price. This allows all 
firms entering the market to diversify. I.e. prices are so high that even the less 
efficient firms can survive in both markets.
We shall simply assume here that the number of firms is given exogenously and this 
determines equilibrium prices.
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(b) 3 - s >  —  >2 
v 7 4
In this case the equilibrium price is slightly lower than in case (a). Diversified 
firms have an average cost per industry equal to (3-s)/2, while undiversified 
firms have on average cost equal to 3/2.
This means that diversified firms are more profitable. This case holds if  the 
equilibrium price is high, and relatively inefficient firms can enter the market. 
Diversified firms will then enjoy the advantage of the economies of scope.
2
(c) 2 > —  > 2 - s
4
If the price is lower than in the previous cases, specialised firms need to be very 
efficient in order to survive (specialised firms will be those with a very good 
cost draw in one market and a veiy bad cost draw in the other, so that the cost 
reduction generated by the economies of scope are not sufficient to compensate 
for the losses in the market where they are less efficient), while those entering 
both markets can exploit the economies of scope. However these economies 
only allow the firms to survive in the markets and do not compensate for the 
relative inefficiency with respect to undiversified firms. Diversified firms have 
an average cost in each industry equal to (3-s)/2, while specialised have costs 
equal to 1. In this interval, specialised firms are more profitable.
(d) 2 - —> —  > 2 - s
2 4
In this case an equilibrium price lower than in the previous cases eliminates 
some o f the inefficient diversified firms. Diversified firms have average costs 
per industry equal to (8-3s)/6 while specialised firms have, on average, costs 
equal to 1. Diversified firms are more profitable if  s > 2/3, i.e., if  economies of 
scope are 'important'. If  the economies of scope are sufficiently high, this will 
induce a higher average profitability for the diversified firms.
2
(e) 2 -  j  > —  > 1 
v 7 4
This is the extreme case of (d): if  the price is extremely low, only highly 
efficient firms manage to survive, whether they diversify or not. Diversified 
firms however enjoy a cost reduction.
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Diversified firms have an average cost in each industry equal to l-s/2. Hence 
they are more profitable than specialised firms, whose average costs equals 1.
2
(f) 1 > £ - > 1 - -  
4 2
In this case the equilibrium price is even lower than in case (e). Only 
diversified firms (the most efficient ones) enter.
Here, the result that diversified firms are not more profitable than 
specialised firms is driven by the possibility, for those entering both markets, o f 
achieving a cost reduction through economies o f scope which allows even 
relatively inefficient firms to survive. Undiversified firms on the other hand are 
those with a very high efficiency level in one industry, and a very poor one in 
the other, so that the cost reduction does not compensate for the difference in 
costs.
7. Conclusions
Empirical studies that find a negative relationship between 
diversification and profitability do not necessarily imply that diversification has 
a negative impact on profitability.
We have shown that such econometric results may be explained either in 
terms o f a bias in the estimation of the relationship, due to the omission of 
variables affecting efficiency, or in terms of selection bias: diversified firms 
may be very inefficient and able to survive only due to the exploitation o f 
synergies.
More generally, it is not surprising that no very clear or consistent result 
emerges from the econometric literature. In spite o f the commonly adduced 
arguments as to why a positive relationship should be expected here, an 
examination of some simple models suggests that there is no robust theoretical 
basis for any such relationship.
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Appendix 1
(i) Cost correlation
Entry patterns for each price range:
Cost combinations Price ranges
vi V2 V12 c. C2 p j - p > p l - p > p > p p > p > l - p p >  p tl - p
1) 0 0 0 0 0 1&2 1&2 1&2 1&2
2) 0 0 1 p p - 1&2 - 1&2
3) 0 1 0 0 1 - p 1 1 1&2 1&2
4) 0 1 1 p 1 - 1 - 1
5) 1 0 0 1 - p 0 2 2 1&2 1&2
6) 1 0 1 1 p - 2 - 2
7) 1 1 0 1 - p 1 - p - - 1&2 1&2
8) 1 1 1 1 1 - - - -
The symbol (-) means that firms with the indicated cost combinations do not enter any 
market; 1&2 that they enter both markets etc.
2
An example of comparison between profits: the parameter range —  > p , \ - p
4
(a) We first look at specialised firms: these will be firms with the cost 
combinations 4) and 6), i.e.:
- firms with v, = 0,v2 = l,v12 = 1 (they enter only industry 1)
- firms with v, = l,v2 = 0,v12 = 1 (they enter only industry 2)
These firms have a "bad" common cost draw v12 = 1 , and a "good" cost draw in 
one industry only. Average costs per industry, £(c,|l) = £*(0212), are p.
(b) We now look at diversified firms. These are firms with cost draws as in 1), 
2), 3), 5), 7), i.e.:
- firms with v, = 0,v2 = 0,v]2 = 0
- firms with v, = 0,v2 = 0,v12 = 1
- firms with v, = 0,v2 = l,v12 = 0
- firms with v, = l,v2 = 0, v12 = 0
- firms with v, = l,v2 = l,v12 = 0
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These firms have on average a "good" common cost draw (except in one case,
2), where firms have very good values of both independent cost draws), which 
allows entry even with high market specific draws. Average costs per industry 
are £ (c,|l + 2) = £(c2|l+2) = (2 -p ) /5 .
2
(c) The comparison is then between E (r i lor2)  = —— p  and
4
£(;r|l + 2 ) _ p 2 2 - p
2 “  4 5
(ii) Economies of scope
When there are economies of scope, the entry decisions for the two markets are 
not independent: the "entry criterion" involves a comparison of profits that can 
be achieved by entering only one market with those that can be achieved by 
entering both.
(1) Firms enter only industry 1 if:
£■— v, >o
4 1
and
Pl-V, + ( v , + v 2 - i )
4 4
i.e., if  profits in industry 1 are positive and higher than those that can be 
achieved by entering both markets.
(2) Firms enter only industry 2 if  the equivalent condition holds, with the 
subscript interchanged.
(3) Firms enter both industries if:
;7 "  + T " ~ ( Vl +v2 - s ) >0  ~ r  + ~T— (V1 +V2 “ •*) > raax( ' ~ - vl»“ ' - v2)4 4 4 4 4 4
i.e., i f  profits are positive and higher than those that can be achieved by entering 
one market only.
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A profit comparison: the case 3 -  s> —  > 2:
4
V, v 2 c
1 1 1 2-5
2 1 2 3-5
3 1 3 4-5
4 2 1 3-5
5 2 2 4-5
6 2 3 5-5
7 3 1 4-5
8 3 2 5-5
9 3 3 6-5
We first identify firms which pass the "enter both" criterion: these are firms in 
groups 1), 2), 4), 5). Their costs are (2-s), (3-s), (3-s) and (4-s). Average costs 
per industry are (3-s)/2.
Firms in groups 3) and 6) pass the "enter only industry 1" criterion. Their costs 
are 1, 2 (on average 3/2).
Firms in groups 7) and 8) pass the "enter only industry 2" criterion. Their
2 ^
average costs are 3/2. The comparison is therefore between E (jr|l or 2) = -  -
and E(n\l + 2) = ^ - -
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Appendix 2
Proof of proposition 1.
The proof proceeds in three steps:
(i) We first show that for c7 = ( 1 - p)vj+pvj , E(cj\cj < p,v12 = w)  is a
decreasing function of w under the assumption o f the proposition. I.e., the 
lower is the realisation of the common part o f the costs, the higher is the 
expected value of the cost c7.
Observe that:
E(cj\cj < p,v]2 = w )  =
= (l-p)E(Vj\vj < P- ) + pw = 
1 - P
p -p w
1-p
\v ,f,(v ,)d v ,
= (J ~ P ) ~ h z ---------+ P"p - p w
Differentiating with respect to w gives:
p -p w
p - p w p —pw  
1 -p
P-P™
1 -p
\ - E-S x ( t r £!L) \  f x ( \ ^ h ( Lr £ L )  Jv,/,rv1M ’1 1 - P  1 - p  J 1 - p  % + 1
For p - x  the assumption, by continuity, implies that, for every w 
if  p  is chosen small enough
&  ^  
—  < 0
d#
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On the other hand if  the assumption is not satisfied, it is always the case 
that
dE 
—  > 0  
d#
(ii) we now integrate over the common cost factor. Here we use the fact that:
Pr(vl2 < w\(l -  p)v2 + pvl2 <p)> Pr(vn  < w\(\ -  p)v2 + pvn  > p )
Vw e[0,l]
This can be established by showing that, for independent x and y,
Pr((x < xjfic +y <z)> Pr((x < x)fic +y  > z)
which, by standard properties of conditional probabilities, is equivalent to
Pr(x < x,x +y  < z) Pr(x < x,x +y > z)
P r ( x + y < z )  P r ( x + y > z )
This inequality holds if
Pr(x <x,x + y< z )> P r (x < x )P r (x  + y  <z)
which holds trivially for z  < x. If jc < z  we rewrite the last inequality as
\Fy(z -  t) fx(l)dt > } f x( t )d t]Fy(z -  l ) fx(t)dt
0 0 0
that is
E(Fy(z-xJ^x  < x) > E(Fy( z - x ) \ x  < z)Pr(x < z) 
which is obviously true.
(iii) We can now proceed to the comparison o f the two expectations:
E(cj\div.) -  E(Cj\undiv.) =
= Efc,\c, <p,c2 < p ) -  E(Cj\c, < p,c2 > p )  =
1
= jE(c,\c, < p,vI2 = w \ f ( v \ c 2 < p ) - / ( w \ c 2 > p)\tw  =
0
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J
= 0 -  J — (CjIc; < p,vn  = w ^ F (w \c 2 < p ) - F ( w\c2 > p jp w  > 0 
as:
gE(i) implies —  < 0  and
d*>
(ii) implies [F(w\c2 < p ) ~  F(w\c2 > p)] > 0 Vw
Since a violation of the assumption implies cE /  dw > 0 , we also obtain the 
necessary part of the proposition.
q.e.d.
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A bstract
The paper addresses the question of the effects o f diversification strategies on 
firms' profitability. Empirical analyses do not seem to confirm the hypothesis 
that diversification is the optimal response to the presence of synergies and 
hence generates higher profits. It is shown that this might be either the effect of 
distortions due to the omission of some other factors which affect the efficiency 
o f firms, or the result of selection bias. Diversified firms, in fact, may be the 
less efficient firms, just able to survive due to the synergies they achieve 
diversifying.
Chapter 3
Diversification Patterns in the Food Industry: 
U.K. and Italy
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1. Introduction
In this chapter we introduce an empirical approach to the analysis of 
diversification, and in particular to changes in the pattern of diversification over 
time and across countries.
Most empirical studies on diversification consist o f econometric analyses 
o f the levels of diversification (and these studies face limitations due to 
measurement problems, and to the unavailability o f disaggregated data). They 
assume a priori that patterns of diversification are driven by factors such as 
similarities in R&D intensity, common channels of distribution leading to 
economies o f scope, and so on.
The present study takes a different approach, in that we begin by 
inferring directly from the observed levels and patterns o f diversification, the 
extent to which one industry is, or is not, linked to another.
Our present aim is to analyse whether observed diversification patterns 
are consistent with the hypothesis that diversification within the food sector is 
driven largely by 'technological factors' (which we shall represent as 'correlation 
o f costs' and 'economies of scope'). The analysis is based on a comparison of 
diversification patterns and levels across two countries (U.K. and Italy) in two 
different time periods (1962 and 1986).
The question we want to address is whether these patterns have changed 
over time, and are different across countries, or whether they are fairly stable 
(so that any differences we observe can be explained in terms of differences in 
the overall level of diversification, in the food sector, and differences in the 
relative size o f the various markets - and so in the relative numbers o f firms 
active in each).
This is done by estimating a model using one dataset and assessing how 
well this model predicts the other datasets.
The analysis is confined to the food and drink sector. The advantages of 
choosing a specific sector are basically that firms are relatively homogeneous 
with regard to the technology of production and distribution and to institutional 
factors which might affect the extent and direction of diversification1.
The differences we observe at first glance between diversification 
patterns in the Italian food and drink sector and those in the British industry 
might easily be attributed to the fact that diversification levels are much lower 
in the Italian industry - the 1986 Italian levels correspond more closely to the
Though we do not specifically address the effects of institutional factors on diversification, 
some institutional issues will be touched on when differences across countries are analysed.
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1962 levels found in the UK, as opposed to the current UK levels, for example. 
Secondly, the relative size of different industries within the Italian food and 
drink sector is very different to the distribution found in the UK - and again, 
this might account for much of the difference. The key issue we address here is 
whether the observed patterns of diversification found in the Italian food and 
drink sector are consistent with the same underlying model (parameters) as is 
driving the UK diversification matrix, or not.
The first novel aspect of the present approach is that it uses a dataset 
which is highly disaggregated. This has been built up using the Kompass trade 
directories. The price we pay for this, is that the present dataset is only 
’qualitative', i.e., we know the industries in which firm x operates in great detail, 
but we cannot distinguish the primary and secondary activities o f the firms, nor 
do we know their relative weight, i.e., the total sales in industry j  o f a firm also 
operating in industry i.
The second novelty concerns the approach taken to the concept of 
'industry relatedness', which, instead of being assumed as an explanatory factor 
underlying diversification, is deduced directly from the observed levels of 
diversification.
Finally we use a simulation, based on the model developed in chapter 2, 
as an indirect way of testing the hypothesis that diversification is driven by 
attempts to exploit economies of scope or cost correlations.
2. The Data Sets
2.1 The Food and Drink Industry: Preliminary Remarks
The food and drink sector is here approximately identified with sectors 
41 and 42 of the NACE classification.
It is a mature sector, not highly affected by cyclical factors, and has 
relatively stable profit margins. The production technology is characterised by a 
low level of R&D investments, together with a high level o f advertising 
intensity2 (which varies widely across products).
Market structures are different across countries3: the English food and 
drink industry is the most concentrated in Europe. In 1977 there were 5600 
firms, and the top 30 accounted for 3/5 of employment and value added4.
2 See Sutton (1991).
3 See Sutton for a detailed description.
4 See Bums et al. (1983).
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Employment in 1980 was 506,000 (7.6% of total manufacturing), and 44.4% 
was concentrated in firms with more than 10,000 employees. Concentration 
varies across segments but is generally very high.
On the other side the food and drink industry in Italy is extremely 
fragmented. In 1971 only 13.7% of total employment was in firms with more 
than 2000 employees (as compared to 65.5% in U.K. in 1977) and in 1981 
15.2% was in firms with more than 1000 employees (as compared to 72.2% in 
the U.K.)5. Concentration differs widely across sectors: both in Italy and in the 
U.K., the salt, sugar, canned vegetables, margarine, ready to eat cereals, and 
baby food industries are highly concentrated, while among other industries 
there are some substantial differences in concentration levels.
On average, however, the Italian industries tend to be less highly 
concentrated than the corresponding U.K. industries.
The two countries also differ in regard to the relationship with the 
distribution sector: in the U.K., the distribution sector is highly concentrated; 
while in Italy it remains fragmented (though it is becoming less so over time).
Finally it is worth noting that, given the complete absence of antitrust 
intervention in Italy until the end of 1990, we would expect, a priori, to find a 
greater degree of intra-industry acquisitions in the Italian case, and so a lesser 
tendency for diversification to be used as a vehicle for growth.
2.2 Datasets
The basic dataset for the study was built up using the Kompass Trade 
Directories for the United Kingdom (1962 and 1986 editions) and for Italy 
(1986 edition)6.
Kompass directories are not official Census publications and are not 
fully comprehensive (so that results derived from this analysis will have to be 
evaluated with care), but they offer an almost complete list o f the companies 
operating in various sectors, and, for each firm, they provide a very detailed list 
o f its product range. For the 'food and drink' sector Kompass has a basic 
classification which includes 65 product categories in the 1986 directory, for 
example. Within each category, a list of about 20-30 products is specified.
In Appendix 1, two Kompass tables are included to illustrate the level o f 
detail they offer. The allocation of individual products to categories in the
21% of employment in 1977 and 22.8% in 1981 was in firms with less than 6 employees 
(Censimento dell'Industria 1971,1981).
6 The directory for the year 1986 was the most recent available at the beginning of the data 
collection, while 1962 corresponds to the first edition of the Kompass Trade Directories.
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Kompass directory reflects, at some point, presentational convenience. 
However, the level o f detail is approximately at the level o f the U.S. 7-digit SIC 
classification. A lengthy process of data analysis was performed with a view to 
collapsing Kompass entries into sets of industries in some way comparable to a 
4-digit SIC classification, identical for the U.K. and Italy. However, the 
availability o f the detailed Kompass classification made it possible to create 
product categories which could be defined in a manner more suitable to the 
present analysis, and more reflective o f demand patterns7. This procedure led to 
a set o f 60 product categories, listed in Appendix 1. Having defined a product 
list which suited the analysis, we reconstructed the Kompass matrices 
associating with each firm a list of (newly classified) products. The number of 
firms in each dataset is as follows: 636 in the U.K. 1962 dataset, 889 in the 
U.K. 1986 dataset, and 1378 in the Italian 1986 dataset.
Hence we obtained three matrices o f size (636, 60), (889, 60), (1378, 
60), which associated each firm to its product range.
The main limitation of these datasets is that we do not have information 
on the relative weight of each production line for each firm. Diversification 
indices will be based on counts of products. Moreover, since for the Italian case 
it is not possible to identify inter-firm linkages (ownership patterns), our 
analysis deals only with diversification through internal expansion rather than 
by acquisition8.
From the matrix of the production ranges o f the companies, a
’diversification matrix' was generated: this is a square matrix D=(60 X 60) 
whose generic element dtJ represents the number o f firms active both in sector i
and j  (the diagonal element dH is then the total number o f firms active in sector 
0-
2.3. A Preliminary Analysis
In order to compare the matrices, the first preliminary analysis consisted 
o f 'grouping' the 60 product categories into 'clusters' o f products which are 
related in the following sense: if  a high percentage o f firms active in one 
industry is also active in the other, the two industries are considered linked, and 
are grouped together. The idea is to check whether the same sort o f groups arise 
in all the datasets, and then to analyse in detail possible differences, i.e., we
As opposed to SIC classifications which are in most cases based on a commonality of 
production techniques.
8 Unfortunately this means that we cannot account for diversification strategies that are decided 
at the parent company level rather than at the individual firm level.
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first check whether the same industries are related in the above sense, and
secondly to what degree are they related in the different datasets.
From the diversification matrix D we first constructed a second matrix,
labelled P, by dividing each row by the diagonal element; the result is again a 
(60 X 60) matrix whose generic element ptj represents (loosely speaking) the
'probability* that a firm producing in sector i is also active in sector j  (the 
diagonal elements plt equal 1). Note that the matrices P are not symmetric 
(while the D matrices are).
Product categories are then grouped so that all the product categories
within a cluster are related through some chain o f pairwise linkages, i.e., for 
any pair (ij), either ptj is large, or there are some other products within the
group, such that pik,pkl,...,pn,p,i are all large.
1 2 3
1 0 0.8 0
2 0 0 0.9
3 0.7 0 0
Fig. 3.1- A possible group configuration
Note that not all pairwise links within a group need be large. A simple 
algorithm was used for this purpose, which *block diagonalizes' the 
diversification matrix P. The procedure is best explained using a numerical 
example.
Suppose the matrix P is:
1 2 3 4 5
1 1 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.2
2 0.2 1 0.3 0.5 0.4
3 0.3 0.6 1 0.2 0.1
4 0.6 0.2 0.3 1 0.2
5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 1
Firstly the maximum off-diagonal element is identified (i.e., the highest 
probability of diversification from one product category i into another j): in the 
example this is p n =0.8. Sectors i and j  are then grouped into one cluster (ij), 
which represents a new element in the matrix. This is carried out by re-ordering 
the industries so as to begin with the 'first cluster' i.e. (1, 3) and then the 
remaining industries are listed in the original order, i.e., 2,4,5 etc.:
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1 3 2 4 5
1 1 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.2
3 0.3 1 0.6 0.2 0.1
2 0.2 0.3 1 0.5 0.4
4 0.6 0.3 0.2 1 0.2
5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.5 1
Again the maximum off-diagonal element is identified (i.e., the maximum 
element not lying in the diagonal block, in the example p52 =0.7); this will 
determine a new group:
1 3 2 5 4
1 1 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.1
3 0.3 1 0.6 0.1 0.2
2 0.2 0.3 1 0.4 0.5
5 0.4 0.5 0.7 1 0.5
4 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 1
Note that there are no 'natural' or statistical criteria which can be applied to 
indicate where to stop the procedure, i.e., for which value a  o f the 
diversification ‘probability’ the grouping procedure should end. This cut-off 
value is arbitrary9. We have therefore adopted the following approach: we first 
compared the results of the grouping procedure for the datasets UK62 and 
UK86, for different 'cut-off values'. Using as a minimum diversification 
probability the value a - 0.9, 6 groups are formed in UK62 and only 3 in 
UK86. Only two of the groups are common to both. Lowering the value of a  
increases both the total number of groups formed and the number o f groups 
common to both datasets. For a level o f a =0.7 there are 11 groups in UK62 
and 9 in UK86. Moreover the algorithm generates a grouping which is 
approximately similar for both matrices (7 of the groups are in common).
As we aim to identify the closely related product groups which will 
usually emerge from any dataset for the food industry (i.e. over countries and 
time periods), we also compare the groupings with those for the Italian dataset. 
Again there is a close similarity between the groups which appear in the UK
This is a problem which is shared with most of the standard cluster procedures. The approach 
used here resembles the cluster method using the minimum distance between groups as a criterion to 
join elements.
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and Italian datasets: 4 of the 11 groups in UK62 also arise in the Italian data, 
while 6 o f the 9 groups in UK86 also appear in Italy.
We conclude very tentatively, that the groups observed at this level 
probably correspond to underlying 'technological' similarities10, which hold 
good both across countries and across time (we shall try to confirm this 
preliminary conclusion in the section which follows).
If, on the other hand, we set the 'cut-off value' at a level below 0.7, we 
find less sharp differences, and the groupings become less obvious (see 
Appendix 1 for the results of the grouping procedure for different values o f a)  
and it becomes more difficult to define them in such a way as to make them 
comparable across countries and time.
The groups identified through the procedure are therefore:
1) the DAIRY group, including: 
milk and yoghurt industry 
condensed and dried milk industry 
cheese industry
2) the SOFT DRINKS group, including: 
vegetable and fruit juices industry 
soft drinks industry
mineral water industry
3) the JAM  group, including: 
jam  industry
preserves industry
4) the BISCUIT group, including: 
biscuit industry
crackers industry
5) the CHOCOLATE group, including: 
chocolate confectionery industry 
cocoa industry
6) the BAKERY group, including: 
bread industry
10 I.e., related to production processes.
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cakes and pastries industry
7) the PROCESSED FRUIT AND VEGETABLES group, including: 
processed fruit industry
canned fruit industry 
processed vegetables industry 
canned vegetables industry
8) the FLOUR AND CEREALS group, including: 
ready to eat cereals industry
other cereals industry 
flour industry 
special flours industry 
processed rice industry
9) the FATS group, including: 
margarine industry 
edible oils industry
10) the SUGAR group, including: 
sugar industry
sugar allied products industry
11) the FROZEN FOOD group, including: 
frozen food industry
processed fish industry
12) the CONDIMENTS group, including: 
vinegar, condiments, sauces industry 
processed spices and herbs industry
13) the ANIMAL FEED group, including: 
pet food industry
animal feed industry
14) the PROCESSED M EAT group, including 
meat processing industry
poultry industry
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15) the TEA COFFEE group, including: 
tea industry 
coffee industry
All the other industries do not appear strongly related to any other".
The groups obtained through this procedure seem acceptable, and even 
rather 'obvious' (but in fact, they are not exactly the same across the three 
datasets): this is reassuring, given the arbitrary elements in the approach. They 
are however useful for our objective, viz., to analyse differences across the 
datasets. From this preliminary analysis two lines have been followed.
2.4 A Log-Linear Analysis?
One way of both testing the 'group' structure and examining 'intra-group 
structure' is to use a log linear model. This is a convenient 'standard' technique 
to analyse relationships among categorical variables where data are organised in 
contingency tables.
For any multiway table there are a number of possible hypothesis about 
these relationships (that all the variables are independent, that each pair of 
variable is associated but the association is independent o f other variables etc.). 
In the log-linear analysis these hypotheses are specified by models fitted to the 
cell frequencies which are decomposed into a number of multiplicative 
components. By taking the logarithm of the cell frequency the components of 
the model are made linear (Payne, 1977).
A very simple example of the kind of problems to which log-linear 
models can be applied, would be the following. Suppose we want to assess 
whether voting choices are independent o f sex (race, culture etc.). The variables 
are "voting choice" (suppose there are only two parties, Conservatives and
11 Some comments on the results of the procedure (all the tables are presented in Appendix 1): 
In UK62 industries appear more 'strongly related' than in the other two cases: some groups in fact 
emerge for relatively low values of the 'stopping point'. When a  — 0.9 , 6 groups are formed in UK62 
(including 16 industries) while in UK86 and IT86 only 3 arise (with 7 industries each). When 
a  = 0.8, 10 groups are formed in UK62 (24 industries) while the corresponding number for UK86 
and IT86 are 5 and 7. Groupings become closer only for a  =  0.7 .
Concerning the groups that are formed: the dairy group emerges for all datasets, the soft drink 
industry is a group in the UK but is not so evident in Italy (fruit juices and mineral water are not 
strongly linked). The bread & cakes and the biscuit & crackers groups are more clearly identified in 
the UK, while in Italy only the first two are strongly linked. The fruit & vegetable group is one group 
in the UK but is a two group sector in Italy, while flour & cereal is a single group in the UK but not in 
Italy.
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Progressives) and sex (male, female). A contingency table o f size (2X2) can be 
constructed:
Voting
 (
Sex
C P
M «.l «12
F n2\ n22 A
A  A
where / ,  , / 2 are the sex variable "marginals", / , , / 2 are the voting variable 
"marginals".
Suppose the two variables are independent. Define P(V  = i) and 
P(S = j )  to be the probabilities that the Voting variable is at level i (C or P) 
and the Sex variable at level j  (M or F). Assuming independence and given that 
marginals are fixed, the probability that an observation will fall in cell (ij) is:
P =P(V = i) .P (S  = j )  =
J n n
Under the assumption that the model is correct, the expected frequencies are 
given by:
F. = — •— •«y n n
Taking the logarithm we obtain: 
logFtj = lo g /, + lo g /, -logw
It is possible to show that the equation can be reformulated as a log-linear 
model:
logFff = ^  + ^ ( 0  + ^ 0* )
where A is the overall mean of the logarithm o f the expected frequencies, A, is 
the main effect o f the log frequency of being at level i of variable V, and 
similarly for A2. This can be extended to consider a term for the two-way effect 
between the two variables, An (ij). The aim is to find the model which best fits 
the data, having taken account of sampling variability in the cell frequencies. A 
range of models have to be fitted, where some or none o f the A terms are set to 
zero, in order to choose among them using a test for the goodness of fit, based 
on the comparison of the observed log frequencies with those fitted under the 
particular model12.
With three or more variables all possible links (two and three way) have to be considered. 
Tests are either statistics or the likelihood ratio chi-square test.
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Active Non Active
Active nu w,2
Non Active «21 n72
In analysing diversification patterns with log-linear models the variables 
are the industries. For each firm the variable can take the value ’active’ or 'non 
active'. A contingency table may be for example:
Cheese
______________
Yoghurt
where: is the number of firms active in both industries
rtn is the number active in yoghurt but not in cheese 
«2,is the number active in cheese but not in yoghurt 
n22 is the number not active in either industries13.
The case of three, four, etc. variables is treated in a similar way.
Since computational limitations do not allow to apply the procedure to 
the whole (60X60) matrices, we limited the analysis to the previously identified 
groupings.
Results of the analysis are presented in Appendix 2. They approximately 
confirm the patterns found in the previous section but allow us to evaluate them 
in a statistically significant way and to uncover more complex links. Hence log- 
linear analysis has proven to be a rather powerful instrument to uncover 
complex links in categorical data. It may be a sufficient method o f analysis if  
we only aim at distinguishing between cases where significant links exist and 
cases where no link emerges. When a more precise comparison is needed, log- 
linear analysis may be a reasonable starting point that allows to exclude non 
relevant links.
However there are at least two reasons why we decided in favour of an 
alternative approach. The first is a ’statistical' issue, which strongly affects 
results. The second relates to an interpretation question.
In our log-linear analysis, the product choice14 is unconditional rather 
than conditional on being already in a certain group of industries15. In the above 
example matrix, the question is the definition of n^,  the number o f firms not 
active in either cheese or yoghurt. It seemed reasonable to define as (total 
number of firms in the food industry - number of firms active at least in one of
13 See Appendix 2 for the problems in defining .
14 In which industry to operate.
15 See the Appendix for details.
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the two industries). However this is to some extent arbitrary16. The problem is 
that this choice strongly affect the results in terms of significance o f interaction 
parameters. Given the absence of a reference model for this choice, the 
interpretation becomes rather shaky.
The second point refers to an interpretation issue. A log-linear model 
uncovers relationships across variables (revealing whether they are independent 
or not), but does not allow to ’’describe” the type of relationship between them. 
This is particularly relevant as we would like to compare these relationships 
across datasets.
It is this dissatisfaction which justifies the approach developed in the 
next section.
3. A Simulation Approach
In what follows, we proceed directly to implement the theoretical models 
developed in Chapter 2. The hypothesis is advanced that, within the food sector, 
diversification can be mainly explained through 'economies o f scope' or 
'correlation across costs'. We try to describe the data through simulations based 
on each of these hypotheses, and then compare them to test whether differences 
across datasets can be attributed only to differences in the distribution o f firms 
across industries and in the levels of diversification, the patterns being 
substantially the same.
In this section we shall advance the hypothesis that diversification within 
the food sector is essentially driven by technological factors, namely correlation 
across costs in different markets17, and economies of scope18 (as introduced in 
the previous section) and that this hypothesis holds across different countries 
and different time periods.
We shall first develop some models which allow us to "describe" 
diversification in a way relevant for comparisons.
We shall fit the data with these models and then compare the models 
which best approximate each dataset, with the aim of testing whether we can 
assume diversification is generated by the same underlying process, or whether 
there are significant differences to be explained. Simulations are used since it is
For example, why not choosing the total number of firms in the economy?
7 By which we refer to the case of managerial skills (or in some cases common inputs, with 
trices moving in the same direction) driving diversification.
8 Which describe cases where some costs can be shared across more than one production line.
extremely difficult to test the theories directly: data on firms' costs are available 
only in a limited number of cases, and are often not separated for different 
production lines.
We first show that the actual diversification patterns are not consistent 
with an underlying random diversification process. Hence, we implement the 
two models developed in chapter 2 (where diversification is driven by the aim 
of exploiting synergies). We perform a simulation which (on the basis o f these 
models) generates diversification matrices with a structure similar to that o f the 
observed ones. The generated matrices are then compared with the actual ones 
in order to select the model which best approximates them. Finally the models 
which best fit each dataset are compared using the parameters o f the model 
which best approximates one dataset (UK62) to predict the others, testing 
whether predictions differ from observed parameters in a significant manner19.
The Underlying Model
The models used for the simulations are based on those developed in 
Chapter 2. Consider one sector of the economy (the food industry). Within this 
sector, we assume that products in each of the industries are homogeneous, and 
demand is given by:
D(p)  = Ai - p i
Firms are price-takers, and have a cost function for each product i:
q=(<7,)2+cf
where ct is a random draw. The profit maximising choice of output i for a firm 
is:
Pl i f i£ > c ,
& = 2  4
0 otherwise
Given the equilibrium price in each industry, a firm will be active in industry i,
2
if  its fixed cost c, is lower than Each firm has a range o f activities
determined by the value of its random cost draws: this describes diversification 
patterns in the sector. The models we shall consider differ essentially in the 
representation of the fixed cost draws. We shall first assume that the c/s are 
independent random draws from a uniform distribution on [0,1], and then reject
It has of course to be noticed that the description of diversification is based solely on 
qualitative data. Results therefore cannot be taken as conclusive, but rather as an indication of general 
patterns which we want to confirm with further work.
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this hypothesis in favour o f the two alternatives of correlation between costs 
and economies of scope.
The Simulation Program
In order to describe how the simulation program works, we shall use an 
example. Suppose that the actual diversification matrix we want to ’describe’ is 
the following:
Industries 1 2 3 4
1 3 2 0 3
2 2 4 1 4
3 0 1 1 1
4 3 4 1 5
Fig. 3.2- The actual D matrix 
The basic program can be described by means of a flow-chart:
build a diversification 
matrix D
build a matrix F
of 0's and l's
compare actual matrix 
with generated one
generate a matrix F 
of random cost draws
is it possible to 
improve the approximation
diversification Matrix
read actual
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1 - After having "read" the actual diversification matrix, the simulation 
program generates a matrix where each row represents a firm: each row is a 
vector o f random cost draws from a uniform distribution on [0,1], one for each 
possible industry. The number of'potential firms', N, is exogenously set20. In the 
example N= 10. If we consider K possible industries we have a matrix F of 
dimension (N x K). In the example K = 4. The matrix F could be, for example:
1 2 3 4
1 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.4
2 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.2
3 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.9
4 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.4
5 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.6
6 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.7
7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6
8 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.5
9 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.3
10 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.7
Fig. 3.3- The (NxK) matrix F of random cost draws
2 - To match the observed matrix D, we exogenously fix the number of firms 
operating in each industry21 and set it equal to the actual number (the diagonal 
element on the D matrix). Then we select the firms active in each industry. For 
example, industry 1 has 3 active firms (number of firms in industry 1 = du =3), 
whence firms 3, 4 and 10 (the lowest cost firms) are deemed 'active'. We now 
construct a new matrix G, being an (N x K) matrix of 0's and l's (0 for 
industries where the firm is not active, 1 for industries where it operates). In the 
example G is:
It could be taken to be the actual total number of firms in the manufacturing sector.
21 We assume that the actual number of firms operating in each industry is the equilibrium 
number.
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1 2 3 4
1 0 0 0 1
2 0 1 0 1
3 1 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 1
5 0 0 1 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 1 0 1
9 0 1 0 1
10 1 1 0 0
Fig.3.4 - The G matrix shows firms active in each industry
3 - From G, it is finally possible to build a 'diversification matrix' D ', analogous 
to the observed one, which can be compared directly with the observed matrix 
D shown above. An element d\j of matrix D' represents the number o f firms
active both in industry i and j. In the example, the generated D' matrix is:
1 2 3 4
1 3 1 0 1
2 1 4 0 3
3 0 0 1 0
4 1 3 0 5
4 - We carry out a large number of runs, following this procedure, and thereby 
generate an 'average' or 'expected' matrix D.
5 - The last step in the basic program consists of generating a 'test statistic', T, 
for the comparison between the actual and the generated diversification matrix:
I d'„-d«- * - ) / »T = ( Z
where d 'v is the generated value 
*/„ is the actual value
The preliminary results obtained in the previous sections (the significance o f the 
groupings has also been confirmed through the log-linear analysis) were used to
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select the groups to be analysed by means of the present approach22. Here the 
purpose is firstly to analyse how well the hypotheses of 'cost correlation' and 
'economies of scope', as described, fit the data, and to describe patterns of 
correlation and economies of scope within groups; secondly to study how they 
differ across time and countries.
As noted earlier, we first tested for random as opposed to purposive23 
diversification. In each group (as described above) we generated a matrix with a 
vector of random independent cost draws for each firm (as described), and 
obtained diversification matrices. In each case the 'random cost draws’ (and 
therefore the 'random diversification') hypothesis was rejected through a 
comparison between the value of the test T in the basic simulation and its value 
when the two more complex hypotheses are introduced. In both cases the value 
of the test decreases, suggesting that either of the two models considered is a 
more appropriate description than 'random draws'.
4. Cost Correlation
The Underlying Model
Here we use the basic model described previously but modify the 
process generating fixed costs.
The fixed cost of producing product i will be described as follows:
(i) if  industry i is not 'related' to any other industry, a random draw from a 
uniform distribution:
c( ~ [0,1]
(ii) if  two industries, i and j, are related, the fixed cost o f producing products i 
and j  will be respectively:
ci =  ( l - p i j ) v i + p ip>ij 
CJ = ( l - P i j ) V j + P i j V , j  
where v,, v;., vy are random draws from uniform distributions24:
22 Computational unfeasibility made it necessary to introduce some sort of preliminary selection.
23 The term is borrowed from Scott (1982) who uses it to describe diversification performed with 
a specific aim (exploiting synergies, obtaining market power) as opposed to random diversification.
24 Whenever more than two industries are related, we consider a 'group relationship'; i.e., if i 
and j  are related, and j  and k are related, we assume:
c, = ( l - A ,* ) vi+ A ,t'V
c i =  0 ~p, jt  )v; + p t,kv,jk
88
V/.vv.Vj- [0,1]
As before, given the equilibrium price in each industry, a firm will be active in 
industry i if  its fixed costs c. are lower than p* 14. The range o f activities of 
each firm will therefore be determined by the value of its random fixed costs 
relative to the equilibrium prices in the markets.
The Simulation Program
The basic program described previously represents the first step o f the 
procedure. Fixed costs will now be however generated as:
c ,= 0 -P v f i+ P i ,%
Cj = ( l - p lj)vj +Pij%
The aim is to endogenously determine the values o f p  which best approximate 
the actual data.
The way the program works is described by means o f a flow chart in the 
Appendix. The structure of this program is similar to that of the basic program 
and it iteratively determines the values of the "correlation factors". The output 
o f the program is a generated diversification matrix, a value for the test T, 
which allows for comparisons, and the values of the significant correlation 
factors.
Test for the Results
In order to test for the results, i.e., to see whether the model proposed 
predicts the actual data reasonably well, we shall use a test o f hypotheses on the 
parameters of normal distributions.
The simulation program performs 100 runs for each value to be 
determined, and generates a distribution of parameters du. It is possible to show 
(see Appendix 3 for some examples) that these parameters are approximately
ck = ( l - p ij1c)vk+pijkvij1c
This is rather restrictive. However any other relatedness structure would be equally arbitrary and 
restrictive.
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normally distributed. We shall therefore use a test o f hypotheses for normal 
distributions25.
For each group of industries described through diversification matrices 
we therefore test the hypothesis that each generated value dv, i.e., each off-
diagonal element is not significantly different from the actual one.
Results
Results are summarised in Table 3.1, which we shall presently discuss. 
Some tentative explanations are introduced which will be developed in what 
follows. Details are left for the Appendix.
For the interpretation of results we are basically interested in the values 
of the p  -coefficients, which describe the degree of relatedness and therefore are 
used for the comparisons of the differences in diversification26.
25 Assume we have a random sample of n observations x , , . . . ,  x n from a normal population with 
mean p  and variance a 2 and we are interested in testing hypotheses about p.  Our null hypothesis 
will be:
If  a 2 is known, we have that:
er _ a  ^
X - z ]+ —F=,X + Z ]+ —f=
V T i n  - T i n ,  
is a 100y  percent confidence interval for p.  A possible test is given by the following: reject H0 if 
the confidence interval does not contain p 0. Such a test has size 1 —y  since:
PrM=t*o x - z = r
G _ <T
~ r =  <  M o <  x  "*■ z \+ r ~ T  I n  -j- 1n
If a 2 is unknown, we can obtain a test similar to the one above, using the y  percent confidence 
interval:
 ^_ s _  s ^
x ~ *i+r ~7=r,*: ~7=—  I n  T  I n  j
In our case n=100, x  is the sample mean that we take as an estimate of each cell, and S is the 
computed standard deviation. We shall perform a test for y -  95 (f1+95 = 1.99). In each test p Q is 
the actual value of each cell, of which we want to see whether the sample mean generated by the
program is a reasonable approximation.
26 T is only a useful indicator for the program (saying where to stop, when no other
improvements are possible). However, it can be useful for impressionistic considerations. tests
whether the model is accepted or rejected by the data.
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Results with cost correlation
Sector Dataset Links across industries Values of 
coeffic.
T x 1
Dairy UK62 1-2 2-3 1-3 0.6 0.118 4.82
UK86 1-2 2-3 1-3 0.5 0.246 2.33
IT86 1-2 2-3 1-3 0.6 0.133 4.62
Soft drinks UK62 1-2 2-3 1-3 0.7 0.142 2.67
UK86 1-2 2-3 1-3 0.7 0.310 6.47
IT86 2-3 0.6 0.640 7.30
Biscuit Bakery UK62 1-2 3-4 0.8 0.624 9.57
UK86 1-4 3-4 0.6 0.303 27.99(R)
IT86 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4 0.5 0.325 11.50
Fruit-Veget. UK62 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4 0.7 0.122 12.39
UK86 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4 0.7 0.158 11.22
IT86 1-2 0.5 0.320 28.72(R)
3-4 0.7
Flour-Cereals UK62 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 2-3 2-4 0.5 0.243 13.13
2-5 3-4 3-5 4-5 0.5
UK86 2-3 2-4 2-5 3-4 3-5 4-5 0.5 0.324 12.32
IT86 7.14
R=rejected.
Table 3.1
The Dairy Sector
The same model explains the three datasets equally well. The three 
industries seem to be strongly related in all cases. The degree of relatedness is 
slightly lower in the UK86 case ( p -  0.5 instead of 0.6), but patterns are very 
similar. In the three cases a 3-way link is accepted as a reasonable model 
describing the data.
The Soft Drink Sector
Diversification in UK is explained equally well in 1962 and 1986 by a 
model where relatedness is very strong (p=  0.7). Both patterns and levels are 
the same.
Italian diversification however is not described by the same parameters. 
The model which best describes this dataset includes no relatedness parameter 
between the first industry (fruit juices) and the other two, but has a relatedness
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coefficient equal to the UK one between these two (soft drinks and mineral 
waters)27.
The Biscuit-Bakery Sector
Different models seem to describe the three datasets: in the UK62 dataset 
two subgroups clearly emerge: industries 1 and 2 (biscuits and crackers) are 
strongly linked (p=  0.8) as are industries 3 and 4 (bread and cakes & pastries, 
with p - 0.8). The two groups represent separate industries. In UK86 industries 
1, 3 and 4 are linked, but less strongly than in 1962 (p=  0.6). The cracker 
industry has 'developed separately'28.
A still different model (but one not too far from the first) describes 
diversification in Italy: the four industries are related (less strongly than in UK, 
p=  0.5). Contrary to UK62 there is no clear separation between the 'bread and 
cake’ industry and the 'biscuits and crackers' sector. This might be mainly due to 
the fact that a 'bread industry' cannot properly be defined in Italy (production is 
highly fragmented, the industry consists of a huge number o f small independent 
bakeries), and firms classified as bread producers are mainly offering other 
baked products, among which are biscuits and crackers. In the UK, on the other 
hand, the bread industry is strongly concentrated.
The Fruit and Vegetable Sector
The same model holds for UK62 and UK86: in both cases strong links 
exist across all industries ( p = 0.7). In Italy, the best fit is obtained by including 
two relatedness parameters, pn and pM, the first slightly lower (0.5), the second 
as high as in the U.K. case (0.7)29. The vegetable industry and the fruit industry 
are therefore separate sectors.
The Flour and Cereal Sector
In the U.K. the model which best describes diversification patterns has 
not changed substantially over time: in 1962 a link existed across all the 5 
industries included in the group (p= 0.5). In 1986 the first industry (RTE
In fact In Italy the fruit juice industry appears more strongly related to the canned vegetables 
and fruit industry. This finding might depend on the different types of correlation across markets that 
are relevant in the two countries. The correlation might come, for the U.K., from the highly 
concentrated distribution system, while for Italy it could be generated by common inputs (for example, 
the type of package).
28 This is the model which best approximates the data. However it is not a sufficiently good 
description, as the test rejects it as a correct representation of the data.
29 However, for the Italian dataset the model is not accepted by the data.
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cereals) seems to have developed as a more specialised industry. The other four 
industries are linked as strongly as in 1962 ( p - 0.5).
In Italy there does not seem to be any relationship across these 
industries. This may be partly explained by the absence of a cereal (ready to 
eat) industry, and by high fragmentation of the flour industiy, in contrast to the 
U.K. case.
5. Economies of Scope
The Underlying Model
The alternative hypothesis we want to test is the presence o f economies 
of scope as the main factor driving diversification. Starting from the same basic 
model, we shall now assume that for firm k, the fixed cost o f producing product 
i is a random draw from a uniform distribution: 
c<~ [0.1]
i f  industry i does not share economies of scope with any other industry; if  
economies o f scope arise in the joint production of products i and j, then the 
total cost of producing them will be:
c . .  =  c . +  c  — S -ij i j ij
with:
c„c ~  I0-1]
where j  is an index of the reduction in costs due to the joint production.
Again in each industry only the firms with lowest costs will be active.
However the ’entry criterion' is different from that in the 'cost correlation' case; 
there the level of costs was independent of entry in other markets, so that, for 
each industry i, it was sufficient to compare the cost draw o f each firm for each 
industry with the equilibrium price in the industry30; here the cost reduction is 
only achieved if  the firm enters both markets.
In general, if  the equilibrium prices in markets i and j  are pi and pj the entry 
criterion will be:
(a) a firm only enters industry i if:
_ 4
—  > c .
30 That is, in the program we could simply examine column i and set the cell corresponding to 
the n, lowest cost draws equal to 1.
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2 «2 2
———(c. +C —S ) < —— C. 4 4 *V 4 «
The first condition guarantees non negative profits; the second implies that the 
profits that can be attained by entering both industries are lower than those 
earned entering only market 1: this will be the case when c, is very low and c2 
is very high.
(b) a firm only enters industry j  if  the above conditions hold, with j  substituting 
for i;
(c) a firm enters both industries i and j  if:
2 „2 n p .
— + —  - (c , +c, - £ , ) >  max4 4  v ' ) v'
0 pL - c. £ l - c .
' 4 ” 4 1
(d) a firm does not enter if none of the above conditions is satisfied.
These conditions determine the markets where each firm is active; again this 
uniquely identifies a diversification matrix.
The Simulation Program
As before, the program is illustrated by means of a flow chart in the 
Appendix. The basic program explained in section 3 still represents the first 
step in the procedure. The main differences with the cost correlation program 
lie in the way costs are generated, and in the criterion used to allow entry of 
firms into the markets.
The output of the program will be:
(a) a generated diversification matrix
(b) a value for the test statistic
(c) the values of the significant economies of scope factors.
Results
Results are summarised in Table 3.2, which we shall presently discuss.
Results with economies of scope
Sector Dataset Links across industries Values of 
coeffic.
T x 2
Dairy UK62 1-2 2-3 0.2 0.098 0.330
1-3 0.3
UK86 1-2 13 0.2 0.131 0.612
IT86 1-2 0.4 0.128 0.630
1-3 0.3
2-3 0.2
Soft drinks UK62 1-2 0.4 0.290 3.290
1-3 0.2
UK86 1-2 0.4 0.082 1.180
2-3 1-3 0.2
IT86 2-3 0.2 0.740 7.090
Biscuit Bakery UK62 1-2 3-4 0.4 0.343 4.05
UK 8 6 3-4 0.2 0.373 8.82
1-4 0.1
IT86 1-2 0.2 0.311 2.81
1-4 2-4 3-4 0.1
Fruit-Veget. UK62 1-2 0.5 0.197 9.53
2-4 0.4
3-4 0.3
1-3 1-4 2-3 0.2
UK 8 6 1-2 1-3 2-4 3-4 0.2 0.222 9.23
IT86 3-4 0.3 0.506 4.29
1-2 2-3 0.2
2-4 0.1
Flour-Cereals UK62 2-3 4-5 0.5 0.372 44.34(R)
3-5 0.3
2-5 1-5 2-4 0.2
1-3 0.1
UK86 2-4 3-5 0.2 0.260 6.57
2-3 4-5 3-4 0.1
IT86 0.600 7.14
R = rejected
Table 3.2
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The Dairy Sector
Similar models describe diversification in UK62 and UK86. For the first, 
the results are basically the same as with the cost correlation procedure. For the 
Italian case all links are significant but with slightly different values. The model 
is a better description of the data than the cost correlation one, in terms o f the T 
obtained.
The Soft D rink Sector
The only difference between UK62 and UK86 lies, as above, in the fact 
that, in the first dataset, strong links are only found between industries 1 and 2 
and industries 1 and 3 (and not directly between 2 and 3), while in the second, 
links exist across all three. In Italy, again, a relatedness pattern is only shown 
between industries 2 and 3. Only for UK86 does this model give a better 
approximation than the cost correlation case.
The Biscuit-Bakery Sector
Results for all three cases do not substantially differ from those derived 
assuming cost correlation, but in this case the approximation is better.
The F ru it and Vegetable Sector
In UK62 and UK86 all links appear significant even if  in UK62 some of 
them (between the first two) are stronger. In IT86 links emerge across all 
industries, but industry 1 only appears to be related to industry 2 and not to the 
others. The model gives a worse approximation than in the cost correlation 
case.
The Flour and Cereal Sector
All the industries are linked in UK62 and all except RTE cereals are 
linked in UK86. In Italy there is no significant link.
To summarise the preceding analysis, we must notice first that it is 
difficult to compare the two sets of results in order to identify the correct 
model: we cannot conclude that one type of synergy (managerial ability in the 
cost correlation case) or the other (economies o f scope) is the main explanatory 
variable in the diversification process. In most cases, in fact, both are
/
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acceptable models for describing the datasets31. The main conclusion is that we 
can reject the random diversification hypothesis.
However we can use the above methodology in order to describe and 
compare data. In the next section we propose a simple application to compare 
patterns and levels of diversification at the same time.
6. Comparisons across Time and Countries
In this section we present an application of the simulation procedure 
used above.
The question we want to answer here concerns the possibility of 
predicting diversification, given the distribution of firms across industries. That 
is, is it true that diversification patterns are relatively stable over time and 
countries and that the changes in observed diversification can be entirely 
attributed to a different distribution of firms across industries?
We test this hypothesis for the UK 1962 - UK 1986 and the UK 1962 - 
IT 1986 cases: the way we proceed is to impose on the 1986 distributions of 
firms, the 1962 diversification patterns; i.e., we take as given the number of 
firms in each industry in 1986 and see how well we can predict diversification 
on the basis of the 1962 patterns and levels. We consider the cost correlation 
model.
Results of the simulation exercise are summarised in Figs. 3.6 and 3.732. 
There, the actual ptj values33 are on the horizontal axis for UK86 and It86
matrices. The values predicted from the UK62 diversification patterns and 
levels (with their prediction error terms)34 are on the vertical axis.
In some sense, given the way the models are built, a better performance of the cost correlation 
model might be interpreted as a uniform pattern within the group, while a better performance of the 
economies of scope model shows a more differentiated pattern.
32 For sector details see Appendix 3.3.
33 We transformed the D matrices, with the actual number of firms, into P matrices, with 
relative frequencies, in order to be able to describe graphically the differences.
34 Notice that we can mainly draw general considerations from the analysis. Firstly from a 
statistical point of view, the approach is rather ad hoc. We cannot precisely compare the difference 
between parameters that describe diversification in two datasets. Secondly diversification is only 
described through the count of products, i.e., in a qualitative sense.
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Fig. 3.6 clearly shows that UK86 values are well predicted from UK62 
diversification. Only 4 out of 28 values are significantly different. Italian 
diversification patterns and levels instead cannot be correctly predicted from 
UK values (Fig. 3.7). Only 7 out o f 24 values are not significantly different.
The global quantitative description of diversification suggests that:
1) diversification patterns are essentially unchanged in the UK from 1962 to 
1986: diversification processes are induced by the same underlying 
technological motivations. Also levels are not substantially different in the UK:
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they have slightly decreased between 1962 and 1986. Given that diversification 
is measured by the count of products, this only means that this number 
decreased on average, but it might be consistent with a larger share of 
production in non primary products (and therefore with an increase in 
diversification).
2) diversification levels are certainly different from the Italian ones, so that 
specific factors must be considered for Italy.
6.1 Qualitative Similarities
We now go back to the original P matrices (Table 3.3) in order to 
analyse in greater detail the differences, and assess whether there are qualitative 
similarities between the UK 1962 and the Italian case.
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UK62 UK86 IT86
Dairy
1.000 0.530 
0.625 1.000
1.000 0.666
0.473
0.375
1.000
Soft drinks
1.000 0.784 0.078
0.769 1.000 0.058
1.000 0.750 1.000
Biscuit-Bakery
1.000 0.464 0.071 0.250
1.000 1.000 0.154 0.538
0.125 0.125 1.000 0.937
0.200 0.200 0.428 1.000
1.000 0.123 0.671
0.900 1.000 0.700
0.690 0.098 1.000
1.000 0.265 0.294
0.600 1.000 0.200
0.714 0.210 1.000
1.000 0.288 0.088
0.203 1.000 0.578
0.064 0.597 1.000
1.000 0.862 0.172
0.676 1.000 0.135
0.714 0.714 1.000
1.000 0.229 0.083 0.604
0.733 1.000 0.200 0.666
0.333 0.250 1.000 0.666
0.439 0.151 0.121 1.000
1.000 0.074 0.259 0.518
0.400 1.000 0.000 0.200
0.333 0.000 1.000 0.809
0.250 0.018 0.303 1.000
F ru it-Vegetables
1.000 0.595 0.476 0.428
0.893 1.000 0.607 0.678
0.645 0.548 1.000 0.581
0.666 0.703 0.666 1.000
1.000 0.421 0.092 0.105
0.492 1.000 0.308 0.246
0.155 0.444 1.000 0.511
0.205 0.410 0.589 1.000
1.000 0.411 0.706 0.411
0.411 1.000 0.500 0.666
0.461 0.231 1.000 0.423
0.411 0.470 0.647 1.000
Table 3.3
The main differences occur in the soft drink cluster (where p n >P3i are 
overestimated and p ^ is underestimated), in the biscuit segment (where 
P\a*Ph*Pia are underestimated and /?12,p34 are overestimated), in the fruit & 
vegetable segment (where nearly all coefficient except /?34 are overestimated)35.
Specifically, in the soft drink cluster, these differences arise because 
British producers of fruit juice also produce soft drinks (and vice versa) and 
mineral water firms also produce soft drinks (but not vice versa). In Italy soft 
drinks and fruit juices are produced by different firms; conversely, in Italy soft 
drink producers also produce mineral water, which is not the case in the UK.
We exclude the flour & cereal matrices since they are completely different in the two 
countries.
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In the biscuit cluster, patterns are similar with two main differences: in 
the UK fewer biscuit producers also produce pastries, and most o f pastries' 
producers also produce bread, while this is not the case in Italy.
Finally in the fruit and vegetable cluster, differences are concentrated 
along the "secondary" diagonal: in the U.K. fruit and vegetables are all 
produced by the same firms, while in Italy vegetable producers are not fruit 
producers.
Hence, we have here some similarities in patterns, but differences are 
sufficient to generate the above global disparities in predictions. We conclude 
that the models developed above are useful to explore general patterns, but we 
need to consider further specific factors relative to the Italian case.
7. Conclusions
In this chapter we have compared patterns and levels o f diversification in 
the food industry across three datasets. We showed how a log-linear analysis 
approach could be used to tackle this problem, and then applied a simulation 
analysis to explore two hypotheses concerning the reasons for diversification.
The results of the log-linear analysis suggested that general 
diversification patterns are rather similar across countries and time, i.e., that the 
same 'group' patterns seem to explain the three datasets equally well. These 
results must however be qualified. If we try to explain diversification on the 
basis of correlation of costs or economies of scope, we find that in general these 
hypotheses cannot be rejected for any of the three datasets taken individually, 
but that different models (i.e. different patterns and levels o f correlation or 
scope economies) explain the U.K. case and the Italian one. The Italian 
situation is characterised by a much lower degree of diversification within the 
groups previously identified, while U.K. patterns and levels o f diversification 
reveal rather stable behaviour over time.
In concluding we remark on some (descriptive) analyses of Italian 
industry which suggest some ways of interpreting these results.
D. Odifreddi (1988) describes the diversification strategies o f 44 large 
food companies over the period 1981/85 using both the Utton diversification 
index (w)36, and the Rumelt indicators37. The first index mainly accounts for the 
levels o f diversification, the second for the type of diversification strategies.
The Utton diversification index is:
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Only 12 of the firms considered are reasonably diversified (w > 1.5). O f 
these 4 are highly diversified (w>2.5), often in non related activities; 3 are 
diversified (w>2) in activities both related and unrelated; 5 have an average 
level of diversification (w>1.5) in related activities. The others have a very low 
degree o f diversification and operate in closely related activities. In general, 
even for highly diversified firms Odifreddi finds that the search for 
technological synergies forms the basis of these strategies.
The same sort o f considerations emerge from A. Nova (1990), who 
analyses the diversification behaviour of 55 large Italian manufacturing firms. 
In particular he compares the Herfindahl diversification index for the Fortune 
500 firms in 1965 with that for the 55 largest Italian firms in 1986, at the 2, 3, 
and 4-digit levels. While the index for the Fortune firms is, respectively, 0.396, 
0.585 and 0.661, for the Italian case it reduces to 0.10, 0.25, and 0.34.
Finally it is particularly interesting to compare these results with those of 
R. Pozzana (1991) on acquisitions in the food sector over the period 1983/88. 
Pozzana finds that most of the acquisitions occurred within the food industry, 
and that actually the majority were within the same sector, as the following 
table shows:
Industries Acquired firm's 
main activity %
Buyer firm's 
main activity %
% acquisitions 
within sector
Drinks 35.2 22.8 78.3
Pasta 15.2 13.3 93.0
Sugar 6.7 8.6 77.0
Bakery 4.8
Processed meat 4.8
Dairy 4.8 7.6 100.0
Milk 4.8
Chocolate 4.8 75.0
Table 3.4: Acquisitions in the Italian food sector
w = 2 £ p , - i - 1 
»=1
where p i — Ti l  7^, is the share of the firm's turnover in industry i (and i= l is the primaiy activity of 
the firm). It takes into account both the number of industries where the firm is active and the share of 
activity in that sector. If the firm is completely specialised. w =l; if it is equally diversified into n 
activities, w=n.
37 These describe the type of diversification strategy pursued by the firm: specialised; with a 
dominant activity and minor correlated activities; with a dominant activity and minor uncorrelated 
activities; diversified in correlated activities; diversified in non-correlated activities.
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It is rather obvious that acquisitions are not used to diversify, but mainly to 
expand within the same industry. The effects of these acquisitions have been to 
increase concentration, especially in the ’mineral water' and in the 'pasta' 
industry. The search for market power seems an obvious motivation for those 
acquisitions. This strategy was only available to firms due to the absence o f any 
antitrust law in Italy up to the end of 1990.
All these analyses concentrate only on large firms' behaviour (on which 
better data are available). However they may provide some suggestions for the 
interpretation o f the results presented here.
As anticipated, two factors appear relevant in explaining differences in 
diversification in the two countries considered: differences in competition 
policy, and differences in concentration in the distribution sector. The absence 
o f anti-trust legislation might lead to a greater reliance on acquisitions as a 
means of growth in Italy, first of all within the same sector (in order to increase 
market power directly) and secondly into related sectors. This might have the 
effect of reducing the incentives to diversify through internal expansion.
The impact of the second factor is more subtle and ambiguous: in Italy 
the distribution sector has been highly fragmented until recently, and the 
concentration process had not gone very far. This meant that large (national) 
companies needed their own distribution networks. In some cases an extremely 
well developed distribution organisation formed the incentive to diversify into a 
wide range of products (see the example of STAR spa). In this way the large 
costs o f distribution could be shared over a wider set o f products. This solution 
has been used in a limited number of cases38.
In the U.K. the high level of concentration in food distribution has 
greatly increased the bargaining power of distributors versus manufacturers. 
The optimum response of manufacturers to this situation may be to be present 
in relatively few sectors, with a strong position in each of them. This might 
allow them to counterbalance the power of supermarket chains. An alternative 
strategy would be to become a subcontractor to the chain-stores themselves, and 
produce own brand products. In Italy both distribution and manufacturing are 
much more fragmented, and except in a few cases there does not seem to be any 
evident conflict o f interest between the two groups39.
In order to explore these issues further, we turn in the next chapter to a 
case-study approach.
38 Recent changes in the structure of the distribution channels led to a higher concentration of 
activities.
39 An interesting test of the relevance of this line of argument would be to analyse the future 
behaviour of Italian manufacturers in response to increasing concentration in distribution, and to the 
presence of anti-trust legislation.
Appendix 1: Datasets
Table A l .l  An example of a Kompass table: Sugar
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Table A1.2 An example of a Kompass table: Coffee
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Table A1.3 List of Products
1 -S alt
2 - Meat Processing
3 - Poultry
4 - Milk and Cream Products
5 -Yoghurt
6 - Ice cream
7 - Condensed and Dried Milk
8 - Cheese
9 - Egg Products
10 - Processed Fruit
11 - Canned Fruit
12 - Processed Vegetables
13 - Canned Vegetables
14 - Canned Tomatoes
15 - Canned Olives
16 - Canned Baked Beans
17 - Jams
18 - Preserves
19 - Soups
20 - Processed Fish
21 - Frozen Foods
22 - RTE Cereals
23 - Other Cereals
24 - Flour
25 - Special Flours
26 - Processed Rice
27 - Pasta
28 - Biscuits
29 - Bread
30 - Cakes and Pastries
31 - Crisps
32 - Crackers
33 - Baby Food
34 - Health Food
35 - Sugar
36 - Sugar Allied Products
37 - Sugar Confectionery 
3 8 -T ea
39 - Coffee
40 - Chocolate Confectionery
41 - Cocoa
42 - Processed Spices and Herbs
43 - Vinegar, Condiments, Sauces
44 - Processed Nuts
45 - Margarine
46 - Edible Oils
47 - Pet Foods
48 - Animal Feed
49 - Additives for Food Industry, Yeast
50 - Tobacco Products
51 - Spirits
52 - Wines
53 - Beers
54 - Malt
55 - Cider
56 - Fruit Juices
57 - Vegetable Juices
58 - Soft Drinks
59 - Spa Waters
60 - Miscellaneous
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Table A1.4 Results of Grouping Procedure a  = 0.9
UK62 UK86 IT86
4,5,7,8 4,5 4,5
(Dairy Products) (Dairy Products) (Dairy Products)
56,57,58,59 56,57
(Soft Drinks) (Fruit Juices)
17,18
(Jams)
28,32
(Biscuits)
29,30
(Bakery)
40,41
(Chocolate)
15,42,43 13,15,43
(Condiments) (Condiments) 
47,48 
(Animal Feed)
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Table A1.5 Results of Grouping Procedure a  = 0.8
UK62 UK86 IT86
4,5,7,8 4,5 4,5
(Dairy Products) (Dairy Products) (Dairy Products)
56,57,58,59 56,57
(Soft Drinks) (Fruit Juices)
29,30 29,30
(Bakery) (Bakery)
40,41 40,41
(Chocolate) (Chocolate)
17,18
(Jams)
28,32
(Biscuits)
10,11
(Canned Fruit and Veg.)
13,16
(Canned Veg. and Baked
Beans)
23,24
(Flour, Cereals)
25,26
(Special Flour, Rice)
2,3 2,3
(Meat Processing) (Meat Processing)
15,42,43 13,15,43
(Condiments) (Condiments)
47,48 
(Animal Feed) 
38,39 
(Tea, Coffee)
14,57
(Vegetables, Veg. Juices)
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Table A1.6 Results of Grouping Procedure a  = 0.7
UK62 UK86 IT86
4,5,7,8 4,5,8 4,5,7,8
(Daiiy Products) (Dairy Products) (Dairy Products)
56,57,58,59 51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59
(Soft Drinks) (Soft Drinks and 
Alcoholics)
29,30 29,30
(Bakery) (Bakery)
40,41 40,41 40,41
(Chocolate) (Chocolate) (Chocolate)
17,18 17,18
(Jams) (Jams)
45,46 45,46 45,46
(Fats) (Fats) (Fats)
28,32 28,32
(Biscuits) (Biscuits)
10,11,12,13,16 10,12,13
(Processed Fruit and (Processed Fruit and
Vegetable) Vegetable)
22,23,24,25,26
(Flour, Cereals)
20,21
(Frozen Food)
35,36
(Sugar) t
2,3,27 2,3
(Meat Processing) (Meat Processing)
15,42,43 13,14,15,19,42,43,57
(Condiments) (Condiments, Process. 
Vegetable)
47,48 47,48
(Animal Feed) (Animal Feed) 
38,39 
(Tea, Coffee)
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Table A1.7 Results of Grouping Procedure a  = 0.6
UK62 UK86 IT86
4,5,7,8 4,5,8 4,5,7,8
(Dairy Products) (Dairy Products) (Dairy Products)
56,57,58,59 51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59
(Soft Drinks) (Soft Drinks and 
Alcoholics)
29,30 29,30
(Bakery) (Bakery)
37,40,41 40,41 40,41
(Chocolate, Sugar (Chocolate) (Chocolate)
Confectionery)
10,11,12,13,16,17,18 17,18
(Processed Fruit and (Jams)
Veget., Jams)
45,46 45,46 45,46
(Fats) (Fats) (Fats)
28,32 22,28,29,30,31,32
(Biscuits) (Biscuits, RTE Cereals, 
Bread)
22,23,24,25,26 25,26
(Flour, Cereals) (Flour, Rice)
20,21
(Frozen Food)
35,36
(Sugar)
2,3,10,11,12,13,15,24,27, 2,3
38,39,42,43,49,60 (Meat Processing)
(Various)
11,12,13,14,15,16,17,19,
21,42,43,57,60
(Various)
47,48 47,48
(Animal Feed) (Animal Feed) 
38,39 
(Tea, Coffee)
1,39,49
(Salt, Coffee, Additives)
I l l
Table A1.8 Diversification Matrices by Groups 
The dairy group
Within this group we include the products milk (1), condensed milk (2), 
cheese (3). The ’diversification matrices’ for the group are:
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 19 10 9 1 34 9 10 1 73 9 49
2 10 16 6 2 9 15 3 2 9 10 7
3 9 6 9 3 10 3 14 3 49 7 71
UK1962 UK1986 IT1986
The soft drinks group
Within this group we include the products: fiuit and vegetable juices (1), 
soft drinks (2), mineral water (3). The 'diversification matrices' for the group 
are:
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 51 40 4 1 29 25 5 1 45 13 4
2 40 52 3 2 25 37 5 2 13 64 37
3 4 3 4 3 5 5 7 3 4 37 62
UK1962 UK1986 IT1986
The biscuit-bakery group
The three dataset include the products: biscuits (1), crackers (2), bread 
(3), cakes and pastries (4); the 'diversification matrices' are:
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 28 13 2 7 1 27 2 7 14 1 48 11 4 29
2 13 13 2 7 2 2 5 0 1 2 11 15 3 10
3 2 2 16 15 3 7 0 21 17 3 4 3 12 8
4 7 7 15 35 4 14 1 17 56 4 29 10 8 66
UK1962 UK1986 IT1986
The fruit-vegetables group
The group includes the products: processed fruit (1), canned fruit (2), 
processed vegetables (3), canned vegetables (4), canned baked beans (5). The 
'diversification matrices' are:
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 42 25 20 18 1 17 7 12 7 1 76 32 7 8
2 25 28 17 19 2 7 12 6 8 2 32 65 20 16
3 20 17 31 18 3 12 6 26 11 3 7 20 45 23
4 18 19 18 27 4 7 8 11 17 4 8 16 23 39
UK1962 UK1986 IT1986
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The flour-cereals group
The group includes the products: ready to eat cereals (1), other cereals 
(2), flour (3), special flours (4), processed rice (5). The 'diversification matrices' 
are:
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 16 5 10 6 5 1 10 4 4 1 3 1 3 0 1 0 0
2 5 9 8 6 5 2 4 32 14 7 4 2 0 0 0 0 0
3 10 8 41 12 5 3 4 14 38 7 9 3 1 0 63 2 2
4 6 6 12 29 6 4 1 7 7 14 6 4 0 0 2 6 1
5 5 5 5 6 7 5 3 4 9 6 14 5 0 0 2 1 18
UK1962 UK1986 IT1986
Appendix 2 
Log-linear Analysis
1. Evaluation of a Model through Log-linear Analysis
The class o f statistical techniques called log-linear models has been 
formulated for the analysis of categorical data (Haberman, 1978). These models 
are useful for uncovering the potentially complex relationships among variables 
in contingency tables.
In order to explain how they are used, we consider the case o f a (2X2) 
table, that is, the case of two dichotomous variables A and B, which can take 
values 1 and 2 :
B
1 2
A 1 "n n\2
2 w2, n22
The behaviour of contingency tables can be characterised by reference to 
conditional and marginal probabilities and conditional and marginal log odds 
ratios.
Assuming that the N (Ah,Bh) observations are independently and 
identically distributed, let be the probability that Ah is equal to i and Bh is 
equal to j; then mjJ= N • ptJ is the expected value of ntJ. The odds ratios:
f t
(where p x , p2 are the marginal probabilities o f A = 1 and A = 2), and the log 
odds ratios:
< 2  = l ° g ^
can be used to characterise the contingency table. Conditional odds ratios:
a*(B=  n  Pr(^  = 1lfi = -/) p " l p > Np'‘
12 Vr(A = 2\B = j )  p2i / Pj Npv  m2J
and conditional log odds ratios:
*i*j (■» = 7) = (£  = ./)
are considered to study the effect of one variable on the other. Dependence of 
the two variables can be assessed by differences in conditional probabilities or 
in conditional log odds ratios.
The differences in conditional log odds ratios can be analysed through the log 
cross-product ratio:
*02)02) = *i2 (-B = ! ) -  < ( B  = 2) = logm„ -logWj, -Iogm ,2 H-log/n^
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Since the hypothesis of independence of the two dichotomous variables is 
equivalent to a log cross-product ratio of zero, and this can be expressed as a 
linear function of the logarithms of the cells means, the hypothesis of 
independence can be shown to be equivalent to an additive log-linear model.
We can represent the underlying probabilities as:
Hence:
lo g /W y . =  X + X* +  Aj +  X** 
with:
S4=S^=S-*J*=S-»J*=o
j i
where:
X = jOog/Wj j +log/w12 +log/w21 +logm22)
*1 ~ ~^2  = ^ ( loS7Wn _I°g/wi2",' log/W21_log/W22^
D D 1
X^  = “ ^2 = ~ ( i° g /wj2 +log/Wj2 - l ° g ^ 2 i  - o^g/w22^
X\ \  = X22 = - X\2 = ~ ~ X2\ i (l08ml 1 + logw12 " logm21 +logm22)
Testing independence of the two variables ( which implies a log cross-product 
ratio equal to zero) means testing whether AJ* is equal to zero.
In the model above Xf is the parameter indicating the main effect of 
variable A. In fact:
(
log^ +log^ k ]  = i log— + log
P2\ Pl22^1 ^22 /  ^ 
under the independence model,
Pu_= Pn_
PlX Pn
and:
2Xa.= \ or^ -
PlX
i.e. the parameter provides a measure o f the relative prevalence of the two 
responses. Analogously for Af.
To test the independence model either the Pearson chi-square statistic:
.2z 2 = s i -
*  \2  »*
m,,1 j "'ij
where ih„ = Hl JLl  is the maximum likelihood estimate of mit under the
9 N  tJ
independence model; or the likelihood ratio chi-square test:
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t f = 2 Z I ^ * 4
• j  ij
with d.f. = number of cells - number of independent parameters in the model, 
can be used.
When three (or more) dichotomous (polytomous) variables A, B, and C 
are cross-classified, they are usually analysed through hierarchical log-linear 
models. These are extensions of the model described for the two dichotomous 
variables case, so that the logarithm of the mean of the cell value is represented 
as:
\ogmijk = k  + kJ* + k*+ kck + k f  + k ?  +kB£ + k f kc
with:
=1^ = 1 4  =Z 4 =Z4 =Z 4 =
i j  k  i j  I k
=Z4C =Z4 =Z4C =14" =Z4" =°
j  k  i j  k
where, as before, the ^ re p re se n t the A-B interaction parameters, the
represent the A-B-C interaction parameters, etc.
The model above is called a saturated model, as no restrictions on the 
parameters are imposed. This is an example of a hierarchical model; other 
hierarchical models have some k  parameters set to zero, with the restriction that 
if  any k  parameter is set to zero, any k  parameter of higher order must be zero 
as well.
This is the type of model we will be using for the analysis of 
diversification.
According to Haberman (1978, p. 2 ), the analysis o f data through a log- 
linear model involves three stages: the proposal of a plausible model for the data 
under study; the estimation of unknown parameters from the data, generally by 
means of the maximum likelihood method; and the use o f the parameters in 
statistical tests o f the model's adequacy. If the last step reveals an inadequacy of 
the model, the results should be used to suggest new models more consistent 
with the data.
In practice, two methods are usually adopted to select a model:
(a) one possibility is to fit a saturated model and then, by backward induction, 
eliminate the effects which are not relevant; this could be done by 
examining the standardised values for the parameter estimates (parameter 
estimates/standard errors) which are approximately normally distributed 
with zero mean and standard deviation=l if  the model fits the data;
(b) another possibility is to systematically test the contribution made by terms 
of a particular order to the model (a decrease in the value o f the likelihood 
ratio chi-square statistic when terms are added to the model signals their 
contribution).
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In the following analysis we shall adopt the first procedure.
2. Log-linear Analysis applied to Diversification
In order to study the pattern of relatedness across products, we used a 
rather 'ad hoc' method, which consisted of clustering products in the same group 
if  more than 70% of firms producing one of them was also producing the other.
Using log-linear analysis for this problem would allow a better 
consideration of the relationships across products, not only based on possible 
two way interactions, as in the previous case, but also taking into account many 
possible levels o f interactions.
The obvious problem here is the dimension of the datasets. In order to 
use a log-linear model, the original (60 X 60) matrix must first be transformed 
into a contingency table, where the variables are represented by the 60 
industries (which can take values 'Active' or 'Non Active'); each firm can be 
either active or not in each of the industries, and the number o f cells would be 
2 60, given all the possible values taken by each variable.
Most of these cells would have a zero frequency, making the 
computation of the results unfeasible. Moreover, even if  computation 
difficulties could be overcome, problems of interpretation would arise, as the 
interaction patterns would be too complicated to be able to give them any 
economic meaning.
We therefore decided to use the log-linear analysis with the limited aim 
of studying the problems of the comparison within 'groups' or 'clusters', as they 
were obtained through the previous procedure, with the following objectives:
(i) firstly, as a way to confirm or reject the validity of the previous approach; if  
no interaction is in fact significant through a loglinear model, this would 
signal the inappropriateness of the clustering procedure;
(ii) secondly, as an alternative way to compare patterns o f diversification within 
groups, and across countries (U.K. and Italy) and time (U.K. 1962, U.K. 
1986).
We wanted in particular to use log-linear models to study the groups: 
dairy, soft drinks, biscuit+bakerv. processed fruit and vegetables, and flour, as 
these are the groups which include more than two products and allow us to 
study more than just two-way interactions and the similarities in patterns.
For the other groups, the log-linear analysis will address only the first 
objective.
3. The Model
We want to test, by means of a log-linear model, whether there are 
significant links between the industries within the groups, in the sense that the
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probability o f being active in one of them is not independent o f the probability 
o f being active in another within the same group.
Our variables will be, for each group, the industries belonging to it. For 
each firm in the dataset, each industry variable can take value 1 (if the firm is 
active in that industry) or 0  (if the firm is not). Hence in each cell o f the 
contingency table there will be the number of firms corresponding to a specific 
pattern of activity. The contingency tables are analysed assuming a log-linear 
model for the underlying probabilities.
In a two industry case we would have a contingency table given by:
in d 2
active non active
active "n w12
non active W21 n72
with being the number of firms active in both industries, nn the number of 
those active in 1 but not in 2 , n2l vice versa, and the number not active in 
either industry.
One problem that arises concerns the number o f firms which are not 
active in any of the industries in the group considered. The choice o f this value 
is relevant for the analysis as it influences the level o f significance o f the 
parameters. A large number of firms non active in any of the industries in the 
group considered implies a low probability p{ o f producing in one industry in 
the group, and a probability of order p] of randomly entering two industries in 
the group; which in turn implies that the larger the number o f non active firms, 
the more likely it is that even a small number o f firms active in more than one 
sector will generate a result of a significant link between the two.
Therefore there is a degree of arbitrariness in this choice. The most 
reasonable approach seemed to be that of using (as the number of non active 
firms in each group) the total number of firms in the food industry which are not 
in the specific group1.
This issue however hides a more serious problem, which is that we would actually wish to 
model the product choice conditional on being in the group, rather than the unconditional product 
choice. That is, if we assume that the Ml probability function is log-linear:
then, P22, is the probability of not being active in any of the two industries, and qtJ the probability of 
being in i and j, conditional on being active, is:
  ¥ i j  &
q,i ~ \ ~ Pn
The conditional distribution is then also log-linear. However there is no easy solution to this problem, 
as most of the statistical packages do not allow great flexibility, i.e. they do not allow us to estimate a 
conditional log-linear model. We therefore decided to use the unconditional specification, even with its 
limitations, and interpret the results with care.
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The estimation procedure implied starting with a 'saturated model', 
progressively eliminating interactions parameters which did not contribute 
significantly in explaining the pattern2.
4 The results
4.1 The dairy group
Within this group we include the products: milk, condensed milk, and 
cheese.
The results obtained through the procedure which starts with a saturated 
model and progressively eliminates interaction terms which are not significant 
in 'explaining' die inter-relationships (that is, whose addition to the model does 
not reduce chi-square significantly) are summarised in Table A2.1.
Here, the presence of significant positive two way interaction terms is 
interpreted as implying that the number of firms active in two industries cannot 
be explained simply by the product of the probabilities of being active in each 
industry.
UK 1962 
n. firms=25
UK1986 
n. firms =42
IT1986 
n. firms=96
Parameters Value z-value Value z-value Value z-value
Indl 
Ind2 
Ind3 
Indl by lnd2 
Indl by Ind3 
Ind2 by Ind3 
Indl by Ind2 by Ind3
-0.262
-0.541*
-1.061*
0.613*
0.989*
0.711*
-0.444*
-1.21
-2.46
-4.83
2.79
4.50
3.25
-2.00
-0.273
-1.035*
-1.090*
0.548*
0.688*
0.476*
0.413*
-1.50
-5.69
-6.03
3.02
3.78
2.62
2.27
-0.068
-1.769*
-0.331
0.790*
0.683*
0.504*
-0.510*
-0.33
-8.75
-1.63
3.91
3.38
2.49
-2.52
Saturated model.
* Significant at the 5%  level.
Table A2.1
The results of the log-linear analysis reveal approximately the same 
pattern of relationships across industries as the preliminary analysis; i.e., 
whenever a 'link' was found through the previous method, it is also found by the 
log-linear analysis.
One feature of the results which is worth noticing and requires an 
explanation is the presence of negative three-way interaction effects in two of 
the three datasets (in the UK-1986 case it is positive and significant).
This seems to imply that the "probability" o f being active in all three 
industries is lower than that generated by considering 'main effects' (each 
variable, taken alone) and two-way interaction effects only; that is, it seems that 
there are some obstacles to being active in all three industries.
One problem in the estimation was the presence, for some groups, of a large number of zero 
cells, which, given the way the likelihood chi-square test is defined, might generate convergence 
problems; to avoid this, a small value (0.01) has been introduced whenever a zero occurred.
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As there are positive links between each of the industries, taken in pairs, 
it is difficult to imagine technological diseconomies of scope, when producing 
three instead of two products.
We should look then for other explanations: as this effect is particularly 
strong for the case of UK 1962 and Italy 1986, we could consider the possibility 
o f the presence of financial constraints, relevant in these two cases, which 
limited the expansion from two to three sectors, and that are not relevant any 
more in the UK 1986 sample.
4.2 The soft drinks group
Within this group we include the products: fruit and vegetable juices, soft 
drinks, and mineral water.
UK1962 
n. firms=62
UK1986 
n. firms=43
IT1986 
n. firms=120
Parameters Value z-value Value z-value Value z-value
Indl 
Ind2 
Ind3 
Indl by Ind2 
Indl by Ind3 
Ind2 by Ind3 
Indl by Ind2 by Ind3
-0.230
-0.180
-1.680*
0.808*
0,505*
0.454
-0.533*
-0.97
-0.76
-7.12
3.42
2.14
1.92
-2.26
-0.491*
-0.216*
-1.410*
1.020*
0.720*
0.445*
0.445*
-2.23
-0.98
-6.43
4.65
3,28
2.02
2.02
-1.230*
-0.494*
-0.983*
0.485*
-0.175*
0.863*
-0.305
-7.80
-3.13
-6.22
3.07
-1.11
5.46
-1.93
Saturated model.
* Significant at the 5% level.
Table A2.2
We find a rather similar pattern across the three datasets (except for the 
link between the fruit juice sector and the mineral water one in Italy), which 
confirms the links found through the previous procedure:
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 1 .78 .07 1 1 .86 .13 1 1 .28 .08
2 .76 1 .00 2 .67 1 .10 2 .20 1 .57
3 1 .75 1 3 .66 .66 1 3 .06 .59 1
UK1962 UK1986 IT1986
Again the results have the feature of a negative three way interaction effect in 
the UK1962 and Italyl986 cases.
4.3 The biscuit-bakery group
Here we have considered two of the groups formed through the previous 
procedure together. In fact the links between products just failed to be strong 
enough to satisfy the previous criterion.
The datasets include the products: biscuits (1), crackers (2), bread (3), 
and cakes and pastries (4).
The results of the log-linear analysis are in Table A2.3.
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UK 1962 
n. firms=56
UK1986 
n. firms=74
IT1986 
n. firms=88
Parameters Value z-value Value z-value Value z-value
Indl -0.440 -0.83 -0.573* -2.83 0.295 -0.92
Ind2 -0.780 -1.46 -1.166* -6.15 -1.178* -3.69
Ind3 -1.176* -2.20 -0.643* -3.39 -1.328* -4.16
Ind4 -0.349 -0.65 -0.108 -0.57 0.143 0.44
Indl by Ind2 1.533* 2.86 0.399* 2.11 0.632* 1.98
Indl by Ind3 -0.075 -0.14 0.324 1.71 0.059 0.18
Indl by Ind4 0.074 0.13 0.275 1.45 0.347 1.08
Ind2 by Ind3 0.262 0.49 0.505* 2.66 0.391 1.22
Ind2 by Ind4 0.413 0.77 -0.029 -0.15 0.542 1.70
Ind3 by Ind4 1.044* 1.96 0.494* 2.60 0.566 1.77
Indl by Ind2 by Ind3 -0.262 -0.49 -0.186 -0.98 -0.247 -0.77
Indl by Ind2 by Ind4 0.564 1.05 -0.138 -0.72 -0.111 -0.34
Indl by Ind3 by Ind4 -0.020 -0.03 -0.213 -1.13 -0.308 -0.96
Ind2 by Ind3 by Ind4 -0.359 -0.07 -0.357 -1.88 0.095 0.30
Indl by Ind2 by Ind3 
by Ind4
0.130 0.24 0.076 0.40 -0.221 -0.69
Saturated model.
* Significant at the 5% level.
Table A2.3
Again the patterns described by the previous procedure are confirmed:
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 1 1 .07 .25 1 1 .21 .26 .47 1 1 .22 .08 .60
2 1 1 .15 .53 2 .41 1 .08 .25 2 .73 1 .20 .66
3 .12 .12 1 .93 3 .23 .03 1 .84 3 .33 .25 1 .66
4 .20 .20 .42 1 4 .17 .04 .34 1 4 .43 .15 .12 1
UK1962 UK1986 IT1986
and actually the 'grouping' procedure is justified by the log-linear analysis (with 
the previous approach, products 1 and 2 were not a group in the UK 1986 
dataset, but the log-linear model shows a link; the same is true for the Italy 1986 
dataset, where industries 3 and 4 were not linked by the previous procedure, but 
are now through the log-linear analysis).
4.4 The fruit-vegetables group
The group includes the products: processed fruit ( 1 ), canned fruit (2), 
processed vegetables (3), and canned vegetables (4). The results o f the log- 
linear analysis are in Table A2.4.
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UK1962 
n. firms=54
UK1986 
n. firms=32
IT1986 
n. firms=144
Parameters Value z-value Value z-value Value z-value
Indl -0.373 -1.15 -0.739 -1.77 -1.098* -3.60
Ind2 -0.291 -0.90 -0.991* -2.38 - 0.025 -0.08
Ind3 -0.370 -1.14 -0.250 -0.60 -0.660* -2.17
Ind4 -0.744* -2.31 -0.479 -1.15 -0.717* -2.35
Indl by Ind2 1.070* 3.33 0.566 1.35 0.815* 2.68
Indl by Ind3 0.200 0.62 0.803 1.92 -0.092 -0.30
Indl by Ind4 -0.072 -0.22 0.054 0.13 0.137 0.45
Ind2 by Ind3 0.347 1.07 -0.095 -0.23 0.377 1.24
Ind2 by Ind4 0.996* 3.09 0.882* 2.11 0.362 1.19
Ind3 by Ind4 0.571 1.77 0.991* 2.38 1.149* 3.77
Indl by Ind2 by Ind3 -0.223 -0.69 -0.227 -0.55 -0.190 -0.62
Indl by Ind2 by Ind4 0.324 1.00 -0.227 -0.55 -0.002 -0.01
Indl by Ind3 by Ind4 0.001 0.00 0.182 0.43 0.407 1.34
Ind2 by Ind3 by Ind4 -0.146 -0.45 0.159 0.38 -0.464 -1.52
Indl by Ind2 by Ind3 
by Ind4
0.424 1.31 0.393 0.94 -0.069 -0.22
Saturated model.
* Significant at the 5% level.
Table A2.4
The same comments as those to the previous case apply to this case as 
well. For the first two datasets (UK 1962 and UK 1986) the same links are 
found as with the previous approach, and other links, previously not significant, 
are relevant now and justify the grouping of the four industries.
For the Italian case only links across the first two (fruit) and the second 
two (vegetables) appear significant.
4.5 The flour-cereals group
The group includes the products: ready to eat cereals (1), other cereals
(2), flour (3), special flours (4), and processed rice (5). The results of the log- 
linear analysis are in Table A2.5.
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UK1962 UK1986 IT1986
n. firms=61 n. firms=69 n. firms=84
Parameters Value z-value Value z-value Value z-value
Indl -0.415 -1.78 -0.900* -4.61 -2.620* -8.77
Ind2 -0.853* -3.03 -0.426 -1.95
Ind3 0.148 0.64 0.034 0.16 -0.344 -0.95
Ind4 0.390 0.15 -0.783* -3.98 -1.670* -5.91
Ind5 -0.957* -3.41 -0.611* -2.77 -1.480* -5.42
Indl by Ind2 0.390 1.58 0.376* 2.15
Indl by Ind3 0.252 1.76 0.596* 1.99
Indl by Ind5 0.806* 3.29 0.653* 3.57
Ind2 by Ind3 0.877* 3.85 0.328 1.89
Ind2 by Ind4 0.419 1.85 0.701* 3.87
Ind2 by Ind5 0.791* 2.92 -0.282 -1.24
Ind3 by Ind4 0.252 1.29 0.596* 2.76
Ind3 by Ind5 0.428* 2.20
Ind4 by Ind5 0.839* 3.29 0.847* 3.99 0.703* 2.57
Indl by Ind2 by Ind3 -0.422* -2.59
Indl by Ind3 by Ind4 -0.645* -5.81
Indl by Ind3 by Ind5 -0.544* -3.26
^=8.35 ^=8.77 /= 2 .4 6
d.f.=18 d.f.:=16 d.f.=8
Saturated model.
* Significant at the 5% level.
Table A2.5
In this case the pattern is not so clear. Through the previous procedure 
only the first dataset had sufficiently strong links to justify the groupings, while 
in the two other dataset such links are considerably weaker (especially in the 
Italian case).
The log-linear analysis results seem, however, to approximately confirm 
the pattern of the links and to justify the groupings. For the UK 1962 data, the 
significant links are 1-5, 2-3, 2-5 and 4-5, all significant also with the previous 
approach. Only the 3-5 link does not appear significant. For the UK 1986 data 
the significant ones are 1-2, 1-5, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-5, which show the highest 
values of the percentages with the previous approach. For the Italy 1986 data 
the significant ones are 1-3, 3-4, and 4-5, which again are the highest values of 
the percentages.
4.6 Groups with only two Products
The results of the log-linear analysis are in Table A2.6 and they do not 
require many comments: all the two-way links are significant in each of the 
datasets, confirming the validity of the grouping procedure for these products.
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UK1962 UK1986 IT1986
Parameters Value z-value Value z-value Value z-value
FATS n. firms=36 n. firms=34 n. firms=92
Indl -1.720* -8.31 -1.844* -8.96 -2.050* -12.12
Ind2 -0.503* -2.44 -0.601* -2.86 -0.418* -2.47
Indl by Ind2 1.129* 5.44 1.150* 5.47 0.967* 5.71
SUGAR n. firms=18 n. firms=12 n. firms=14
Indl -0.756* -3.45 -1.420* -5.93 -1.456* -7.22
Ind2 -0.156* -7.12 -1.620* -6.78 -1.344* -6.66
Indl by Ind2 1.305* 5.95 1.070* 4.49 1.456* 7.22
FROZEN FOOD n. firms=40 n. firms=53 n. firms=40
Indl -0.688* -5.31 -1.002* -9.36 -1.206* -5.77
Ind2 -1.034* -7.98 -1.125* -10.50 -2.040* -9.77
Indl by Ind2 1.187* 9.16 0.800* 7.47 0.657* 3.14
CONDIMENTS n. firms=33 n. firms=55 n. firms=158
Indl -1.160* -8.85 -1.600* 12.72 -2.050* -12.89
Ind2 -0.858* -6.14 -0.570* -4.53 -0.137 -0.85
Indl by Ind2 1.080* 7.76 0.755* 6.32 0.941* 5.89
ANIMAL FEED n. firms=77 n. firms=100 n. firms=135
Indl -1.680* -11.80 -1.885* -11.50 -2.110* -8.26
Ind2 -0.580* -4.05 -0.213 -1.30 0.219 0.85
Indl by Ind2 0.503* 3.52 0.907* 5.53 1.440* 5.65
MEAT PROCESS. n. firms=59 n. firms=l 13 n. firms=139
Indl -0.518* -4.17 -0.252* -2.43 0.053 0.20
Ind2 -1.377* -11.08 -1.360* -13.16 -2.360* -9.06
Indl by Ind2 0.828* 6.66 0.926* 8.96 1.189 4.55
TEA-COFFEE n. firms=12 n. firms=25 n. firms=47
Indl -1.390* -6.27 -0.960* -5.96 -1.823* -9.37
Ind2 -1.270* -5.77 -1.130* -7.00 -0.452* -2.32 -
Indl by Ind2 1.134* 5.12 1.440* 8.91 1.420* 7.33
CHOCOLATE n. firms=34 n. firms=34 n. firms=52
Indl -0.289 -1.06 -0.637* -2.96 -0.569* -3.90
Ind2 -1.930* -7.12 -1.939* -9.02 -1.577* -10.82
Indl by Ind2 1.262* 4.64 1.096* 5.10 1.321* 9.07
Saturated models.
* Significant at the 5% level.
Table A2.6
5 Limits of the Approach
We have already underlined a number of limitations o f the analysis of 
diversification patterns through the log-linear approach. Even though it is 
considered a standard method for the problem considered, ambiguities arise in 
the interpretation, due to the arbitrariness in the choice o f some parameters (the
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number of firms non active in either industry of the group) and o f the 
underlying model (unconditional rather than conditional).
There is however an even more serious limitation, in our view, 
represented by the absence of any underlying economic model, which makes the 
results hard to interpret.
It is essentially this dissatisfaction which justifies the approach 
developed in section 3 o f chapter 3.
Appendix 3 
A simulation analysis 
1 Correlated costs
1.1 Program flow chart
The way the program works is best described through a flow chart. The steps 
followed are explained below:
A (100 times)
yes
T>T R<Rmax nono
(100 times)
yes
test T
test T
R=R+1
<? +0.1
—  ( f ^  . 0.
test T  
stop
Read actual matrix D 
Read correlation vector
generate F 
generate F 
build D
diversif. matrix D 
value of the test 
values of correlation
1- The program reads: (i) the actual diversification matrix D: the diagonal 
values will be used as the equilibrium number of firms in each industry; this 
means that in the final diversification matrix generated by the program, the 
diagonal values will be the same as in the actual one, by construction; (ii) a
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vector of 'links', describing which industries seem more closely related, in terms 
o f the ad hoc method of the first section. So, for example, if  the actual matrix is:
1 2 3
1 1 0 8 1
2 8 1 2 3
3 1 3 4
the correlation vector would be:
R______ links
1 1-2
2 2-3
3 1-3
i.e., the vector indicates to the program which 'links' should be tried first, as 
they seem more relevant. In the above matrix, industry 1 and 2 appear to be the 
most strongly related, while 1 and 3 are the most distant.
2 - In the first 'round', no link is considered (R=0). We are just repeating the 
basic program, which assumes that fixed costs are random draws from uniform 
distributions, and serves as a reference point to compute the test which will be 
compared with the following ones.Each A is repeated for 100 runs and mean 
values are computed. A typical result could be:
D = 1 0 2 1
2 1 2 1
1 1 4
T = 0.314
3 - After the first round we try introducing the first link. As noted, possible links 
(correlation factors) are ordered according to the percentage of firms active in 
two industries.
In the example above, at this point we would have R=1 and the first link (1-2) is 
considered.
4 - The value o f p l2 for c, = ( 1  - p n )v, +pI2v„; c2 = ( 1  - p l2)v2 +p12vl2 (p 12 = p ' in
the program) is determined iteratively. As all p 's  are initialized at 0 , in the first 
run and p] = 0 + 0 . 1  = 0 .1 .
With this value the matrix F is generated again, where c, and c2 are now 
computed according to the formula and c3 are random draws from uniform 
distributions. Again F' and D are built from F and a new test T' is computed. D 
could be in this case:
1 0 4 1
4 1 2 1
1 1 4
with T' = 0.259.
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5 - We now compare the value of the test when correlation is introduced with 
the case when no correlation is assumed.
6  - If  the test decreases, (meaning that the approximation has improved) we 
repeat the previous procedure, i.e., we try whether increasing the value of the 
correlation factor p] improves the fit.
7 - When the value of the test does not decrease any more, we introduce a 
further possible link; i.e., we first check whether further links can be examined 
(in the example only 3 links are possible, so that Rmax = 3); if  that is the case, 
we repeat the procedure with all the previous correlations which appeared 
significant (the last value of p  has to be reduced of 0 . 1  as the last step - increase 
o f 0.1 - did not improve the approximation) and a new one: R=R+1.
8  - Finally, when all possible links have been considered, we build a 
diversification matrix with all correlation factors that the data "accepted", i.e. 
which helped in describing the actual matrix.
The final output of the program is:
(a) a generated diversification matrix
(b) a value of the test
(c) the values of the significant correlation factors.
1.2 Results
(a) The Dairy Sector
UK1962 Results of the simulation:
Generated matrix 19.00 1 0 . 0 1 6.36
1 0 . 0 1 16.00 5.64
6.35 5.64 9.00
Values of p  coefficients 1 -2 : 0 . 6
1-3: 0.6
2-3: 0.6
Value of test T 0.118
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Tests on the generated values of off-diagonal cells1:
X s/yfn
d,2 10.01 1.500 H0'M= io accepted2
6.35 1.233 H0:fi = 9 rejected3
5.64 1.403 H0 M = 6 accepted4
Here we present some examples of the generated dtJ parameters. They are
approximately normally distributed. Hence we can use a test of hypotheses for 
normal distributions.
d J2: generated distribution vs. normal distribution:
0.3
0,25
0,2
0,15
0,1
0,05
0
5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15
generated frequency —-  normal distribution
Here they are shown in detail as an example. In the remaining of the text only the results are
given.
2 In fact the interval X - t — ^=,X +  t--i= =(10.01-1.99.1.5, 10.01+1.99.1.5) = (7.025,
VS’
12.995) includes the value 10.
In fact the interval (6.35-1.99.1.233, 6.36+1.99.1.233) does not include the value 9. 
In fact the interval (5.64-1.99.1.403, 5.64+1.99.1.403) includes the value 6.
129
d l2: generated distribution vs. normal distribution:
0,35
0,3  -
0,25  -
0,2 -
0,15  -
0,1 ■-
0,05
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
generated frequency normal distribution ]
d 23: generated distribution vs. normal distribution:
0,3
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11
| f  generated frequency normal distribution |
UK1986 Results of the simulation:
Generated matrix 34.00 8.91 8.26
8.91 15.00 4.83
8.26 4.83 14.00
Values of p  coefficients 1-2: 0.5
1-3: 0.5
2-3: 0.5
Value of test T 0.246
All the generated value pass the test.
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IT1986 lesults of the simulation:
Generated matrix 73.00 8.95 48.65
8.95 1 0 . 0 0 8.93
48.65 8.93 71.00
Values of p  coefficients 1 -2 : 0 . 6
1-3: 0.6
2-3: 0.6
Value of test T 0.133
Only d23 does not pass the test, 
(b) The Soft D rink Sector
UK1962 Results of the simulation:
Generated matrix 51.00 42.12 4.00
42.12 52.00 4.00
4.00 4.00 4.00
Values of p  coefficients 1-2: 0.7
1-3: 0.7
2-3: 0.7
Value of test T 0.142
Only d23 does not pass the test.
UK1986 Results of the simulation:
Generated matrix 29.00 22.51 5.78
22.51 137.00 6.47
5.78 6.47 7.00
Values of p  coefficients 1-2: 0.7
1-3: 0.7
2-3: 0.7
Value of test T 0.310
Only d23 does not pass the test.
IT1986 Results of the simulation:
Generated matrix 45.00 11.78 11.28 
11.78 64.00 36.64 
11.28 36.64 62.00
Values of p  coefficients 2-3: 0.6
Value of test T 0.640
Only dl3 does not pass the test.
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(c) The Biscuit Sector
UK1962 Results of the simulation:
Generated matrix 28.00 12.45 4.16 8 . 8 8
12.45 13.00 1.92 4.23
4.16 1.92 16.00 15.79
8 . 8 8 4.23 15.79 35.00
Values of p  coefficients 1 -2 : 0 . 8
3-4: 0 . 8
Value of test T 0.624
All the generated value pass the test.
UK1986 Results o f the simulation:
Generated matrix 27.00 0 . 8 8 9.92 1 2 . 0 2
0 . 8 8 5.00 0.62 0.91
9.92 0.62 2 1 . 0 0 9.96
1 2 . 0 2 0.91 9.96 26.00
Values of p  coefficients 1-4: 0 . 6
3-4: 0 . 6
Value of test T 0.303
IT1986
Only du does not pass the test.
! Results of the simulation:
Generated matrix 48.00 3.93 7.28 29.40
3.93 15.00 3.22 10.70
7.28 3.22 1 2 . 0 0 10.70
29.40 10.70 10.70 6 6 . 0 0
Values of p  coefficients 1-2: 0.5
l-3:0.5
1-4:0.5
2-3:0.5
3-4: 0.5
2-4: 0.5
Value of test T 0.325
Only dn does not pass the test.
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(d) The F ru it and Vegetable Sector 
UK1962 Results o f the simulation:
Generated matrix 42.00 22.67 24.44 21.64 
22.67 28.00 17.92 16.36 
24.44 17.92 31.00 17.67 
21.64 16.36 17.67 27.00
Values of p  coefficients 1-2: 0.7
1-3: 0.7
1-4: 0.7
2-3: 0.7
3-4: 0.7
2-4: 0.7
Value of test T 0 . 1 2 2
Only dx 3 does not pass the test. 
UK1986 Results of the simulation:
Generated matrix 17.00 5.86 10.67 7.62
5.86 1 2 . 0 0 37.81 5.93
10.67 7.81 26.00 1059
7.62 5.93 10.59 17.00
1 -2 : 0.7
1-3: 0.7
1-4: 0.7
2-3: 0.7
3-4: 0.7
2-4: 0.7
Values of p  coefficients
Value of test T 0.158
All the values pass the test.
IT1986 lesults of the simulation:
Generated matrix 76.00 31.66 1 1 . 8 8 10.03
31.66 65.00 10.24 8.85
1 1 . 8 8 10.24 45.00 22.37
10.03 8.85 22.37 39.00
Values of p  coefficients 1 -2 : 0.5
3-4: 0.7
Value of test T 0.320
Both d23 and d24 do not pass the test.
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(e) The Flour and Cereal Sector
UK1962 Results of the simulation:
Generated matrix
Values of p  coefficients
Value of test T
d\5,d2S,d1A do not pass the test.
16.00 3.50 10.42 8 . 0 1 2.57
3.50 9.00 6.51 4.96 1.99
10.42 6.51 41.00 12.30 5.05
8 . 0 1 4.96 12.30 29.00 4.23
2.57 1.99 5.05 4.23 7.00
1-2: 0.5
1-3: 0.5
1-4: 0.5
1-5: 0.5
2-3: 0.5
2-4: 0.5
2-5: 0.5
3-4: 0.5
3-5: 0.5
4-5:0.5
0.243
UK1986 Results of the simulation:
Generated matrix
Values of p  coefficients
Value of test T
1 0 . 0 0 2.3 3.00 1.30 1.25
2.31 32.00 16.83 7.82 7.31
3.00 16.83 38.00 8.50 8.49
1.30 7.82 8.50 14.00 4.38
21.25 7.31 8.49 4.38 14.00
2-3: 0.5
2-4: 0.5
2-5: 0.5
3-4: 0.5
3-5: 0.5
4-5: 0.5
0.324
All the values pass the test.
IT1986 Results o f the simulation:
Generated matrix
Values of p  coefficients
Value of test T
3.00 0 . 0 0 1.15 0.14 0.39
0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1.15 0 . 0 0 63.00 2.78 6.93
0.14 0 . 0 0 2.78 6 . 0 0 0.82
0.39 0 . 0 0 6.93 0.82 18.00
0.640
Only d35 does not pass the test.
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2 Economies of Scope
2.1 Program  flow chart
As before, the program is illustrated by means of a flow chart. The basic 
program explained in section 3 still represents the first step in the procedure:
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Read actual D 
Read vector of 
economies of scope
1
5=0
s '  =0
generate F 
build F  
build D
100 times2
define vector p /4: 
(p/4,...,p/4)= 
=(max c m a x  c )
3
test T
4 s=s+l
generate F
build F  with p /4 as 
entry criterion5
p /4+/-0.01=d +/-0.16 no
yes
build D
yes
no
S =S -0.1
s<smax yes
no
I
stop
✓ * \
divers, matrix D
value of test
values of ec. scope J
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1 - As for the first simulation exercise, the program: (i) reads the actual 
diversification matrix D, (ii) reads the vector with the pattern o f economies of 
scope5.
If  we take the same example, i.e. the matrix:
1 2 3
1 10 8 1
2 8 12 3
3 1 3 4
with the economies of
 s_
1
2
3
scope vector:
links
1-2
2-3
1-3
the program will consider them in turn as for the correlation factors.
2 - Again, as a reference starting point, we generate a basic diversification 
matrix assuming no economies of scope are present.
3 - From F (matrix o f random cost draws) we build F  (O's-l's matrix), using the 
hypothesis that, on each market, the equilibrium number o f firms is equal to the 
actual number observed in the industry (dH in the observed diversification 
matrix), and active firms are the du lowest cost firms in market i.
We now make a further step, and define as equilibrium price on each market, 
the price defined by the equality between the highest cost draw among the du 
active firms in market i and pf /4 . We shall need equilibrium prices in order to 
define an entry criterion, where economies o f scope are considered.
4 - As previously, we compute the value of the test T, as a reference, and then 
we introduce positive values of economies of scope, starting from the highest 
link. Again we generate a matrix F of random cost draws.
5 - In order to build F , we have here to use the 'entry criterion' described in the 
model. When economies o f scope are present it is not possible to sort each 
column and define the lowest cost firms as the active ones on that market. The 
level of fixed costs depends in fact on whether the firm enters one market only 
(or more than one market but not linked through economies of scope) or more 
than one market which share economies of scope.
We therefore use the 'entry criterion' described: given equilibrium prices on 
each market, for each cost draw of each firm, (c/, i= industry index, j=firm 
index):
5 Contrary to the cost correlation case, where a relationship between i and j, and between j and
k, was taken to create a 'group relationship' among i, j and k, here we only introduce two way 
economies of scope: i.e., if i,kj are somehow linked, we consider as possible pattems:ij, jk; ij, ik; ij, ik, 
jk.
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(i) if  industry / is not linked through economies of scope to any other industry, 
we simply compare c{ with / 4: the firm is active (the corresponding cell is
set to 1) if  c{ < p] /4 ,
(ii) if  industry z shares economies of scope with another industry /, we shall first 
compare c/with pf /4; if  the first is smaller, firm j  will be certainly active in 
industry z. If this is not true, we have to check whether the firm is able, and has 
an incentive to enter anyway, exploiting the economies o f scope advantage:
(i.e., entering both industries generate positive profits and the "bad 
performance" in industry z does not completely outweigh the cost reductions 
obtained through the economies of scope). If the inequality holds, both cells j i  
and j l  are set to 1 .
6  - This however will in general generate more entry than desired, i.e., in 
markets where firms enter exploiting economies o f scope, for more firms than 
dti the new criterion will be satisfied.
In order to obtain again the right number of firms, we 'adjust' the equilibrium 
price. Starting from the industry where the actual number o f firms diverges most 
from the generated one, we reduce slightly the equilibrium price and compute 
again F  and the number of firms in each market (as before, each time 100 runs 
are performed and means are computed). The adjustment continues until actual 
and generated number of firms do not differ by more than one.
The diversification matrix D is then finally built.
7 - From here on, the procedure repeats exactly the steps o f the previous 
program, updating values of economies of scope, and introducing new ones 
until every possibility has been tried. The output o f the program will be:
(a) a generated diversification matrix
(b) a value for the test
(c) the values of the significant economies of scope factors.
We shall present here only the values o f the economies o f scope which 
best approximate the actual matrix, with the value o f the test T and the results of 
the test o f the hypothesis that the off-diagonal elements, as predicted by the 
simulation, are not significantly different from the actual ones.
4 4
(  2 \  
-  (c\ + c{ -  sa ) > max 0 ,— -  c{
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2.2. Results
(a) The Dairy Sector
UK1962 Results of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients 1 -2 : 0 . 2
1-3: 0.3
2-3: 0.2
Value of test T 0.098
All the values pass the test. 
UK1986 Results of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients 1 -2 : 0 . 2  
1-3: 0.2
Value of test T 0.131
IT1986
All the values pass the test.
Results of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients 1-2: 0.4
1-3: 0.3
2-3: 0.2
Value of test T 0.128
All the values pass the test.
(b) The Soft Drink Sector 
UK1962 Results of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients 1-2: 0.4 
1-3: 0.2
Value of test T 0.290
All the values pass the test. 
UK1986 Results of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients 1-2: 0.4
1-3: 0.2
2-3: 0.2
Value of test T 0.082
All the values pass the test.
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IT1986 Results of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients 2-3: 0.2
Value of test T 0.704
Only dn does not pass the test.
(c) The Biscuit Sector
UK1962 Results of the simulation:
All the values pass the test.
Values of S coefficients 1-2: 0.4 
3-4: 0.4
Value of test T 0.343
UK1986 Results of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients 1-4: 0.1 
3-4: 0.2
Value of test T 0.373
.Only dM does not pass the test.
IT1986 Results of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients 1 -2 : 0 . 2
3-4: 0.1
2-4: 0.1
1-4: 0.1
Value of test T 0.311
All the values pass the test.
(d) The Fruit-Vegetable Sector 
UK1962 Results of the simulation:
UK1986
IT1986
Values of S coefficients 1-2: 0.5
2-4: 0.4
3-4: 0.3
1-4: 0.2
2-3: 0.2
1-3: 0.2
Value of test T 0.197
The values d ^ d ^  do not pass the test.
Results of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients 1 -2 : 0 . 2
3-4: 0.2
1-3: 0.2
2-4: 0.2
Value of test T 0 . 2 2 2
Only dXA does not pass the test.
lesuits of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients 3-4: 0.3
1 -2 : 0 . 2
2-3: 0.2
2-4: 0.1
Value of test T 0.506
All the values pass the test.
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(e) The Flour-Cereal Sector
UK1962 Results of the simulation:
UK1986
IT1986
Values of S coefficients 2-3: 0.5 
4-5: 0.5
3-5: 0.3 
2-5: 0.2
1-5: 0.2
2-4: 0.2 
1-3: 0.1
Value of test T 0.372
The values dn ,dls ,d2A d15 do not pass the test.
Results of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients 3-5: 0.2 
2-4: 0.2
2-3: 0.1
4-5: 0.1
3-4: 0.1
Value of test T 0.260
All the values pass the test.
lesults of the simulation:
Values of S coefficients -
Value of test T 0.600
Only d25 does not pass the test.
3 Comparisons across Time and Countries: Results
(a) Dairy Sector
We "give" to the simulation program only the distribution of firms across 
industries:
UK1986 35 IT1986 73
15 10
14 71
We impose the 'correlation pattern': 1-2: 0.6; 2-3: 0.6; 1-3: 0 .6 , which was the 
best approximation to the UK 1962 data. The predictions for the two matrices 
are:
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UK1986 34.00 10.78 10.30 IT1986 73.00 8.95 48.65
10.78 15.00 5.56 8.95 10.00 8.93
10.30 5.56 14.00 48.65 8.93 71.00
value of T: 0.36 value of T: 0.24
In order to test the hypothesis that predicted values are not significantly 
different from the true ones, we compute for each value the standard deviation:
UK1986
X s/*Jn H0:M = m0
d n 10.78 1.63 accepted
10.30 1.46 accepted
5.56 1.56 accepted
IT1986
X s / S o
51IIttf
8.95 1.03 accepted
48.65 1.03 accepted
8.93 0.90 rejected
(b) Soft Drink Sector
The distribution of firms is:
UK1986 29 IT1986 45
37 64
7 62
We impose the UK1962 'correlation pattern': 1-2: 0.7; 2-3: 0.7; 1-3: 0.7. The 
predictions are:
UK1986 29.00 22.51 5.78 IT1986 45.00 34.87 34.01
22.51 37.00 6.47 34.87 64.00 34.90
5.78 6.47 7.00 .34.01 34.90 62.00
value ofT: 0.31 value of T: 10.02
The results of the test o f hypothesis are:
UK1986
X s/<Jn H0-M = Mo
d n 22.51 2.01 accepted
5.78 0.87 accepted
^ 23 6.47 0.70 rejected
IT198 6
X s!  Vw
34.87
34.01
34.90
2.47
2.77
2.53
rejected
rejected
rejected
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(c) Biscuit Sector
The diagonal elements of the actual diversification matrices are:
UK1986 27 IT1986 48
15 15
21 12
56 66
From the UK 1962 model the correlation pattern is: 1-2: 0.8; 3-4: 0.8. The 
predictions are:
UK1986 27.00 4.69 3.56 4.13
4.69 5.00 0.77 0.95
3.56 0.77 21.00 16.68
4.13 0.95 16.68 56.00
IT1986 48.00 14.78 3.34 17.60
14.78 15.00 1.04 5.72
3.34 1.04 12.00 12.00
17.60 5.72 12.00 66.00
value ofT: 0.63 value of T: 0.41
Testing the hypothesis // = we have:
UK19I36 IT198 6
X s/*Jn on X s/yfn
d n 4.69 0.54 rejected 14.78 0.44 rejected
<*» 3.56 1.45 rejected 3.34 1.50 accepted
< 4.13 1.50 rejected 17.60 2.83 rejected
d 23 077 0.80 accepted 1.04 0.83 rejected
<*24 0.95 0.95 accepted 5.72 1.78 rejected
<*34 16.28 1.82 accepted 12.00 0.00 reiected
(d) F ru it and Vegetable Sector
Given the distribution of firms across industries:
UK1986 17 IT1986 76
12 65
26 45
17 39
We impose the correlation patterns: 1-2 : 0.7; 2-3: 0.7; 3-4: 0.7. The predictions 
are:
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UK1986 17.00 5.86 10.67 7.62
5.86 1 2 . 0 0 7.81 5.93
10.67 7.81 26.00 10.59
7.62 5.93 10.59 17.00
IT1986 26.00 48.38 35.81 31.55
48.38 65.00 32.67 28.91
35.81 32.67 45.00 2 2 . 6 6
31.55 28.91 2 2 . 6 6 39.00
value of T: 0.16 value of T: 1.50
The results of the tests of hypothesis are:
s UK19I36 IT198 6
X s/Vn H0-M = Mo X s / y f n o
n
dl2 5.86 1.34 accepted 48.38 2.87 rejected
4  3 10.67 1 . 8 8 accepted 35.81 2.25 rejected
d\ 4 7.62 1.59 accepted 31.55 2.36 reiected
^23 7.81 1.61 accepted 32.67 2.69 rejected
djA 5.93 1.97 accepted 28.91 2.43 rejected
djA 10.59 1.75 accepted 2 2 . 6 6 2.78 accepted
(e) Flour and Cereals Sector
Starting with the actual distribution of firms: 
UK1986 1 0  . . . IT1986 3
. 32 . . . 0
. 38 . . 63
14 . 6
14 18
We impose the UK 1962 correlation patterns: 1-2: 0.5; 2-3: 0.5; 3-4: 0.5; 4-5: 
0.5. The result is:
1 0 . 0 0 5.72 6.38 3.15 3.20 IT1986 3.00 0 . 0 0 2.42 0 . 6 6 1 . 2 0
5.72 32.00 17.02 7.50 7.85 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
6.38 17.02 38.00 8.35 8.74 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 63.00 4.67 12.92
3.15 7.50 8.35 14.00 4.43 2.42 0 . 0 0 4.67 6 . 0 0 2.43
3.20 7.85 8.74 4.43 14.00 1 . 2 0 0 . 0 0 12.92 2.43 18.00
value of T: 0.42 value of T: 1.90
The test of hypothesis leads to:
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UK19I36 IT198 6
X s l*Jn H o'M = Mo X s / ^ f n H o'V  = Mo
d\ 2 5.72 1.45 accepted 0 . 0 0 / L
dn 6.38 1.46 accepted 2.42 0 . 6 8 rejected
du 3.15 1.31 accepted 0 . 6 6 0.65 accepted
dX5 3.20 1 . 2 2 accepted 1 . 2 0 0.74 accepted
d23 17.02 2.24 accepted 0 . 0 0 / /
d» 7.50 1.77 accepted 0 . 0 0 / /
d2S 7.85 1.94 accepted 0 . 0 0 / /
d34 8.35 1.71 accepted 4.67 1 . 1 0 rejected
d35 8.74 1.53 accepted 12.92 1.85 rejected
dAS 4.43 1.58 accepted 2.43 1 . 2 0 accepted
Chapter 4
Diversification of Italian Food Firms 
A Case Study Analysis
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1. Introduction
The main theme of this chapter is that the factors shaping the 
diversification strategies of the largest Italian firms are rather different from 
those determining diversification patterns among small and medium size firms, 
whose behaviour dominated the statistical pattern described in the cluster 
analysis o f chapter 3.
While we argue that these largest firms are atypical, we cannot 
demonstrate this statistically since we are dealing with a mere handful o f firms. 
To uncover what is special about these firms, we need to proceed to detailed 
case studies. That is the task of this chapter. What we argue is that, in the case 
o f these firms, four mechanisms are important. Apart from technological 
economies of scope, which formed the focus of our discussion so far, we find 
that three further factors play a role. These are: constraints to the expansion of 
firms, brand economies of scope, and, most importantly, economies o f scope in 
distribution. We explore the role of these three mechanisms, by reference to the 
experience of four o f the Italian largest food processors: Galbani, Barilla, 
Parmalat and Star. They display a wide variety of diversification strategies. 
Galbani and Barilla are diversified but focused on core activities, Parmalat is 
more widely diversified, and Star, the most widely diversified of these 
companies, has a range of products which is extremely large.
The data used here are collected from publicly available sources (balance 
sheets o f firms, trade publications, census information), information obtained 
from market research companies (Databank, AGB), interviews within the 
companies themselves and interviews with independent experts o f the Italian 
food industry. Quantitative data are available only for parts o f the histories of 
the firms. For the remaining years we rely, in describing the industry, on 
information collected through interviews.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. We first describe the 
framework used to analyse diversification of our four firms. Secondly we 
present a brief history of each firm. In section 4 we develop the diversification 
analysis. Section 5 discusses other factors that might be considered relevant to 
explain diversification. Section 6  analyses the relationship between the case 
studies in this chapter and the results of chapter 3.
The Appendix includes detailed Tables with the data used in the analysis.
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2. Reasons for Diversification
In chapter 3 we looked at how economies of scope accounted for 
diversification patterns. Economies o f scope were defined in an abstract way, so 
as to include everything which made it cheaper to produce two (or more) 
products jointly rather than separately. However the discussion on the clusters 
identified through the statistical analysis revealed that economies o f scope were 
mainly related to the presence of common inputs.
In the present chapter, we need to consider a wider menu o f motives for 
diversification.
2.1 Motives for Diversification A: a Push Factor
The first theme we explore here is the familiar idea o f a unique 
individual asset that allows profitable expansion of the firm's scale o f operation 
as was described in chapter 1. If this expansion is hindered by the size o f the 
segment relative to the firm's current size (in other words if  the firm's market 
share in the segment is already large) then diversification may be the only route 
to profitable expansion1. Usually, this factor will only operate for large firms. 
There is, however, a variant of this effect, which might in principle affect 
smaller firms. If some institutional constraint renders the average or marginal 
returns to this unique asset artificially low, then the optimal response for the 
firm may be to diversify out of the industry. An example of this arises in the 
case of Barilla, as we shall see below.
2.2 Motives for Diversification B: Pull Factors
The second set of factors relevant to the discussion that follows falls 
within the economies of scope model2. If we interpret the concept broadly, we 
have to include everything that makes it cheaper to produce or market products 
jointly. We need to distinguish between economies of scope arising at the level
1 If, as was discussed in Chapter 1, transaction costs imply that renting or selling the excess 
capacity is not a feasible option.
2 As discussed in chapter 1 and as used both in the theoretical analysis of chapter 2 and in the 
statistical analysis of chapter 3.
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o f production costs (those normally emphasised in the literature) and those 
arising at the level of marketing costs.
Regarding production costs, technological economies o f scope may arise 
because of the existence of by-products that can be used in other production 
lines, because of common inputs, or because of the availability o f machines 
with excess capacity at some stages of production. These types o f economies 
may arise at different stages in the production process.
As to marketing costs, we first note those brand name economies of 
scope which reflect the fact that advertising costs for one product can be 
"shared" with another, having the same brand name. I.e., if  the first is a 
successful product, the second might need lower advertising expenditures since 
it benefits from the success of the first. The role o f this type o f economy is 
likely to be important only for the largest firms, in that only a quite small 
number o f firms support nationally recognised brands.
A second kind of marketing economy arises when the distribution 
network of the firm can be profitably shared across more than one product. This 
is so if  the distribution network, a fixed asset for the firm, exhibits excess 
capacity: this case we label distribution economies of scope. Again, unlike 
production economies, the role of distribution economies of scope is likely to be 
relevant only for the largest firms, for only a tiny fraction of Italian firms enjoy 
a widespread distribution network (most of them distribute their products via 
independent distributors).
In chapter 3 it emerged that the first set o f factors (technological 
economies of scope) sufficed to describe diversification patterns in the broad 
run o f Italian and British food firms. Here we claim that the further economies 
just described, and in particular distribution economies, are relevant in 
explaining diversification activities of the largest firms. It is also claimed that 
this accounts - at least partially - for the different diversification patterns of 
these large food firms as compared to the typical diversification pattern that 
emerged from the statistical analysis of chapter 3. To put the point another way, 
we shall see how the diversification histories o f the firms considered in this 
chapter are rather atypical of the general run of Italian food firms. We conclude 
that the statistical analysis (as it was performed in chapter 3, without weighting 
for firms' size) is useful in uncovering diversification patterns among small and 
medium size firms, but a different approach needs to be taken in discussing 
large firms. Some economies of scope may be quantitatively unimportant except 
at very large scales.
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We first describe the firms’ histories and activities and then go on to 
consider in turn each of the listed reasons for diversification. We shall see 
whether and how each one is relevant in explaining the firm's diversification 
and, where appropriate, how it compares with other firms. We discuss some 
other possible reasons for diversification that might be considered relevant. 
Finally, we compare these findings to the results o f the statistical analysis of 
chapter 3.
3. The Firms' Histories
The following case studies are based on four Italian food producers: 
Egidio Galbani S.p.A., Parmalat S.p.A., Barilla S.p.A. and Star S.p.A.. The 
reasons for choosing these firms lie in their peculiar diversification histories, 
which are outlined in the next section. They are all large firms in the food 
industry (respectively the 3rd, 6 th, 5th, and 12th, in terms of total sales in 1991. 
Two of them (Galbani and Barilla) are diversified into related markets, the first 
producing cheese and salami, the second pasta and biscuits. One (Parmalat) is 
diversified into more distant activities (milk, fruit juice, processed tomatoes, 
biscuits). Finally, Star is a firm which has been extremely diversified since its 
earliest days.
We briefly summarise their histories before looking at the main factors 
driving their diversification (and non diversification) strategies.
3.1 Galbani3
Galbani was founded in 1920 by Egidio Galbani and his family, as the 
successors to a small cheese producer/seller in the area o f Lecco. The firm built 
plants in Melzo (Milan), Certosa (Pavia), Corteolona (Pavia) and Casale 
(Cremona), with approximately 30/40 employees each. A large distribution 
network was rapidly built up with salesmen directly employed by the firm.
Along with other cheese producers, Galbani also raised pigs on a farm 
near the cheese plants, some by-products of cheese production being used to 
feed the pigs. Until the war the firm used to raise pigs to sell them. After the 
war Galbani entered the salami and pork meat market with separate plants.
3 What follows is bases on information obtained from Mediobanca, R&S, Company reports, 
Milano (issues from 1977 to 1991), hereafter R&S; interviews at the company and daily 
business/financial newspapers.
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Galbani also produced other dairy products, albeit in smaller quantities: butter, 
yoghurt, cream (and a very limited amount o f milk).
In the meantime the original owners had sold some share o f the firm to 
others. Following some internal disputes these shareholders left the firm to 
found Locatelli (now a competitor to Galbani, which was later acquired by 
Nestle). By the 1960s the other shareholders had sold the firm to five foreign 
financial companies4.
In July 1989 Galbani was acquired by IFIL (Fiat Group), who later sold 
35% to BSN. In December 1990 IFIL sold a further 15% to BSN. In 1990 BSN, 
through Galbani, acquired Agnesi, a pasta producer. In June 1992 BSN acquired 
10% of IFIL's remaining holding of Galbani shares, and in 1993 another 10%; 
the remaining 30% will be transferred in the near future5.
Both of the markets in which Galbani operates are extremely fragmented. 
The cheese market is the more concentrated o f the two (the four firm sales 
concentration ratio is approximately 30% but there are approximately 2000 of 
firms in the market6) and has higher brand consciousness. Galbani sells a large 
number of differentiated products in the average quality-low price range. It has 
always been the market leader and currently has a market share o f 
approximately 17%7. In the late 1960s Galbani advertised heavily in the cheese 
market, creating a very well known image (the brand Bel Paese was advertised 
with the sentence "Galbani vuol dire fiducia" (Galbani means trust) which is 
still familiar today). Later its advertising expenditures fell to approximately 0.5- 
1.5% of total sales, as compared to 11-15% for Kraft, the second largest 
producer8. This reflects the fact that Galbani’s main customers are cheese shops, 
which are not very sensitive to advertising, and sell unbranded products910.
In the salami market brand consciousness is basically absent. The market 
is very fragmented (CR4 is less than 15%) with Galbani being the second 
largest producer with approximately 3.5% of the market11. The new 
management plans to launch the salami products under a new brand name 
distinct from Galbani.
The main strength of the company has always been the distribution 
network, which in the cheese12 market is essential. With its system o f "tentata
Source: company interview.
Source: Sole 24-Ore, various issues, R&S.
Source: Databank.
Source: Databank. See Appendix.
Source: Databank.
This is the view reported in interviews by the company's management.
Since Galbani's recent acquisition by BSN, advertising expenditures have increased.
Source: Databank.
And more generally in the fresh products markets.
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vendita" (direct sale) Galbani was always able to reach the entire country with 
much higher frequency and lower unit costs than its competitors13. Salesmen 
with refrigerated vans visit all the sales points (approximately 140,000) to sell 
them what they need directly, rather than taking orders for fixed quantities. This 
system generates immediate cash from sales and gives a high turnover of 
products. It is one of the reasons for the strong liquidity position of the Galbani 
company14. The recent changes in the Italian distribution sector (where 
concentration has been rising) have not affected the company yet15. Galbani 
sells approximately 50% of its output through supermarkets but generally it 
supplies their salespoints directly (rather than delivering to central depots).
Galbani also produces for the foreign own-brand sector: for example it 
produces mozzarella, ricotta, mascarpone for all the major British supermarkets.
The reason why it has never entered other product markets, according to 
statements by the company's management, is mainly because its distribution 
network can only be used to sell a limited number o f different types o f products. 
The management also thinks it better not to disperse its effort over too many 
products. The sales agent with his refrigerated van can expect to sell only three 
or four products to each small shop. Widening the number o f products offered 
would not be expected to lead to a proportionate increase in sales.
Financial management has always been a high priority for the company. 
Galbani has always had ample liquid funds and an important share of its profits 
came from its holding of government bonds16.
Galbani sales and profits/sales17 for the years 1972-199018 are shown in 
Fig. 4 . 1  (in logarithmic scale). Over this entire period Galbani did not diversify 
its activities beyond its two basic businesses.
13 Source: company and food experts interviews.
14 Source: Databank.
15 As reported in interviews with management.
16 Source: Databank, food industry experts, balance sheets.
17 Measured as the difference between sales and operating costs, in order to isolate the results of 
the company's industrial activity from its returns from other activities (holdings of financial assets, 
etc.).
18 Balance sheets with a standardised structure (hence comparable across firms) are available 
from 1972 (source: R&S, Milano, various issues).
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3.2 Barilla19
Barilla was founded in 1875 in Parma by Pietro Barilla (grandfather of 
the current owner) who owned a bakery making bread and pasta. By the end of 
the century the Barilla family was producing 50 kilos o f pasta per day. In 1919 
production was up to 30 tons per day and the firm had 300 employees.
During this period, much attention was devoted to other production 
methods (Barilla personnel frequently visited Germany to study bread
19 What follows is based on information obtained from R&S publications (issues from 1977 to 
1991), Barilla internal publications, Databank, interviews with company management and food 
industry experts.
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production there), to distribution methods (the company's products reached most 
Italian cities and the Italian colonies), and to questions o f company image20.
During the war period the difficulty of buying raw materials and the 
fixed per capita quota system led to reduced production and a fall in quality. 
Between 1943 and 1945 the bakery was taken over by the Germans, and from 
1945 to 1946 by the Americans.
After the war Riccardo Barilla, the son of the founder, left the direction 
o f the company to his sons Pietro, who was in charge of the sales department, 
and Gianni, who was involved in the production area.
After the reopening of free markets in 1948 the number o f pasta 
producers increased from 1000 to approximately 2 0 0 0 . Competition, 
accordingly, became extremely tough. Barilla in 1952 abandoned the production 
o f bread, and concentrated on pasta. Up to this period pasta was sold unbranded 
and unpacked. Barilla was the first to introduce packaged and branded pasta 
with a very successful advertising campaign ("Con pasta Barilla e sempre 
domenica" - with Barilla pasta it is always Sunday) and became the first Italian 
industrial pasta producer21.
In 1965 a new plant was built in Rubbiano di Solignano (Parma). At that 
time the sales network reached 100.000 sales points. In the same year Barilla 
also began the production of bread sticks and rusks.
In the mid '60s Barilla lobbied heavily for the introduction o f legislation 
requiring a minimum percentage of durum wheat in the pasta, as well as specific 
standards for packaging (the law was passed in 1968). This represented a 
substantial barrier to entry for many small producers, especially in the South, 
where soft wheat was often used to produce pasta. Moreover the new packaging 
standards required plants that most of the small producers did not have. The 
result was an increase in the standard quality o f the product and the feasibility 
o f a more organised distribution system (thanks to packaged products). However 
in the medium-long term it made the product more homogeneous and increased 
price competition22.
The year 1968 was one of the most critical in the history of the company. 
Its expansion plans led Barilla to build a plant which (for the time) was 
extremely large. The plant was located outside Parma, in Pedrignano, with 
completely new machines that could produce up to 900 tons o f pasta per day23.
20 The horses owned by the family were well known, and at that time generated the kind of
publicity associated with football league sponsorship today.
21 This information come from internal publications.
22 According to the company's management, as reported in interviews.
23 According to the management there were large brand name economies of scale that could only 
be reaped with a larger size.
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The plant was a technical success24, although its cost was twice as high as 
planned (it amounted to 18 billion liras while Barilla's annual sales revenue was 
36 billion liras) which led to a substantial increase in the debts o f the company. 
Other difficulties arose; the main competitor (Buitoni), conscious o f Barilla's 
difficulties, began a very aggressive marketing policy. Moreover, in 1968 the 
political and social situation in Italy was extremely tense. In 1971 the Barilla 
family finally agreed to sell to the American company Grace. Grace Foods was 
a holding company which owned plastic, fertilisers, oil, sugar and food firms. In 
1966-67 it had started an acquisition campaign in Italy and Europe. In Italy it 
had already acquired Tanara25, and had been interested in Barilla for some time. 
In February 1971 Grace acquired 75% of Barilla and left 25% in the hands of 
the Barilla brothers who maintained their positions in the company for a while, 
but left in 1972.
With Grace a new expansion period began, in line with the strategy of 
the parent company. The company's internal organisation was greatly modified 
and improved: marketing, market research and new financial and administrative 
methodologies were introduced26.
The very high inflation rate in Italy at the beginning o f the '70s led the 
government to freeze some prices in 1973. Among them was the price of 
pasta27. This reduced Barilla's profitability and28 constituted the initial impulse 
for diversification into other markets29. The choice of which product market to 
enter, according to Barilla's management, was driven by several considerations: 
it had to be a large market with growing demand; it should not be too 
concentrated, but should have high unit margins; finally it should complement 
the strengths o f the company, allowing it to exploit synergies in sales and 
distribution (and possibly inputs). Market research revealed that there was scope 
to revitalise the bakery products industry in Italy with new and different images, 
and a new name. The production of biscuits would allow the firm to exploit its 
distribution network, which had excess capacity.
Barilla did not initially produce biscuits itself. There was excess capacity 
in the biscuit industry and Barilla used various small producers for its new 
biscuit line (Mulino Bianco) which was launched at the end of 1975. After
24 It is still working well today and has never been modified except for the opening of a  new 
plant to produce biscuits.
25 An ice cream producer, owned jointly by the Tanara, Barilla and Marchi families.
26 Source: company interviews.
27 Prices were first frozen, then regulated, which meant that they could rise in response to
increases in costs but only if these increases were clearly proved. Finally they were "supervised", i.e. 
controlled by national authorities. Only in 1978 every form of price regulation disappeared.
28 Together with the more general strategic objectives of Grace.
29 See the case "Mulino Bianco", Bocconi University, 1988.
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various experiments the "right" image (linked to tradition and non­
sophistication) was found. It was supported by a strong marketing campaign30, 
and it was an immediate advertising success31.
In 1976 Barilla began producing bread sticks under the Mulino Bianco 
brand name and converted the brand name of the Barilla rusks into Mulino 
Bianco. Shortly afterwards pastries and industrial patisserie were introduced.
Meanwhile, Barilla's parent, Grace, was facing difficulties in the 
European market and a series o f financial problems, which eventually caused it 
to abandon its project of creating a large European food conglomerate. The last 
o f its European acquisitions to be sold, in July 1979, was Barilla32.
Pietro Barilla, then 6 6  years old, bought back 25% of the company 
through Finbarilla (a financial company) with an option to buy the rest by 1987. 
The remaining 75% was owned by the Dutch financial company Relou. In 1980 
Finbarilla incorporated Barilla and took its name. In 1987 the Barilla family 
acquired the remaining 26% which gave it control of the company (the rest is 
still owned by the Relou Italia financial company)33. Over the same period, 
Barilla extended the production of biscuits to its Pedrignano plants34.
Barilla's entry in the biscuit sector was extremely successful. The 
company was highly innovative, and it developed a strong brand image. The 
other companies in the sector did not at the time realise the change in strategy 
which Barilla's activities represented35. Using its pasta distribution network 
allowed Barilla to achieve a reduction in unit cost.
At the beginning of 1988 Barilla tried to acquire 40% o f Lustucru- 
Rivoire et Carret, the second French pasta producer (with a market share of 
30%, after Panzani of BSN), but the acquisition failed because of the opposition 
of the majority shareholder36.
In 1989 Barilla adopted a holding structure, and separated the activities 
related to pasta, ready sauces and bread sticks, now performed by Barilla 
Alimentare, from those related to bakery products, now organised under Barilla
30 Which also used for the first time the idea of distributing presents to customers who had
collected enough proofs of purchase.
31 "Mulino Bianco", Bocconi, 1988.
32 Source: company interviews.
33 Source: Barilla internal publications.
34 However it was only after the acquisition of Pavesi with its biscuits plants that internal
production came to account for most of Barilla's sales.
35 The sector was still relatively fragmented; Saiwa was Barilla's main competitor.
36 Source: La Repubblica, 15.1.88.
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Dolciaria, both owned by Barilla. Barilla Alimentare Dolciaria is the 
distribution and sale company owned by the two37.
In 1989 Barilla began a series o f acquisitions in the fresh bread sector, 
acquiring Giannotti, Buralli and Panem38, which now use the Barilla distribution 
network39. Barilla is now the market leader in the Italian bread industry.
Subsequently it launched a new line o f ready tomato sauces, with an 
innovative process (labelled 'mild technologies1)40. Finally, at the beginning of 
1990 it entered the fresh pasta sector. This is a growing market, where the 
leader (Rana) has a very strong brand image. Investments have been high 
because production methods differ from those for dry pasta. The competition 
according to the management is still very strong.
In October 1990 Barilla acquired 49% of Pavesi (owned by Alivar, o f the 
SME company) which produces biscuits and crackers, and in June 1992 the 
remaining 51%41. In January 1991 it acquired 25.5% of Nuova Fomeria (owned 
by Alivar) which produces snacks.
Sales and profits/sales for the years 1972-1990 are shown in FIG. 4.2 (in 
logarithmic scale), with the dates of diversification or contraction.
37 Interviews with food industry experts suggested that this in some cases has created 
competition between the two companies vis-a-vis the distribution outlets (in terms of shelf space for 
products).
38 Without replacing their management.
39 Source: CESCOM data on acquisitions in the food industry.
40 That preserves the original taste and characteristics of the products.
41 Source: Milano Finanza, 1.5.92.
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3.3 Parm alat
The company was founded (as Dietalat-Latte dietetici parmensi) in 1961 
in Parma by Calisto and Anna Maria Tanzi. The Parma area had a long tradition 
in the production of hams and parmesan cheeses and the grandfather o f the 
current owners operated a small firm for the slaughter and maturing o f pigs 
where he produced hams and salami42. When Calisto Tanzi inherited the firm, 
he decided to move out of this market, which was extremely fragmented and
Source: company interviews.
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lacked any brand awareness. He began by producing milk in paper cartons43. In 
Italy at the time milk was distributed only by the Centrali del latte (publicly 
owned) and was basically considered an urban service. Dietalat began 
producing fresh milk sold in so-called tetrapack. Originally it was distributed 
only in Parma, but later also in the Tirrenic coast area (La Spezia).
In 1966 the firm started producing UHT (ultra high temperature) milk 
(i.e., long life milk). This was an important innovation in the Italian market, 
since it allowed the consumption of milk in those areas that previously could 
not be reached by the distribution of fresh milk, especially the South o f Italy. 
The launch was also based on an aggressive policy within the trade, in that it 
involved promoting long life milk as opposed to fresh milk. This was facilitated 
by the limited competition from publicly owned fresh milk producers. For the 
first time in Italy milk became a branded product44.
The wide distribution of the product led to a large distribution network, 
which was fully developed by the mid 70s. It was based on an indirect sales 
force ("concessionari") who bought the products from Parmalat for resale.
Soon the firm began to expand into other product markets. Initially it 
expanded into markets sharing inputs with milk: in 1969 long life cream, in 
1972 yoghurt, in 1974 cheeses. The last one however proved a difficult market; 
highly segmented and fragmented, it needed a large and dedicated distribution 
network to cover the national market, and it always remained a minor product. 
In 1976 Parmalat began producing desserts (which shared part o f the inputs, 
machinery and distribution system with yoghurt) and in 1979 packaged 
industrial bechamelle45 46.
In 1981 Parmalat began its "new" diversification program, outside its 
original (and related) market. First it introduced fruit juices in paper cartons. 
Fruit juices as such were not sold on the Italian market at that time. Nectars47  
were the only fruit drinks and they were sold in bottles48. The production 
"shared" the machinery and packaging with milk and some of the other dairy 
products. Secondly, in 1982 it began producing processed tomato ("passata") in 
paper cartons (again an innovation in the Italian tinned tomatoes market). This
43 It seems that the idea came after a trip to Sweden where paper packaged milk was already 
used at the time.
44 Source: company interviews.
45 Which previously did not exist as an industrial product.
46 Source: Parmalat publications.
47 The difference between nectars and fruit juice is that the former has up to 40% of fruit
content; juices need to have 100% fruit content.
48 Though Zuegg had produced some paper packaged nectars.
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shared only the last part of the production process with the other products. The 
same year it began producing paper packaged wine49.
In 1984 Parmalat entered a very different market; that o f biscuits and 
bakery. In this case there was no apparent synergy in technology with any o f the 
previous products. The decision was taken after market research showed that the 
pastries and biscuit market was growing rapidly (17-18% a year), that most of 
the incumbents were not very aggressive producers, and that Barilla, the market 
leader, was very strong but not likely to be able to supply the entire market. 
Parmalat assumed that its new biscuits and pastries line, sold under the 'Mister 
Day' brands would be perceived by consumers as a complement to its main 
breakfast product (milk)50.
The product has never been very successful. The competition from 
Barilla51, and the use of a distribution network designed for fresh products52
i
were all factors that, according to the management, made the product less 
successful than expected53.
Later Parmalat introduced other products with an innovative image: 
packaged dry bread ("focaccia"), mousses and vegetable soups.
Entry in all these markets was accompanied by the opening of new 
plants. Only in biscuits did Parmalat (like Barilla) begin by producing only a 
small amount itself until its market shares increased.
Following an unsuccessful attempt to enter the television sector with a 
television channel, ODEON TV, the company became strongly indebted and a 
large part o f its cash flow was absorbed by interest payments: in 1989 debts 
amounted to approximately 550 billion liras (revenues were 800 billion liras)54. 
In 1988 Parmalat sold its shares in Odeon TV and was approached by Kraft 
who offered to acquire the company. The proposal was not accepted55.
In 1989 C. Tanzi acquired Finanziaria Centro Nord (a financial company 
in which he had some shares) and transformed it into a holding company to own 
Parmalat: a major capital increase was organised with the support o f an 
investment bank (Akros). Finanziaria Centro Nord increased its assets from 100 
to 680 billion lira. The largest shareholders were Tanzi (56%), Akros (5%), 
Morgan Stanley (3%), Credit Agricole (2%) and Eridania (3%). Finanziaria
49 Source: Parmalat publications and company interviews.
50 Source: company and industry experts interviews.
51 Just before the launch of the product, Barilla pre-empted its sales to supermarkets by filling 
shelves with its biscuits sold at a discount.
52 Moreover according to some analysts the quality of the product was lower than Barilla's.
53 After a while the distribution networks were separated.
54 Source: Milano Finanza, 28.7.90.
55 Sole 24-ore, 4.9.88.
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Centro Nord changed its name to Parmalat Finanziaria and acquired control o f 
Parmalat with a 70% holding56 57.
In 1990 Parmalat restructured its sales organisation (the largest in the 
food sector after Galbani) which is now grouped in three lines: 360 sellers for 
the bakery line, 410 sellers for fresh products, and nearly 1 0 0 0  for milk58.
Parmalat is now moving back to its core business and is expanding in the 
fresh milk sector. This is still a relatively fragmented sector. The leader is SME, 
with a 10% market share, while Parmalat has 1.7% of the market59. The market 
is currently undergoing major changes since a large number of Centrali del Latte 
are being privatised. Parmalat has distribution agreements with the Centrale del 
Latte o f Taranto, and has acquired Centrale del Latte o f Genova (Nov. 1991), 
and o f Como (Jan. 1992)60. In March 1992 Parmalat has acquired also 30% of 
the Giglio group (which has 7% of the long life milk market)61. It is now 
expanding its milk and tomato sauces plants in the South, where it was 
previously producing essentially bakery products.
In August 1992 Schroder acquired 3.26% of Parmalat Finanziaria. 
Accordingly the current ownership structure o f Parmalat is: Tanzi family owns 
51.4%, Akros 5%, Schroder Inv. 3.26%, Eridania 3%, Credit, Agricole, 2.2% 
and others 35.14%.
Sales and profits/sales of the company for the years 1976-1990 are 
shown in FIG. 4.3 (in logarithmic scale), with the dates o f diversification or 
dediversification.
56 This indirectly implied that Parmalat was quoted on the stock market through Parmalat 
Finanziaria.
57 La Repubblica, 21.9.89; 20.12.89; Mondo Economico, 28.10.89; Sole 24-Ore, 14.7.90;
20.7.90.
58 Source: Databank.
59 Source: La Repubblica, 8.2.91; Corriere della Sera, 11.9.91; Sole 24-ore, 13.11.91.
60 The company aims at acquiring more of them. Centrale del Latte di Roma and Centrale del 
Latte di Milano will be probably soon privatised and are the major objects of interest.
61 Sole 24-ore, 26.3.92.
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3.4 STAR
Star was founded by Danilo Fossati in 1948 and produced canned meat 
in a small plant in Muggio (Milan). Almost immediately Fossati began the 
production of stock cubes (Dadi Star). With this product the firm became well 
known and grew rapidly; the market for stock cubes grew with the company. 
Since the beginning, the company’s main strength was its extremely well 
developed distribution network, with hundreds o f salesmen visiting a large 
number o f shops at regular intervals. Star became one of the first large food
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companies in Italy, and was able to build up a strong brand image62. In 1962 the 
firm was already active in a large number of markets (margarine, tea, soup 
preparations and flavouring powders63. It had a relatively strong presence in the 
South and was still growing rapidly. By 1970 it was also producing canned 
tomatoes, marmalades, tuna, coffee, mayonnaise and water powders64. It had 
opened new plants in Corcagnano (Parma) to produce canned tomatoes, and in 
Samo (Salerno) to produce tuna, tomatoes and jam.
In 1971 SME-Societa Finanziaria Meridionale acquired 50% of Star, but 
Fossati maintained the management of the firm65. With the payment from SME, 
Fossati created a holding company, FINDIM (with 10 billion of capital) which 
owned 50% of STAR.
In 1972 SME, through STAR, acquired Societa LUIPA, active in 
beverages preparations, which was subsequently incorporated into STAR. It 
also acquired Mellin d'ltalia from the Mantovani family66: Mellin produced 
baby food and the Mantovani soaps and shampoos for delicate skin, in Camate 
(Milano) (the company was incorporated in STAR in 1977).
By 1977 Star also produced ravioli, barley, camomile, preparations for 
home made pizza and seed oil, all in Agrate67. Star distributed products for 
foreign companies (one of the most important was Kellogg’s' cereals) and was 
producing for the catering and industrial market as well.
In 1985 FINDIM bought back from SME its 50% share in STAR. The 
company subsequently began a reorganisation plan involving the creation o f six 
divisions with separate commercial and sales organisations, a process which 
took two years and implied heavy investments68. The divisions are:
- a consumer products division, the most important in terms of sales, which 
manages the production and sale o f consumer food products. It has two 
separate sales forces, one selling "agricultural related" products, the other 
"industrial type" products;
62 Source: company interviews.
63 Kompass, 1962.
64 Kompass, 1990.
65 Source: Ori, 1974. SME was created in 1899 as Society Meridionale Elettricita and was active
in the electricity sector until 1962. In 1963, after the nationalisation of electricity, it became a financial 
company. The sum received for the electricity activities was invested mainly in the food industry. It is 
now owned by IRI (the largest state owned holding) and owns Alivar (a holding company with 
activities in biscuits, crackers, panettone, snacks, chocolate and sugar confectioneiy), Bertolli-Cirio-De 
Rica (olive oil, tomato sauces and milk), Italgel (frozen food, ice-cream), G.S. Generale Supermercati 
(supermarket chain) and Autogrill (motorway bars and restaurants) (R&S, various issues).
66 Mellin was a company of English origin, established in Italy in 1935. Managerial mistakes by
the heirs of the Mantovani family had led the company into a crisis. The company's creditors forced
the family to sell to a financially stronger group. After some contacts with Gerber and Plasmon-Heinz 
they decided to sell to Fossati (Ori, 1974).
67 Source: Kompass, 1977; R&S, 1977.
68 Source: Star, Balance sheets, 1986,1987.
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- a catering division, which organises the production and sale o f over 1 0 0  
diverse products covering all aspects of meal preparation, and which has its 
own distribution network;
- an industrial product division, producing and selling raw material for other 
firms, with two sales channels, one selling intermediate products, the other 
selling materials for bakery, confectionery and ice-cream;
- the Mellin division, which sells babyfood products;
- the Mantovani division, which sells soap and shampoo;
- an international division, with two separate organisations for the overseas 
sale o f its own brands and third parties1 brands69.
The distribution system has also been reorganised and the number of 
sales agents increased. The most important customers (supermarket chains) are 
now dealt with directly, while retail distribution is still organised through a 
network of salesmen70.
In 1987 the company entered the fresh pasta market investing 10 billion 
lira71. In the summer 1987 FINDIM acquired 30% of Ponti, a vinegar producer 
with a 50% of market share. In February 1988 it acquired 35% of Monini, the 
market leader in olive oil72.
In March 1989 FINDIM sold 45% of Star shares to IFIL and BSN73. BSN 
acquired 35%, IFIL 10%. In return FINDIM obtained 4% of BSN, becoming the 
third biggest shareholder of BSN after Lazard and IFIL, and 5.8% o f ordinary 
shares o f IFIL, becoming the second biggest shareholder o f IFIL after IFI74. 
BSN and Fossati agreed on a joint venture to develop new markets (especially 
pasta, ready meals and biscuits) in Europe75.
In December 1991 IFIL sold its shares o f STAR to BSN76. Thus two 
holding companies currently hold Star's shares: FINDIM (Fossati family) hold 
55% and BSN, 45%.
69 Star originally founded branches in most major European countries, but subsequently closed 
them, and thereafter relied on the Italian sales organisation.
70 See Star, balance sheet, 1987.
71 Star, balance sheet, 1988.
72 Source: R&S, various issues.
73 IFIL is a holding company controlled by IFI, owned by the Agnelli family. BSN is a French
holding company active in the food sector. BSN had already acquired Sangemini-Ferrarelle and
Peroni-Whurer in Italy. It is co-operating with IFIL (which is its second largest shareholder), in trying 
to exploit the relatively low concentration level of the food industry in Italy and the fragmented and old 
distribution system. It also aims at competing directly with Barilla in the pasta sector (having acquired 
various Italian pasta producers).
74 Source: II Mondo, 24 Feb.-2 Mar. 1992.
75 BSN can use its distribution network to sell Star products abroad (in particular ready meals
and tomato sauces).
76 Together with its holdings of Sangemini and Peroni.
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During 1989 Kellogg’s' broke its distribution contract with Star, which 
was due to end in December 199277. In the same year a company called 
Italfresco was created jointly by Star and Gervais Danone Italia (50% Star, 50% 
Gervais) to produce and distribute fresh pasta78.
In October 1991 STAR sold the plants and brand name o f the Suerte 
coffee to Lavazza79: Suerte had approximately 2% of the coffee market80. It also 
left the fresh pasta market and closed Italfresco. Finally, in January 1993 Star 
sold its soap and shampoo division to the British company Reckitt & Colman.
Sales and profits/sales of Star for the years 1974-1990 are shown in FIG.
4.4 (in logarithmic scale), with the dates of diversification81 or dediversification.
77 This might be related to the acquisition by Kellogg’s* of GRAM, the only Italian cereal 
producer, in April 1991, and to the growing importance of modem distribution in Italy. With this 
Kellogg’s' can easily deal with directly (without intermediation).
78 Star, balance sheet, 1989.
79 The first Italian coffee producer, which had already acquired Coinca and Bourbon from
Nestle.
80 Source: II Mondo, 24 Feb.-2 Mar. 1992.
81 Since most of the diversification moves occurred before 1974 they do not appear on the
Figure.
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4. Diversification Analysis
In order to give an account o f the diversification strategies o f the firms, 
we summarise in Figs. 4.5-4 . 8  their diversification moves together with the 
postulated motivations. These figures do not constitute a complete picture, since 
a few of the diversification moves occurred before 1972. This is true especially 
o f Galbani (which diversified after the war) and Star (which diversified before 
1972). These other moves will be discussed in what follows.
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We consider each of the diversification reasons proposed in section 2 in 
more detail and assess how well they account for diversification (or non 
diversification) of the firms.
Galbani was originally active in the cheese market. From this it moved 
into the processed meat (salami) market and into the yoghurt, butter, cream 
markets. While the second diversification move is typical if  compared to our 
previous analysis (it occurs within the dairy cluster), the first move is more 
atypical since it spans two different clusters: the dairy cluster (milk, yoghurt, 
cheese) and the processed meat cluster (processed meat, poultry).
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Barilla moved from the pasta market into the biscuit sector and then into 
the pastries, cracker and bread sector. Its first diversification move was atypical 
in terms of the clusters analysed in chapter 3, while the others were more 
typical.
Parmalat was originally active in the milk market. Its first diversification 
moves occurred within the dairy cluster, where it began to produce cream and 
yoghurt. But then it moved out of it and entered the fruit juice market, the 
production of processed tomatoes82, and the biscuits market. Its activity spans at 
least three o f the clusters identified in chapter 3.
Finally STAR is the most diversified and operates in most o f the clusters 
of chapter 3, producing chocolate, processed vegetables, tea and coffee, and 
also stock cubes, margarine, tuna fish and other products.
We argue that this kind of wide diversification is special to very large 
firms and it reflects the fact that some types of economies o f scope only emerge 
at relatively large firm size. We argue that 'within cluster' diversification is 
typical of those smaller firms active in the same market as these four large 
firms. Diversification 'across clusters' is induced by one of the three factors 
identified above as relevant to very large firms (constraints to expansion, brand 
name economies, distribution economies) or by special technological economies 
which only appear at large production scales.
We now consider each of the four motives for diversification proposed in 
section 2  (one push factor, three pull factors), and discuss how well they 
account for the diversification activities o f the four firms.
4.1 A Push Factor: Constraints to Expansion
If  the source of excess capacity is a factor of production specific to the 
firm and the market83, the firm will try to expand within the same market, where 
it is most profitable. However there may be cases where this expansion is 
constrained: if  the firm is already large relative to the market and the demand is 
rigid; if  demand is either unstable or expected to decline; if  antitrust regulations 
do not allow the firm to obtain a greater market share than it already has; if  an 
exogenous constraint limit the profitability of the activity.
82 Which appear in the same cluster in the Italian dataset
83 In the sense of Montgomeiy and Wemerfelt (1988), i.e., a factor that generates rents for the 
firm.
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In these cases the firm will have the choice of either selling its excess 
capacity, or using it internally to produce a different product. When the factor 
generating capacity is highly firm specific (such as managerial ability), it is 
likely that transaction costs in selling it are high. The firm diversifies if  a market 
close to the original one exists, so that the rents earned on the specific factor are 
not reduced excessively84. We expect to observe this move out o f the market in 
cases where the firm has experienced high growth, but met some constraints that 
impeded further expansion85.
Let us consider each firm in turn.
GALBANI: After expanding from the cheese market into the salami market, 
Galbani entered only other dairy markets. Both diversification moves can be 
explained by reference to economies o f scope. Limits to expansions did not 
play any role. The firm has reached a market share o f approximately 20% in 
the cheese market and approximately 3.5% in the salami market (see tables 
4.1, 4.5 and 4.6 in the Appendix), but has not grown beyond that. Hence, 
even though it is one of the largest Italian food companies (the largest in 
1989), it did not need to move out of these markets to grow86 87. Moreover 
there were no obvious constraints to its profitability in the original markets. 
The same is true for the other product markets (butter, yoghurt, cream) 
where Galbani’s market share is limited.
BARILLA: Barilla is88 the market leader in the pasta market (see tables 4.2 and 
4.7 in the Appendix). This was an extremely fragmented market, and began 
concentrating after the introduction of legislation specifying a minimum 
durum wheat content and requiring packaging89.
At the beginning of the 1970’s, when Barilla was acquired by Grace, its 
market shares in the pasta market were approximately 15% (in durum wheat 
pasta) and 25% (in the egg pasta)90. The firm was growing and there were
84 See Montgomery and Wemerfelt (1988).
85 In these cases the diversification move may reduce average rents.
86 For example, the growth (in nominal terms) in cheese sales of Galbani in the period 1983-88 
(49.1%) matches that of the cheese market almost perfectly (46.2%) (see Appendix, table 4.1; source: 
Databank.). The difference is accounted for by a slight growth in market share from 19.2 to 20.9.
87 During its activity Galbani accumulated a large amount of cash. This was partially due to its 
"tentata vendita" distribution system, under which shops buy goods directly from sales agents for cash, 
rather than placing orders. This gives the firm much greater liquid funds than a system with orders. 
But since these funds are not specific capital or internal know how, they do not need to be reinvested 
internally. Galbani had a large part of its profits from financial activities, and more precisely 
government bonds (Source: R&S, various issues).
88 It has always been.
89 Source: company interviews.
90 See Appendix, table 4.2.
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no obstacles to growth in the pasta market. As noted above, in the spring of 
1973 the Italian government imposed "administered prices" for all goods in 
the "cost-of-living basket": pasta was among them91. The consequence for 
Barilla was a reduction in profits92. As noted above, this provided the initial 
impetus behind Barilla’s first diversification strategy, in which it developed 
a position in the biscuit industry.
After this first diversification move, others followed. Barilla entered the 
snacks and pastries market and the crackers market. None o f these entries 
was driven by the need to move out of the main markets. In 1978, when 
Barilla entered the pastries market, its pasta market shares were 16% and 
25%93 and the biscuit market share was only 7-10%94. The same is true for 
the crackers market, where Barilla entered in 1986, when its market shares 
in pasta were 28% and 40% and in biscuits and pastries were 26% and 34% 
(see Tables 4.2, 4.8, 4.9 in the Appendix).
PARMALAT: Parmalat began to produce UHT milk in 196695. Being the first 
industrial producer of long life milk, it basically "created" this market. Its 
expansion was rapid and was limited only by the availability o f a 
sufficiently wide distribution network. This covered the whole country by 
the mid 70s. In the meantime the firm was growing more rapidly than was 
the market for UHT milk. At the time this market size (essentially 
determined by the extent of Parmalat’s distribution network) limited the 
growth of the firm, and company interviews suggest that this was one o f the 
main reasons for the introduction of other ancillary products (long life 
cream in 1969, yoghurt in 1972, cheeses in 1974). The choice of products 
was influenced by the possibility of using some of the same machinery as 
was used for long life milk, as well as the same distribution network (all of 
the products initially were sold with a single network)96. Economies of 
scope in the use of inputs (mainly milk) were also present.
However subsequent diversification moves cannot be explained in these 
terms. When Parmalat entered the fruit juice, tomatoes and biscuits markets, 
it was not because of any constraint to expansion in its existing markets97.
91 See "Mulino Bianco", Bocconi, 1988.
92 Which decreased from 1973 to 1976 - with the exception of 1975 - and rose again only after 
then (see the Appendix, table 4.2).
93 And no obvious obstacle to growth was at work.
94 See the Appendix, table 4.2.
95 Company publications.
96 Both company interviews and trade publications showed this to be the case.
97 Market shares were not so large as to suggest this. See the Appendix, tables 4.3, 4.10, 4.11.
174
STAR: Star's first product (stock cubes) rapidly gained a large market share. 
The firm had pioneered the use of this product in Italy and it was growing 
in step with the new market98. Its growth was limited by the size o f this 
market and the only route to faster growth lay in diversification. The choice 
o f which market to move into was influenced by the possibility of 
distributing new products through the network that Star was building at the 
time.
We have seen that the push factor has provided the initial impetus for 
diversification in three o f our four cases. In two of these cases it was linked to a 
fast expansion of the firm; in the third it originated in the reduced profitability 
o f the main activity due to an exogenous shock.
4.2 Pull Factors: (a) Technological Economies of Scope
Technological economies of scope arise when indivisibilities in fixed 
(physical) capital induce excess capacity, or when the possibility arises of 
sharing some inputs. Here we consider the types of inputs used in the 
production o f each good and assess whether some of these can be shared or 
whether by-products from the production of one good can be used as an input in 
the production of another. We also examine whether the type of machinery used 
gives rise to excess capacity from indivisibilities, as well as whether other 
possible sources of technological synergies (e.g. the type o f packaging used) 
may be present.
GALBANI: Galbani's first diversification move was partly induced by the 
presence o f economies of scope. These arose from the possibility o f using a 
by-product o f the cheese industry as an input for the salami industry. Only 
1 0 % to 15% of the milk used becomes cheese. Approximately 80% becomes 
"siero", a liquid with a high protein content, that is normally a waste product 
but which can be used to feed pigs99. Raising pigs near a cheese factory 
exploits the synergy. However this does not explain why the two products are 
sold together. Rather, this reflects distribution synergies, which are discussed 
below (section 4.3). The firm's other diversification moves (into yoghurt, 
butter and cream) are typical of the dairy cluster and may be explained both
98 In Italy before the war there was no industrial market for stock cubes. The market was 
essentially created by Star.
99 Company interviews.
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in terms of a common input (technological synergies) and o f distribution 
synergies.
The firm’s other diversification moves (into yoghurt, butter and cream) are 
typical o f the dairy cluster and may be explained both in terms o f a common 
input (technological synergies) and of distribution economies (see section 
4.3).
BARILLA: We discussed above how Barilla's first diversification move was 
induced by a very specific push factor (a price control on pasta). The choice 
of the product into which Barilla diversified was determined by the presence 
of some synergies associated with the use of common inputs100. The 
importance of this consideration is arguable, however, in that pasta is 
produced with durum wheat while biscuits are produced with soft wheat; 
secondly, no other pasta producer entered this second market. We shall see in 
section 4.3 how distribution economies also played a role. Technological 
economies o f scope do seem to have played a role in the later diversification 
from biscuits into pastries and then into crackers and bread. All of these used 
the same inputs and costs could be shared across more than one product101. 
Actually, these diversification moves are ’typical' as they fall within the 
bakery cluster102. Under this respect Barilla adopted an innovative strategy 
for the Italian standards, that only later was followed by other biscuits 
manufacturers.
PARMALAT: The first diversification moves of Parmalat, induced by its rapid 
growth in the long life milk sector, were into supply related markets. Long 
life cream, yoghurt, desserts and cheese shared with UHT milk the basic 
input, milk. Even if  its price was fixed through regional bargaining, the 
knowledge of the input market and synergies in purchasing certainly 
determined the choice of the market. Moreover, for milk and cream the 
packaging was similar103. Hence, Parmalat's first diversification move was 
typical o f the industry, and fell within the dairy cluster.
Parmalat's second diversification move was much more "innovative". From 
the dairy market, Parmalat entered the fruit juice market in 1981. At that time
100 In particular, a relevant consideration was linked with the possibility of sharing the costs of 
quality controls over the input (wheat) (Company interviews).
101 Among them are the research costs: Barilla has a large research centre, which employs 212 
people. Research costs are approximately 1.4% of sales. These are obviously shared across all the 
products.
102 However they are more typical for the English cluster (which includes biscuits, crackers, 
bread and pastries) than for the Italian cluster (which only includes biscuits and crackers).
103 Company interviews.
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the fruit juice market was relatively concentrated (the four firm concentration 
ratio was approximately 45 per cent) and the product sold was nectar, sold in 
bottles. Parmalat began producing 100% fruit juice in paper cartons. The 
final step of product processing could be performed with the same type of 
machinery used to process milk104. A second source of synergy was related to 
the adoption of the same packaging used for milk. This allowed both 
economies in packaging and in the final stages of production105. This move 
was innovative and atypical (in that it does not conform to the typical clusters 
identified earlier) and exploited economies which were only available at a 
large scale. The choice of 1 0 0 % juice and paper carton packaging allowed 
Parmalat to position itself as a high image, high price producer106.
In 1982 Parmalat entered the processed tomatoes market. Peeled tomatoes 
and fruit juice shared the same type of packaging but also economies in 
purchasing of inputs. This move was closer to the typical diversification 
pattern of other fruit juice producers (see the Italian cluster and the behaviour 
of smaller producers, such as Massalombarda, Zuegg, Del Monte, whose 
sales are 60% in the fruit juice-nectar market and 40% in peeled tomatoes or 
other processed vegetables107).
STAR: Technological synergies have not been generally exploited by Star. Its 
products do not share inputs, nor can they be produced by the same 
machinery. A large number of its products are in fact produced for Star by 
others and then sold and distributed by Star. This is confirmed by the fact 
that only a few of its products belong to well defined clusters (fruit juice and 
peeled tomatoes; coffee and tea), while most o f the others do not belong to 
any cluster, and are mostly produced either by widely diversified 
multinationals or by specialised manufacturers (this is the case for stock 
cubes, margarine, baby food, seed oil, chocolate spreads, camomile).
Thus while some aspects of the diversification strategy can be seen as 
diversification within clusters, other parts o f the strategy can not. Rather, these 
reflect economies of scope which only emerge at a large scale o f production.
104 Company interviews.
105 The exploitation of this type of synergy added to the possibility of using Parmalat's large
distribution network which allowed the company to achieve a large market share in a limited time.
106 See Databank, fruit juice reports.
107 See the Appendix, table 4.12 and Databank market reports.
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4.3 Pull Factors: (b) Distribution Economies of Scope
The distribution sector in Italy is still highly fragmented108. Due in part to 
administrative laws (imposed at the beginning of the 70s) concerning the 
location of new salespoints, strong barriers to entry limit the expansion of large 
supermarkets and hypermarkets. This in turn has made it more difficult for food 
manufacturers to achieve a large scale. In order to gain a large national market 
share, firms had to organise a national sales network, which reached a very 
large number o f small sales outlets109 no.
In order to sell to the entire internal market a firm needs an extremely 
large sales force, which regularly (possibly often) visits the sales outlets111. 
Costs o f distribution are difficult to compare across companies; however for 
large companies they may reach approximately 1 0 % of sales112.
Different producers have adopted different types o f sales organisation. 
Some use a direct sales force, others an indirect one. The former is made up of 
salesmen directly employed by the firm. The latter involves independent 
salesmen who may either deal with a single firm’s products ("monomandatari") 
or with products from many firms ("generali")113.
In the first case salesmen either collect orders and send them to the firm, 
which then distributes its products from depots (this is the case of Barilla), or 
they travel with the goods and sell them in the quantities needed directly by the 
shops ("tentata vendita") (as in the case of Galbani, and in general for fresh 
products producers).
In the second instance firms either use salesmen who are independent 
(not directly employed by the firm) but only deal with the firm's products (Star), 
or have further intermediaries: these may be "concessionari”, who only sell the 
firm's products (Parmalat), or wholesalers, who sell other products as well114 115.
108 By distribution sector (as opposed to distribution network) we mean here the channels through 
which food products are sold to the final consumer. It includes hypermarkets, supermarkets, food 
chainstores (co-operatives or not) and individual shops. We define as modem distribution channels 
hypermarkets, supermarkets and chainstores; and as traditional distribution channels small retailers, 
either specialised in one product (normally fresh, e.g., cheese, salami or vegetables) or selling a wider 
range of goods. The distribution network of  the firm instead is the organisation internal to the firm 
that intermediates between the firm and the salespoints.
109 CESCOM interviews.
110 Intermediaries (wholesalers) only rarely cover the whole national market, due to high
transport costs, but concentrate only on some areas. This has led to vertical integration of firms into 
intermediation.
111 The alternative choice is not to expand beyond the size given by the local market.
112 Own computations from various sources: balance sheets, Databank.
113 Normally they do not sell competing products.
114 This would be the choice of small firms. As said above, wholesalers usually cover limited
areas.
115 Databank, various reports; interviews at CESCOM.
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Excess capacity in the distribution network arises when new products can 
be added without reducing the sales of the existing lines. The distribution 
network is usually made of a salesforce (salesmen) who visit the shops and take 
orders, and of a transport system, which delivers products116.
The distribution network will be a source of economies o f scope (and 
hence a pull factor to diversify) if  it is sufficiently large, if  it deals only with the 
firm's products, and if  there exist products with similar durability - 
transportability characteristics as the original one, which are sold by the same 
retailers117. This implies that distribution economies o f scope only arise at a 
relatively large scale o f production, if the firm has created a wide distribution 
network.
The recent evolution of the distribution sector (and in particular the 
increase in concentration and the diffusion o f large supermarkets and 
hypermarkets) has affected these considerations118.
GALBANI: In the cheese and in the salami markets the distribution sector has 
always been (and still is) highly fragmented. Even if  supermarkets have 
recently begun to sell fresh products, small specialised retailers are still the 
major outlets119. The product is usually sold fresh, unpackaged and hence 
unbranded. Selling to the entire home market requires regularly visiting 
150,000 points of sales, which are often small. As table 4.21 in the Appendix 
documents, Galbani has a very large distribution network (300 sellers in 
1983, and 4200 in 1988, with 150 deposits). Salesmen are employees of 
Galbani and are based around the depots120. Galbani has the largest Italian 
distribution network in the food industry (in the 1960's Invemizzi, one o f the 
main producers, had a distribution network of comparable size, but after the 
acquisition by Nestle', much more attention was devoted to modem 
distribution).
Galbani's costs of distribution and transport amount to approximately 15% of 
sales (which is less than that of other cheese companies121.
116 These two functions may be carried out by the same agents (as is the case with the "tentata 
vendita" system).
117 These two conditions must be jointly verified if salesmen also transport products.
118 As more products are sold through modern distribution channels, the power of firms to sell 
more products together is reduced and has to rely mainly on the strength of firm's image. Hence we 
expect to observe a reduction in the scope of diversification, in cases where this was mainly motivated 
by the distribution synergy.
119 As is documented in Databank reports.
120 The Galbani distribution network is organised in the following way. Each deposit "purchases" 
products from Galbani plants at a price which includes a margin, and sells them to the salespoints 
(through his agents, with the "tentata vendita" system) at a price which just covers distribution costs.
121 As interviews with food industry experts and CESCOM confirmed.
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The impact of modem distribution is still limited in this market, since in Italy 
most o f the large chains do not yet have large deposits and distribution 
centres. Most o f the producers (especially o f fresh products) are required to 
supply the point of sales directly, which partially offsets the bargaining 
power o f distributors122.
The large distribution network of Galbani is the source of the synergies 
explaining its diversification moves. The main reason is that retailers selling 
cheese are often specialised, that is, they usually keep only dairy products 
and salami123. Secondly cheeses and salami need the same type of 
refrigerated distribution chain, since they are fresh products124 125(transport 
economies).
Since the war Galbani has had 70-80% of its sales in the cheese market and 
20-30% in the salami market (see table 4.1 in the Appendix). The same is 
true for the other major cheese producers (except for Kraft who imports 
cheese in Italy126, see tables 4.5 and 4.6 in Appendix). This is a rather 
atypical diversification relative to the clusters discussed in chapter 3. The 
dairy cluster includes milk and yoghurt, dried milk, cheese, and is separated 
from the processed meat cluster, which includes meat and poultry. The first 
cluster is dominated by the behaviour of milk producers who also produce 
cheese (rather than vice-versa)127. Distribution economies also allow us to 
explain why no cluster emerges across cheese and processed meat products in 
terms of a scale factor. For low production scales, it is too costly to set up a 
distribution network for both cheese and pork; none of the smaller cheese 
producers sells salami.
BARILLA: Barilla's distribution network has always been one o f the firm's 
main strengths. Only recently have sales through modem distribution 
channels become more important than sales through small retailers.
During the '70s Barilla had a sales force of approximately 500 employees to 
distribute pasta128. Some excess capacity existed129 and could be exploited to
122 Interviews with the company.
123 Source: Databank, cheese market reports.
124 In fact Galbani produces also a limited quantity of yoghurt and butter.
125 According to the management, agents are usually able to sell 3 or 4 products to each 
salespoint from the vast product range in the cheese and salami market that Galbani produces. One or 
two of them are well known products with a high turnover, while the others are pushed by the seller. 
The company feels that pushing other products would reduce its power to sell many cheese products 
(Source: company interviews).
126 Using the waste from cheese production was typical of the poorer Italian farmers, but was not 
usual in other countries.
127 Company interviews. However Galbani also produces yoghurt, albeit in small quantities.
128 Source: Databank and company interviews.
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sell other products with similar transport-durability-joint sale characteristics. 
Biscuits had these characteristics: they were sold by the same type of
retailers as pasta and had, thanks to the new packaging which Barilla
introduced, a relatively long life. Hence for the first diversification move, the 
availability of excess capacity in the distribution network played a role, albeit 
an ancillary one.
However the rapid growth in sales of biscuits led to a saturation o f capacity 
and to the need to enlarge the distribution system. This was done in the first 
instance by adding an indirect sales force130. In 1989, after a substantial
increase in market shares in both the pasta and the biscuit market, an
independent trade and distribution company was set up, with 700 employees, 
which sells both products and deals directly with the modem distribution 
channels131132.
For Barilla, distribution synergies played an ancillary role in the first 
diversification move, but did not play a role in the moves that followed.
PARM ALAT: The distribution network of Parmalat is the second largest in the 
food industry, after Galbani. Its development followed the expansion o f the 
firm in the long life milk market, since a wide and penetrating distribution 
network is one of the main factors leading to success in the market133. This 
factor has played an ancillary role in Parmalat's diversification processes. 
The first diversification moves were within the dairy cluster, and the choice 
of the products was only partly determined by the possibility o f using the 
same distribution network. However at some point diseconomies arose and it 
was necessary to separate the fresh products line from the long life line134.
The products introduced afterwards (fruit juice and processed tomatoes) 
could be sold through the sales network for long life products where excess 
capacity was still available135. However, adding bakery products to this 
distribution line damaged the other products. This was probably due both to
129 According to the management.
130 See the Appendix, table 4.23. In 1986 the firm had both an internal salesforce and
"concessionari".
131 With modem distribution relationships have not always been easy: on the one side 
supermarket chains tiy to use leaders' product to attract consumer (selling them at discounts), on the 
other producers and supermarkets conflict over the shelf space. Barilla in 1986 was excluded from one 
of the major supermarkets (Esselunga), following a conflict over the price at which Barilla products 
were sold, and only in 1989 it returned on the shelves.
132 Source: R&S and internal Barilla publications.
133 All large producers have a well developed network (see table 4.24).
134 As company interviews clarified.
135 Company interviews.
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the different life duration of the products (bakery products have a longer life 
than dairy products) and to the different salespoints136.
STAR: Star has always had a very large distribution network. It was based on 
an indirect sales force, i.e., agents not directly employed by Star, but selling 
only Star products. In the ‘50s Star was one of the first large industrial food 
firms with a wide distribution network. It served mainly small retailers, 
which were ready to buy more than one product. Salesmen themselves 
suggested which ones could be profitably added to the product lines.
In Star’s case the creation of a wide distribution network was the main factor 
leading to diversification. Products with similar characteristics (in terms of 
durability - long life - and the possibility o f being sold by the same 
salespoints) were introduced. Possibly a confirmation of the importance of 
this factor is the fact that the changes in the distribution sector are affecting 
Star's diversification policy. The increased importance o f supermarkets as 
compared to small retailers reduces the bargaining power of manufacturers. 
Only large firms with a national brand image can impose a vast range of 
products: supermarkets tend to buy leading products or low cost (own brand) 
products. Selling a large bundle of different products through the firms’ own 
distribution network is much less effective nowadays. For Star, this has 
implied a reduction in the range of products it offers and the firm's exit from 
various markets where it was not strong enough relative to leading brands 
(coffee, water powders, chocolate spreads, fresh pasta, soap). Secondly it has 
induced a search for new sources of synergies, in particular brand synergies 
(see section 4.4).
To see whether distribution economies are an important reason for 
diversification in Italy, it is appropriate to look at the diversification policies of 
those manufacturers who have the largest distribution networks. If  distribution 
economies matter, these firms will be diversified into "related" products (that 
can be sold by the same sales outlets and have similar durability/transportability 
characteristics).
Among the food manufacturers with the largest distribution networks are: 
Ferrero, Kraft, Alivar, Cirio Bertolli De Rica, Unil-it, Lavazza, Nestle, Trinity, 
Nabisco, Invemizzi, Locatelli, Cerpl, Polenghi. Some o f them (Locatelli,
136 For the majority of the large firms active in the milk/dairy market the distribution network is 
separated into two different lines, one which sells fresh products and the other for long life products. 
These normally use different sales systems, "tentata vendita" for fresh products, and orders for long life 
ones. Hence economies of scope hold only across a limited range of products.
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Invemizzi, Cerpl, Polenghi) are similar to Galbani (i.e., they sell fresh products 
to specialised salespoints) and have followed a similar diversification strategy. 
Alivar and Cirio are actually widely diversified across a range o f long life 
products that can be sold through the same points o f sales. Ferrero and Lavazza 
instead are not diversified, the former being active in chocolate products only, 
the latter producing only coffee. Both companies sell long life products, both to 
non specialised retailers and to coffee bars. The reason why both are not 
diversified even with a large distribution network may be due to the fact that the 
second distribution channel is relatively important and would not support other 
products. A last group includes Kraft, Unil-it, Nabisco, Nestle: they are widely 
diversified multinationals and it is difficult to establish whether their strategies 
in Italy are affected by the possibility o f exploiting a single distribution 
network.
4.4 Pull Factors: (c) Brand Name/Advertising Economies of Scope
Finally synergies may be generated by a well known brand name. If  the 
firm has developed a brand name (usually through intensive advertising) it 
might be able to exploit this to introduce other products without a proportionate 
increase in advertising expenditures.
In order for this to be possible, it must be that the brand name is already 
well known, and that the new product's image is sufficiently close to the 
previous ones to share the brand. The latter consideration depends in part on 
consumer perception, which in turn is linked to various factors (history of the 
firm, the quality o f its products, product sophistication) and may have changed 
over time.
For firms who exploited this factor as a source of synergies we should 
observe relatively large advertising expenditures with the feature that the total 
advertising expenditures of the firm for different products is lower than the sum 
of advertising of non diversified companies active in the corresponding markets. 
However this is hard to verify. A proxy for this comparison will be to compare 
market shares with advertising share of the firm. Economies should exist if  the 
advertising share o f the firm is less than the market share (that is, the firm 
exploits capacity from other product markets). The comparison is obviously
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made difficult by the limited availability of time series data on advertising
outlays on specific products137.
GALBANI: The firm has shared its advertising expenditures and brand name 
across its wide range of cheese products, but not across its other products.
Its advertising expenditures have always been relatively low (between 0.5 
and 1.5% of total sales138) since in a market where distribution is highly 
fragmented and the product is often sold unpackaged and hence unbranded, it 
is the relationship with the distributor that matters rather than the relationship 
with the final consumer. Hence, after a relatively strong marketing campaign 
in the '60s, Galbani has substantially reduced its advertising outlays. Hence 
Galbani represents an exception to the usual rule, in that it did not exploit a 
national brand name in introducing other products. According to the 
company's management, associating the Galbani brand name with the sale of 
salami would have been damaging to both products139 140.
This is consistent with the observation that even cheese producers with a 
relatively high advertising/sales ratio do not use their brand names to 
diversify outside the cheese market141.
BARILLA: Barilla has strongly increased its advertising expenditures since its 
entry into the bakery market. In 1974 advertising expenditures amounted to 
1% of total sales, while in 1989 they were 7.2%. When the firm entered the 
biscuits sector, the brand name chosen for the new line was different from 
Barilla, since it was clear that consumers would not consider pasta and 
biscuits as similar markets142. However, after the introduction o f biscuits, all 
the subsequent new products (snacks/pastries in 1978, crackers in 1986, but 
also rusks and bread sticks, which were renamed after the introduction of 
biscuits) shared the new name Mulino Bianco. Evidence that economies of 
scope from brand name/advertising played a role in the diversification 
process in the bakery sector can be found in the fact that the advertising
137 Here we shall compare advertising expenditure over the years 1981-1986 (Source: AGB). 
Even with these detailed data, some caveats are necessary for what concerns yearly comparisons.
138 See table 4.5 in the Appendix.
139 Galbani is planning to launch its salami products with a brand name in a few months, but the 
brand name will be different from that of the cheeses.
140 Company interviews.
141 Only Kraft, the multinational firm that imports cheese into Italy, with an advertising/sales
ratio of approximately 11-15%, has a significant proportion of its sales outside the cheese market sold 
with the Kraft brand name - 18% of sales (mayonnaise, other sauces). Locatelli and Invemizzi, the 
other two major cheese producers with advertising/sales ratio of approximately 3% only produce 
salami (Source: Databank, cheese market reports).
142 This was the management's perception.
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shares in these markets (except for rusks) are smaller than the corresponding 
market shares143.
The recent introduction of fresh pasta and tomato sauces seems to rely on the 
same mechanism, where the brand name in this case is Barilla144.
PARMALAT: Although Parmalat's advertising expenditures are relatively 
high145, and creating an image for its products has always been one o f the 
main concerns of the firm146, there is no clear evidence that this is a source of 
economies of scope across products. It is possible that the firm believed that 
brand synergies might hold between milk and biscuits as both are used for 
breakfast in Italy147. However this proved not to be true148, and even with 
heavy advertising there were losses, until the production was reduced. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that products were too unrelated in consumers' 
perception to enjoy brand economies.
STAR: For Star it is much less clear whether economies in branding are 
present. Star has always supported its products with strong marketing 
campaigns. Promotional and advertising expenditures were increasing from 
1984 to 1990, from 12% of sales to 16%149, and a large number o f the firm's 
products use the Star name. Hence we might expect some brand economies 
shared across the products. We can offer some suggestive evidence on this by 
comparing market shares and advertising shares for the period 1981-1987. If 
we consider only the products with the Star brand name (i.e. tea, tuna, stock 
cubes, margarine, ready sauces, tomatoes preserves) (see figures A7) we 
observe an initial period where advertising expenditures are larger than 
market shares (except for stock cubes), suggesting diseconomies in brand 
name. In the following years, however, market shares are larger than 
advertising shares in most of the product markets (except in ready sauces). 
One possible interpretation for this pattern is that while originally Star 
exploited economies of scope in distribution, with the increased importance 
o f modem distribution it became more important to push products through 
heavier advertising. The changes in the organisation of distribution seem to 
have led to a shift in the relative importance of the sources o f synergies.
143 See Figure A.5 in the Appendix.
144 But the entry is too recent for us to be able to analyse it.
145 Data on product advertising underestimate the actual expenditure since Parmalat has used its
sponsorship of sports' teams as one of its main advertising channels.
146 Source: Databank, various market reports.
147 This is what food market experts believed.
148 See market and advertising shares in the Appendix.
149 See the Appendix, table 4.4.
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Distribution has become less relevant, while supporting the product with 
advertising is essential. This interpretation seems to be consistent with Star's 
actions over the period. While it increased advertising expenditures to a very 
high level, it seems to have begun to benefit from synergies associated with 
its brand name only after some interval.
This change in the relative importance of the sources o f synergies has 
consequences for the range of diversification. It implies that, since the 
distribution network can no longer push all the products in Star's portfolio, 
fewer synergies arise across these. This means that the firm has to support the 
products which do not carry the Star name with increased advertising, or has 
to exit from these markets. This occurred for Suerte coffee (whose market 
share had fallen from 5% at the beginning of the 80's to 2%  in 1987150) 
whose brand name and machines were sold to Lavazza; for Starlette sliced 
cheese (whose market shares had fallen from 6%  in 1981 to 4%  in 1985) 
which was no longer produced after 1986; for water powders, which were 
sold to the market leader in 1990; for chocolate creams, which were not 
produced after 1989; for shampoo and soap (Mantovani products), which 
were sold to an English company in January 1993.
The change in the source of synergies is forcing Star to reduce its range of 
products. If it is true that consumer perceptions are also changing, Star may 
have to reduce its range even further, in order to produce only products 
where consumers perceive Star to have some expertise.
5. M anagerial Ability and Ownership Changes
In the previous section we argued that the diversification processes o f the 
firms under consideration can be explained in terms o f two sets of factors: 
constraints to expansion in their own market (push factors), and economies of 
scope (pull factors)151. We did not discuss another source of synergies, the 
managerial ability factor, which was mentioned in chapters 2 and 3. This is 
actually more difficult to assess and any judgement must be rather subjective. 
Here, we offer some impressions based on interviews.
150 See figure A.7 in the Appendix.
151 We ruled out risk diversification considerations both because there is no theoretical consensus 
on their relevance and because empirically they have not been found to be important. Moreover the 
food industiy, to which this analysis is limited, is even less exposed to the cyclical fluctuations that 
might induce firms to take this risk into account.
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The managerial ability argument is based on the idea that managers might 
develop "excess capacity" (with better knowledge of their job, they might be 
able to do more in less time), or that some skills may be transferred to other 
fields and induce correlated results (see chapter 2). Hence, if  a manager's skills 
lead to a high performance in one market, he might be able to produce the same 
performance in other markets with related characteristics. Here the evidence is 
only suggestive since it is hard to form objective evaluations on managerial 
ability and on whether this ability (actual or presumed) induced diversification.
In the case o f Galbani considerations of managerial ability argued against 
diversification. Management explicitly pursued a policy of "doing what one is 
good at". Since they believe that the skills developed in the cheese market are 
not easily transferable, their policy is to remain in that market.
Barilla, after its first move outside the pasta market, seems to have taken 
the approach of remaining in markets extremely close to its original ones, in a 
way similar to Galbani.
Star based its diversification on the relationship with the distribution 
network and managerial ability does not seem to have played an important role.
The active diversification program of Parmalat, on the other hand, seems 
to be supported by the belief that the marketing skills of the firm could be used 
in different markets, together with a rather innovative approach on the part of 
their management152.
Notwithstanding Star’s experience, the overall impression from 
discussions with executives is that the argument for managerial economies 
seems to add little in explaining the overall diversification pattern o f these 
firms.
152 A further consideration that might be relevant relates to the ownership structures of the firms. 
In principle, this might have affected diversification choices. However this seems not to be the case for 
the four firms considered here. Galbani was sold before the '60s to financial companies. Both before 
and after that, the strategy of the firm has been identical. Moreover a similar strategy has been 
followed by the other large Italian cheese producers. It is still too early to evaluate the effects of the 
acquisition by BSN, except in terms of a more aggressive advertising policy. Barilla was sold to Grace 
in 1971. In this case there is evidence that the holding company was pushing for diversification. 
However the main push came from the price freeze of 1973. Parmalat never changed ownership; the 
financial restructuring of 1989 did not affect control of the company, which has always been with the 
Tanzi family. Finally, as to Star, the exchange of shares with S.M.E. in 1971, did not affect the 
company's management. Some changes might be expected from the increased participation of BSN to 
the management. Again, it is too early to evaluate changes.
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6. Reassessment of the Cluster Analysis
The main theme of this chapter is that the factors shaping the 
diversification strategies of the largest Italian firms are actually rather different 
from those determining diversification patterns among small and medium size 
firms, whose behaviour dominated the statistical pattern described in the cluster 
analysis o f chapter 3. There diversification was mainly induced by 
technological economies of scope, and more specifically by common inputs.
Central to the case studies in this chapter is the role played by other 
factors, relevant only to the largest firms. The role of the distribution network 
was central in two cases out of our present four (Galbani and Star) and it played 
an important ancillary role in two other. Star built its entire diversification 
strategy around its distribution network. Galbani's distribution network was one 
of the main reasons for its choice to diversify.
The other two cases are rather different. Parmalat's expansion can be 
understood as involving a mix of technological synergies and distribution 
network effects.
Barilla's first diversification move was induced by constraints to growth 
in its market. Its following moves were driven by a mixture o f technological and 
brand synergies.
Only some of these moves were within clusters. Often they were the first 
moves. The more innovative moves were out o f the clusters and were based on 
distribution economies, advertising economies and constraints to the firm's 
growth.
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Appendix
The information and the data used in this chapter were collected from 
various sources. The main sources of data about firms* history were: R&S, a 
Mediobanca publication, with standard balance sheets, information on company 
history and its products; Business newspapers: II Mondo, Mondo Economico, 
Sole 24 Ore; Company interviews: Ing. E. Sbarbaro, general manager o f 
Galbani; Dott. Maestri, planning manager of Barilla; Dott. Manarini, vice­
general manager of Parmalat; Dott. Como, general manager o f Star.
The main source of data and information on markets were: Databank: 
yearly reports on most of the relevant markets (including data on market size, 
number o f firms, employment, market shares, concentration, advertising 
expenditures, distribution networks); food industiy experts: Prof. Bertele, Dott. 
Vento, Dott. Monici, Dott. Guidotti, Dott. Zancani, Dott. Piani (all from 
Databank). Data on advertising expenditures (for the years 1981-1988) were 
obtained from AGB Italia.
The information were complemented with interviews with the food 
industry experts: Prof. U. Bertele (Politecnico di Milano), Prof. Luca Pellegrini 
(CESCOM and Universita Bocconi).
In the Appendix we include all the Tables with data used in the analysis. 
Data are not homogeneous, nor are they available for uniform periods of time. 
The main sources were: R&S (Mediobanca), Databank (market researches), 
AGB (advertising agency), company interviews.
In tables 4.1-4.4 company data are assembled. Sources are: R&S, 
Databank and in some cases (Barilla) company publications.
Tables 4.5-4.20 present data on the most relevant markets. These include: 
size, concentration of the market; market shares, advertising and diversification 
of the main competitors. The source is Databank.
Tables 4.21-4.27 describe distribution networks of the firms (and of their 
competitors) in terms of both the type of channels used and the size o f the 
network. The source is Databank. These data are not homogeneous but are 
sufficient to allow some comparisons.
Tables 4.28-4.49 have figures on firms' advertising in each market. The 
source is AGB. Figures A.5-A.7 compare market share with advertising share in 
most of the product markets. The sources are AGB and Databank.
Figures A.1-A.4 compare market shares with firm's returns. The sources 
are Databank and R&S.
COMPANY DATA - GALBANI Table 4.1
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Turnover (bill.L) 119 138 177 230 295 357 410 471 542 660 836 935 1027 1162 1288 1360 1449 1595 1677
Products:
CHEESE
share of prod. 80.7 82.9 82.8 82.2 80.7 80.8 81.4 81.4 81.1 81.0 79.7 79.8 81.2 80.4 81.1
market share 14.0 14.0 14.0 13.3 13.6 15.2 17.0 17.0
SALUM I/MEAT
share of prod. 19.2 16.8 17.1 17.7 18.9 19.1 18.5 18.6 18.8 18.9 20.0 20.0 18.7 19.4 18.7
market share 8.0 8.0 8.0
PORK
share of prod. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.02
market share
COSTS (%sales):
raw materials 66.3 64.3 66.5 66.9 67.2 67.0 63.9 64.5 63.6 63.3 62.8 62.4 61.6 60.9 58.8 56.7 56.3 57.4 52.6
wages 19.4 19.6 20.9 21.2 19.9 19.4 19.7 19.2 19.2 18.9 18.1 18.7 18.8 19.5 18.3 18.7 18.9 19.6 19.4
advertising
distribution
other 10.0 10.7 8.4 7.8 7.7 7.3 7.0 7.3 9.1 9.3 8.9 9.4 9.7 9.9 9.1 9.3 9.5 10.0 11.2
OPER. RETURN 4.1 5.4 4.1 4.1 5.2 6.3 9.3 8.9 8.0 8.4 10.2 9.5 9.9 9.7 13.8 15.3 15.3 13.0 16.8
financial costs 1.0 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0
PRETAX PROFIT 1.4 2.3 2.5 2.4 4.6 6.0 9.4 9.4 9.3 10.7 12.2 11.8 12.2 11.8 15.6 17.2 18.2 15.0 13.6
NET PROFIT 0.3 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.6 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.5 5.6 5.3 5.5 6.0 6.9 8.0 8.5 8.7 6.4
employment 3599 5887 6411 6558 6609 6672 6632 6653 6709 6682 6795 6931 6923 6986 6959 6941 6978 6947 6636
n. plants 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Source: R&S, Databank, Company interviews.
n o MPAIN[Y DATA - EARILLA Table 4.2
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989* 1990*
Turnover (bill.L.) 54.3 63 109 117 129 160 207 261 350 436 585 728 981 1145 1265 1418 1548 2068 2389
Products:
PASTA
share of prod. 90 87 84 79 74 70 68 64 60 54 50 50 49 48 49 50
market share 15 15 16 16 16 18 20 21 22 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
BISCUITS
share of prod. 4 6 8 8 9 10 13 17 17 18 16 15 17 15
market share 4 7 10 12 13 17 22 24 25 26 27 27 28 28
PASTRIES
share of prod. 2 5 7 9 11 15 19 18 17 19 19 15
market share 5 8 11 14 18 24 32 34 35 38 36 33
TOMATO
SAUCES
share of prod. 6.5 2
market share 19 43
BREAD STICKS
share of prod. 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3
market share 10 8 9 11 14 20 23 27 30 33 33 33 36 39 41 42
RUSKS
share of prod. 4 4 4 5 6 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6
market share 15 15 16 20 24 26 28 32 33 36 39 41 41 43 45 47
BREAD
share of prod.
market share
CRACKERS
share of prod. 2 2 2 2
market share 11 15 17 18
COSTS (%sales):
raw materials 73.1 68.6 67.6 71.7 71.4 72.3 69.0 70.1 66.4 65.1 67.1 64.5 62.4 60.7 59.4 75.2 71.0
wages 11.9 14.1 15.3 13.6 12.5 11.5 10.5 10.8 10.6 10.1 8.7 8.8 9.4 9.5 10.5 14.5 14.3
advertising 1.3
distribution
other 9.7 10.6 11.9 11.7 12.7 14.5 13.3 14.4 15.3 15.8 18.0 19.7 21.8 22.6
OPER. RETURN 10.5 5.1 5.4 6.7 5.1 4.2 8.2 5.3 8.8 8.6 8.8 9.5 8.3 8.6 8.5 8.0 7.5 10.2 14.7
financial costs 2.3 2.3 1.4 1.6 1.0 0.9 2.3 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.5 1.1 0.7 1.0 1.7 2.3 2.6
PRETAX PROFIT 1.3 0.9 0.5 1.1 1.2 1.7 5.1 3.4 4.8 4.9 4.1 5.4 5.5 6.5 6.7 6.7 5.8 4.6 8.5
NET PROFIT 1.28 0.86 0.63 0.82 0.54 0.59 1.95 2.18 3.19 3.03 2.53 2.76 3.22 3.68 3.64 4.23 3.91 3.25 4.17
employment 2014 2030 1997 1945 1913 1899 1857 1872 1922 1986 2070 2161 2225 2332 2428 2543 2679 5896 6020
n. plants 3 3 3 3 3
Source: R & S , D atab ank , C o m p a n y  in terv iew s. 
* n o t com parab le  (c o n so lid a ted ).
COMPANY DATA - PARMALAT Table 4.3
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Turnover (bill.L) 75 108 143 196 263 303 381 466 520 716 730 815 848 856 969
Products:
MILK
share of prod. 75 71.9 68.9 66.0 59.7 59.0 58.7 61.5 53.9 40.9 42.4 40.8 42.2 46.3 45.2
market share 30.0 24.9 23.4 23.0 23.0 23.6 23.0 24.8
CHEESE/BUTTER
share of prod. 9.4 7.4 6.5 5.7 7.6 7.7 7.2 7.4 6.4 4.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.9
market share
CREAM
share of prod. 9.0 6.5 6.1 6.6 7.4 6.8 6.2 7.5 6.8 5.5 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.2 5.9
market share 18 40 33.8 25.0 24.3
YOGHURT/DESE
RT
share of prod. 6.5 5.1 5.5 5.6 6.0 5.1 5.3 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.1 9.3 8.9 8.7 14.1
market share 12.0 15.0 11.4 1L2 11.1 6.0 13.7
SALUMI
share of prod. 0.9 1.0 1.4 2.2 2.8 3.2 3.0 3.1 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0
market share
TOMATO SAUCE
share of prod. 1.3 5.1 8.7 14.7 10.1 9.2 8.6 8.0 7.7
market share 4.3 17.0 15.0
DRINKS
share of prod. 1.9 3.6 5.5 6.5 5.9 8.2 7.6 8.9 9.2 9.8
market share 11.0 13.3
BAKERY
share of prod. 0.8 4.5 10.6 13.4 12.8 12.6 12.0 10.5
market share 5.0 4.0
OTHERS 0 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.5 0.8 0.8 1.3 2.0 6.5 7.7 10.5 10.0 6.4 4.8
IN SUPERMKT. 8.8 11.8 14.5 16.3 16.2 14.1
COSTS (%sales):
raw materials 62.9 65.1 66.9 82.9 81.8 74.0 68.6 64.6 59.1 61.7 60.0 54.9 57.6 56.8 53.9
wages 6.6 6.4 6.2 5.7 5.5 6.7 6.7 6.9 7.5 6.1 6.3 6.3 7.0 7.6 7.4
advertising 1.3 1.3 2.0 2.6 2.9 4.3 6.5 7.3 9.8 4.9 59 7.4 7.2 7.9 8.8
distribution
other 24.7 24.4 24.6 10.2 11.5 15.8 18.5 22.4 27.2 19.8 21.2 27.9 25.2 23.2 25.4
OPER.RETURN 5.8 4.1 2.2 1.2 1.3 3.5 6.2 6.1 6.2 12.4 12.5 10.8 10.1 12.4 13.2
financial costs 3.5 3.0 2.9 2.2 2.2 4.1 4.7 5.4 6.0 6.7 7.4 5.7 6.4 8.2 6.8
PRETAX PROFIT 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.7 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.6 4.3
NET PROFIT 1.12 0.92 0.85 1.06 1.11 1.14 0.94 0.86 1.15 0.90 0.46 0.37 0.59 0.77 2.95
employment 573 604 644 700 788 850 871 972 1078 1087 1080 1086 1089 1135 1217
a  plants 1 6 10 11
Source: R&S, Databank, Company interviews.
COMPANY DATA - STAR Table 4.4
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Turnover (bill.L.) 101 125 164 171 216 255 278 338 385 441 475 519 584 596 594 633 676 710 676
Products:
STOCK CUBES
share of prod. 15 10 11 11
market share 50.0 49.8 49.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 49.0 48.0 48.7
MARGARINE
share of prod. 5 5 6 6 6.2 6
market share 20.0 24.0 18.0 18.4 22.6 22 22.9 25.0
SEED OIL
share of prod. 8 6 5 9.8 5.5
market share 8.3 5.5 4.8 6.2 6.5
SAUCES
share of prod. 9.9
market share 8.5
COFFEE
share of prod. 9.0 8.0 8.0 5.8 6.5 2.6
market share 3.5 3.3 1.6 1.6 1.5 0.9
BARLEY
share of prod.
market share
TEA/CAMOMILE
share of prod. 6.7 6.7
market share 23.1 25.5
BABY FOOD
share of prod. 4.0 5.0 3.9
market share 10.9 5.2 7.0
TUNA FISH
share of prod. 2.8 4.0 9.9 12.5 11.1
market share 7.9 8.0 6.5 6.3 10.9
COSTS (°/«sales):
raw materials 74.4 80.0 64.2 61.2 58.3 58.3 60.0 59.2 57.3 56.7 55.2 52.5 53.9 52.9 49.5 49.1 48.2 47.8 45.8
wages 10.7 10.6 10.2 12.6 11.7 12.4 13.6 13.9 13.8 14.1 15.5 15.5 14.9 14.7 15.4 16.3 16.3 16.7 17.2
advertising 10.9 11.9 14.5 15.1 15.2 15.6 16.6
distribution 12.5 12.5 13.4 13.6 13.1 12.2 12.1
other 14.3 14.9 17.8 19.1 18.1 18.7 21.4 20.9 22.1 23.4
OPER. RETURN 9.5 8.5 11.6 11.1 12.0 10.2 8.3 8.3 7.0 8 3 7.2 8.6 6.5 7.0 5.4 5.4 6.0 6.0 9.2
financial costs 2.0 2.1 4.3 4.8 4.4 3.8 3.5 2.7 3.8 4.0 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.2 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.6
PRETAX PROFIT 5.0 4.8 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.0 3.9 3.6 2.5 4.1 3.7 4.1 3.0 3.9 4.2 4.7 5.1 4.8 6.7
NET PROFIT 3.28 2.64 2.01 1.93 2.16 1.97 2.18 2.08 1.56 1.84 1.92 2.57 2.35 2.35 2.56 3.18 3.48 3.26 3.42
employment 3091 3103 3084 3302 3344 3330 3405 3263 3109 2877 2775 2502 2486 2449 2393 2399 2166
n. plants 5 6 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Source: R&S, Databank, Company interviews.
MARKET DATA
Table 4.5
CHEESE 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
SALES (1) 2500 3680 4303 4724 4955 5052 5386.5
N. FIRMS 1700 1700 1700 1600 1500 1450
EMPLOYMENT 12000 19000 19000 19000 17000 17000
% EXPORT 4.3 4.1 4.7 5.0 5.8 6.9
CR4 51.4 37.9 37.6 40.2 41.5 42.3
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 26 61 72 100 116
MARKET SHARES:
Galbani 20.0 19.2 18.1 18.9 19.6 20.2 20.9
Locatelli 9.0 7.0 6.4 6.1 6.4 7.0 7.2
Kraft 6.0 7.9 7.1 7.2 7.5 7.5 7.5
Invemizzi 8.0 6.8 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.7
Osella 0.8 1.1 1.2
ADVERTISING SHARE: (2)
Galbani 9.0 6.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 1.0
Locatelli 16.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 12.0 3.0
Kraft 41.0 32.0 32.0 26.0 35.0 13.0
Invemizzi 15.0 12.0 12.0 13.0 9.0 4.0
Osella
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market)
Galbani 80 71 71 70 69 70 72
Locatelli 80 78 78 76 76 71 79
Kraft 75 86 74 82 83 82 75
Invemizzi 80 70 70 71 72 74 76
Osella
(1) market value (bill.L.'
(2) % of sales 
Source: Databank.
Table 4.6
M ARKET DATA
SALAMI 1984 1985 1986
SALES (1) 10835
N. FIRMS 2100
EMPLOYMENT 30000
% EXPORT 2.8
CR4 11.7
ADVERT. (bill.L.)
MARKET SHARES:
Fiorucci 3.6 3.9 4.0
Galbani 3.2 3.4 3.2
Vismara 2.2 2.1 2.2
Citterio 1.8 2.0 1.8
Negroni 1.4 1.4 1.4
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Fiorucci
Galbani
Vismara
Citterio
Negroni
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market)
Fiorucci
Galbani
Vismara
Citterio
Negroni
(1) market value (bill.L.’
Source: Databank.
SO
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Table 4.7
MARKET DATA
PASTA 1984 1985 1986
SALES (1)
N. FIRMS 
EMPLOYMENT 
% EXPORT 
CR4
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 
MARKET SHARES:
1980
185
10000
20.9
31.9
Barilla 21.2 20.6 20.7
Buitoni 3.9 4.1 4.8
De Cecco 3.3 3.6 3.7
Agnesi 3.6 3.6 3.1
Amato
ADVERTISING SHARE:
2.9 2.8 3.9
Barilla 58 74
Buitoni 10 5
De Cecco 3 1
Agnesi 9 4
Amato
DIVERSIFICATION: 
(% sales in market) 
Barilla 
Buitoni 
De Cecco 
Agnesi 
Amato
2 2
(1) m arket value (bill.L/
Source: Databank.
VO
Table 4.8
MARKET DATA
BISCUITS 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
SALES (1) 2312 1860
N. FIRMS 180 750
EMPLOYMENT 22312 7000
% EXPORT 6.4
CR4 39.9
ADVERT. (bill.L.)
MARKET SHARES:
Barilla 12.4 14.4 16.6 15.7 16.4 16.9
Alivar 12.5 10.9 10.6 11.3 11.4 11.9
Saiwa 8.6 8.6 7.9 8.3 8.5 8.0
Sidalm 3.4 4.0 4.8
Colussi 4.7 4.4 4.2 3.7 3.6 3.3
Parmalat 1 4.6 4.8 4.8
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Barilla 18.3 13.7
Alivar 16.9 12.8
Saiwa 7.3 10.0 11.0
Sidalm 5.5
Colussi 10.0
Parmalat 9.0 7.7
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market)
Barilla 26
Alivar 30
Saiwa 83
Sidalm 16
Colussi 100
Parmalat 2
(1) market value (bill.L.
Source: Databank.
Table 4.9
MARKET DATA
BREAD 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
SUBSTITUTES
SALES (1) 980.3
N. FIRMS 146
EMPLOYMENT 3700
% EXPORT 4.3
CR4 76
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 60 45
MARKET SHARES:
Barilla 32 33.6 35.8 3.8 45
Buitoni 14.9 12.8 12.1 12.4 12.9
Alivar 11.3 10.4 10.0 10.0 10.0
Saiwa 8.7 8.1 8.7 8.7 8.1
Plada 6.4 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.8
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Barilla 22.6 23.1
Buitoni 24.5 14.5
Alivar 12.8 16.0
Saiwa 6.2 13.3
Plada 14.9 3.3
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market)
Barilla 11.8 11.9 15.0
Buitoni 27.9 23.6 23.9
Alivar 9.8 9.7 10.6
Saiwa 26.7 26.0 26.7
Plada 7.6 7.0 8.0
(1) m arket value (bill.L.'
Source: Databank.
so
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Table 4.10
MARKET DATA
M ILK 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
SALES (1) 2000 2318 2425 2780 2780 2891.9
N. FIRMS 193 193 191 200 200 200
EMPLOYMENT 6900 6900 7300 7300 7300 7250
% EXPORT 0 0.8 0.1
CR4 UHT milk 27.9 34.9 48.1 48.8 48.8 48.8
CR4 fresh milk 22.2 24.2 25.5 25.5 28.3
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 8.58 11.7 13.5 13.0 20.0
MARKET SHARES: (2) (4) (2) (4) (2) (4) (3) (3) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3)
Parmalat 24.9 23.4 23.0 14.8 14.2 13.4 23.6 14.6 23.5 14.8 24.3 14.9
Cerpl 4.6 5.2 5.5 4.8 8.9 7.2 4.8 7.1 5.0 7.5 5.5 9.8
Polenghi 6.1 6.4 6.5 4.2 4.0 5.1 6.1 5.3 6.3 5.4 6.3 4.8
Ala 5.1 4.7 4.9 4.6 5.5 5.0 4.2 4.8 4.7 5.3 4.0 5.1
Sole 5.9 6.4 6.8 5.0 5.1 3.8 5.1 4.3 4.1 4.9 3.4 3.4
Giglio 3.7 4.0 3.7 4.5 3.5 4.8 3.6 4.6 3.6
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Parmalat 23.4 30.2 45.0 40.7
Cerpl 15.5 10.4 6.7 17.0
Polenghi 5.5 14.0 27.1 1.0
Ala 5.4 12.2 12.3
Sole 17.0 6.4
Giglio 19.4 22.2 0.2 10.7
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market)
Parmalat 53 47 47 48 42
Cerpl 69 35 56 50 51
Polenghi 31 38 39 34 37
Ala 62 59 64 54 53
Sole 86
Giglio 23
(1) market value (bill.L.); (2) volume; (3) total milk market; (4) UHT milk only
Source: Databank.
Table 4.11
MARKET DATA
YOGHURT 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
SALES (1) 699.2 889
N. FIRMS 60 100
EMPLOYMENT 1700 3400
% EXPORT
CR4 71.5 41.6
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 10.3 71.8 62.3
MARKET SHARES: (2) (2) (3) (3)
Sitia Yomo 35.0 35.9 27.7 26.3 40.0 37.0 35.4 10.9
Gervais Danone 14.0 15.0 18.0 20.4 18.3 19.5 21.6 4.4
Parmalat 6.4 7.7 19.5 11.4 11.2 11.0 9.4 16.1
Torre in Pietra 5.1 5.3 2.6 2.7 3.3 3.6 3.4 4.8
Mandria 1.9 2.2 5.2
Galbani 2.6 2.9 15.6 15.8 2.2 2.0 1.8
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Sitia Yomo 25.0 21.2 11.7 11.5
Gervais Danone 17.9 23.3 33.6 0.6
Parmalat 17.3 11.7 22.7 26.5
Torre in Pietra 5.5
Mandria 10.8 1.9 16.0 6.3
Galbani
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market)
Sitia Yomo 100 100 90
Gervais Danone 72 65 66 86
Parmalat 6 6 6 84
Torre in Pietra 23 36 44
Mandria 100 94 7
Galbani 8 7
(1) m arket value (bill.L.' ; (2) in volume; (3) yoghurt and cesserts
Source: Databank.
Table 4.12
MARKET DATA
FRUIT JUICES 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
SALES (1) 230 889
N. FIRMS 40 100
EMPLOYMENT 1500 3400
% EXPORT
CR4 48.5 41.6
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 0.6 0.7 1.5 2.1 62.3
MARKET SHARES:
Massalombarda 27.0 14.0 13.5 10.9
Salfa 12.5 11.2 4.4
Zuegg 15.4 10.0 10.8 16.1
Conserve Italia 11.5 10.2 4.8
Parmalat 12.4 7.5 5.2
Star 4.5 3.4
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Massalombarda 34.4 24.6 27.0 11.5
Salfa 0.6
Zuegg 17.8 17.8 15.4 26.5
Conserve Italia 5.5
Parmalat 0.1 27.4 12.4 6.3
Star 17.4 18.2 35.7
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market)
Massalombarda 70 70
Salfa 96 95 86
Zuegg 60 60 84
Conserve Italia 22 23 45
Parmalat 1 3 7
Star
(1) market value (bill.L.'
Source: Databank.
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Table 4.13 
MARKET DATA
TOMATOES PRESERVES 1988 1989
SALES (1) 859.9
N. FIRMS 356
EMPLOYMENT 5900
% EXPORT 57.9
CR4 31.4
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 35.3 33.1
MARKET SHARES:
Cirio Bertolli De Rica 22.2 23.1
Star 8.5 8.9
Conserve Italia 5.5 5.1
Santarosa 4.8 4.8
Parmalat 4.3 4.3
Parmasole 2.4 2.5
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Cirio Bertolli De Rica 30.2 66.2
Star 24.0 8.9
Conserve Italia 7.4 3.8
Santarosa 26.0 5.7
Parmalat 12.0 15.3
Parmasole
DIVERSIFICATION: 
(% sales in market)
Cirio Bertolli De Rica 36.0 36.2
Star 10.8 9.9
Conserve Italia 36.6 36.6
Santarosa 36.1 34.8
Parmalat 5.6 5.3
Parmasole
(1) market value (bill.L.)
Source: Databank.
K>O
Table 4.14
MARKET DATA
STOCK CUBES 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
SALES (1) 60 72 162.3 165.6 160
N. FIRMS 23 25 30 30 30
EMPLOYMENT 871 900 770 390 880
% EXPORT
CR4 95 94 98 98.7 98.4
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 1.1 1.3 1.5 2.1 2.5 2.8 17.3 18.7 33 27.3
MARKET SHARES:
Star 50 49.8 48.3 48.9 48.7
CPC Monda 30 32.5 32.7 32.4 32.5
Nestle 11.8 12.8 11.9
Panzani 12 7.6 5.2 4.4 4.8
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Star 52.3 38.5 33.3 42.9 38.4 36.8 36.4 29.9 35.9 67.0
CPC Monda 29.0 23.1 33.3 28.6 33.1 38.9 23.1 41.7 50.3 27.5
Nestle 34.7 16.6 13.5 5.1
Panzani 1.8 23.1 26.7 23.8 23.5 14.1 5.2 9.1
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market) 15 10 9
Star 38 38 40 11.0 11.0
CPC Monda 38.0 45.6 38.7
Nestle 12 28 30 5.9 7.0 6.0
Panzani 31.0 9.9 6.6
(1) market value (bill.L.)' 
Source: Databank.
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Table 4.15
MARKET DATA
MARGARINE 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
SALES (1) 81.7 97 105 240 260
N. FIRMS 15 18 19 22 20
EMPLOYMENT 1040 950 860 900 750
% EXPORT 0.2 0.5 0.2 3.5 8
CR4 68 72 68.5 57.4 89.8
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 1.4 1.7 2.6 2.4 2.5 3.6 3.9 4.1 9
MARKET SHARES:
Unil-It 33 32 32 24.4 23.7 35.6 35.4
Star 20 24 24 17.5 18.4 22.6 22.9
Kraft 6 4.7 5.5 6.2 6.3 7.3 6.8
Unigra 7.9 4.8 5.9
Sipal 5 4.5 5.5 5 5.4 5.2
Igor 8 10.5 7 5 7.4 4.2 5.1
ADVERTISING
SHARE:
Unil-It 35.7 47.1 53.8 45.8 40.0 50.0 51.3 58.5 41.1
Star 42.9 41.2 30.8 37.5 36.0 27.8 25.6 24.4 58.9
Kraft 28.6 11.8 11.5 12.5 20.0 19.4 23.1 17.1
Unigra
Sipal
Igor
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market) >
Unil-It 6 8.5 8.3
Star 5 5 5 6 6.2 6
Kraft 5 5 5 4 3.5 3.3
Unigra 73 73.3
Sipal 75 90 95 100
Igor 50 40 40
(1) market value (bill.L.)
Source: Databank.
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Table 4.16
MARKET DATA
COFFEE 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
SALES (1) 721(2) 875(2) 956 1200 1360 1525 1760 2272 2601 1919
N. FIRMS 1500 1483 1480 1300 1500 1500 1500 802 780 750 750
EMPLOYMENT 6950 7710 7100 6500 7100 7000 7000 7400 7300 7200 7200
% EXPORT 1.1 1.2 1 1.4 1.7 1.7 2.4 2.9 3.4 4.6
CR4 39.8 39.3 42.7 42 36.9 40.1 46.5 41.2 46.4 52.3
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 4.9 5.1 6.1 6.1 8.9 10.8 11.2 13.9 48 68 85 129
MARKET SHARES: (2) (2)
Lavazza 21 23.9 22.6 23.6 23.2 24.3 23.7 22.6 23 23.3 26.5
Sao Cafe 9.5 7.9 8.2 8.4 8.1 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.4 7.7 2.9
Procter&Gamble 6.3 6.1 7.8 5 4.7 5.5 5.5 6.6 6 5.7 5.6
Segafredo 5.4 5.5 4.7 4.6 4.4 5.3
Cafe do Brazil 3.8 3.8 4 4.3 4.5
Star 3.5 3.2 3.3 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 0.9 0.9
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Lavazza 30.6 33.3 34.4 24.6 37.0 30.4 33.0 36.0 46.0 34.0 40.0
Sao Cafe 10.2 15.7 13.1 9.8 10.0 11.6 10.0 9.0 3.0 4.0 1.0
Procter&Gamble 18.4 13.7 13.1 16.4 25.0 21.4 21.0 24.0 24.0 27.0 20.0
Segafredo 6.0 4.5 4.0 1.0 5.0 7.0
Cafe do Brazil 7.0 11.0 14.0
Star 10.2 7.8 6.6 8.2 8.0 1.0
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Lavazza 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sao Cafe 24 24 24 24 19.4 24.5 22 16.2 12.8
Procter&Gamble 100 100 100 100 100 99.1 98.9 95.8
Segafredo 100 100 100
Cafe do Brazil 9 8 8 8 4 5.8 6.0 6.5 3.2 2.6
Star
(1) market value (bill.L.)
(2) production.
Source: Databank.
204
Table 4.17
MARKET DATA
BABY FOOD 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
SALES (1)
N. FIRMS
EMPLOYMENT
% EXPORT
CR4
ADVERT. (bill.L.)
MARKET SHARES: (2) (2)
Plada 55.2 56.1 68.4 66.8 52.7 62.7
Nipiol 12.4 14.2 12.1 14.5 10.9
Nestle 8.5 8.5 6.0 6.8 10.2 10.7
Star 10.9 5.2 4.0 3.2 7.0 7.0
Monda 6.5 5.4 6.2 6.6
Milupa 8.5 4.6 5.8 6.0
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Plada 49.7 62.0 73.3 65.1
Nipiol 20.0 16.5 9.0 11.1
Nestle 7.2 6.0 1.3 5.4
Star 9.6 6.8 5.6 10.6
Monda 9.9 6.4 10.8 7.2
Milupa 2.8
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market)
Plada 90 70 70 72 77.8
Nipiol 7.8 5 5 5
Nestle 20 13 13 14 12.9
Star 4 5 5 5 3.9
Monda 23 19 19 23 21.1
Milupa 69.2
(1) market value (bill.L.)
(2) production.
Source: Databank.
Table 4.18
MARKET DATA
TUNA FISH 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
SALES (1) 325 440 565.1
N. FIRMS 249 250
EMPLOYMENT 3500 5200
%  EXPORT 6.4 5.4
CR4 45 43.7
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 1.5 2.0 2.7 3.1
MARKET SHARES:
Trinity 11.4 13.5
Simmenthal 4.8 6.2
Star 8.3 7.9
Mazzola 11.8 12.3
Palmera 9.0 9.5
AL.CO. 8.4 9.0
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Trinity 13.3 15.0 11.1 12.9
Simmenthal 26.7 15.0 14.8 9.7
Star 6.7 6.7 3.7 3.2
Mazzola 20.0 15.0 14.8 12.9
Palmera 4.7 20.5 15.2 13.2
AL.CO.
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market)
Trinity 70
Simmenthal 19
Star
Mazzola
Palmera
AL.CO. 85
(1) market value (bill.L.)
Source: Databank.
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Table 4.19
MARKET DATAL
TEA 1986 1987
SALES (1) 220 228
N. FIRMS 30 32
EMPLOYMENT 480 360
% EXPORT 1
CR4 76.5 74.6
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 19.7 22.6
MARKET SHARES:
Star 23.1 25.3
Nabisco 20.9 20.9
Bonomelli 17.1 19.0
Unil-It 15.4 3.6
D&C 9.3 9.1
ADVERTISING SHARE:
Star 25.9 21.7
Nabisco 9.6 21.7
Bonomelli 34.6 35.9
Unil-It 21.3 11.9
D&C 7.6 8.8
DIVERSIFICATION: 
(% sales in market)
Star 6.7 6.7
Nabisco 61 57
Bonomelli 47.7 44
Unil-It 3 2.2
D&C 20.3 18.6
1) market value (bill.L.) 
Source: Databank.
KJO
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MARKET DATA
Table 4.20
SEED OIL 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
SALES (1) 365 474 528.7 883 912(2) 650 608
N. FIRMS 200 200 200 200 200 200 160
EMPLOYMENT 2300 2500 2500 2500 2500 2400 1900
% EXPORT
CR4 47.6 37.4 31.1 34 30.8 37.3 31.3
ADVERT. (bill.L.) 6.9 2.8 4.4 8.4 33 36
MARKET SHARES: (2) (2)
Quacker Chiari e Forti 25.3 19.0 20.9 14.5 15.6 21.6 21.5
Unil-It 5.2 4.8 4.6 3.1 10.0 7.4 7.8
Star 8.3 5.8 5.5 4.8 5.4 6.2 6.5
Salov 2.8 1 1.7 2.1 3.9 5.6
Icic 2.7 3.1 5.0 4.8 5.3
Carapelli 3.3 3.9 4.0 3.8 2.4 3.8 4.0
ADVERTISING (3)
SHARE:
Quacker Chiari e Forti 27.5 35.7 45.5 54.8 10.0 59.4
Unil-It 17.4 10.7 6.8 14.6 32.3
Star 24.6 17.9 13.6 10.7 8.4 5.2
Salov
Icic
Carapelli
DIVERSIFICATION:
(% sales in market)
Quacker Chiari e Forti 81.8 79.7 75.0 70.0 52.0 58.8 50.6 44.4
Unil-It 4.5 4.8 4.0 4.0 9.0 5.3 3.7 3.4
Star 8.0 6.3 5.0 5.0 5.0 9.8 5.4 5.5
Salov 31.5 40.4 43.7 29.5 15.3 19.4
Icic 6.0 6.0 12.2 12.5
Carapelli 30.0 28.0 28.0 25.0
(1) market value (bill.L.
(2) production.
(3) advert./sales.
Source: Databank.
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Table 4.21
DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
Comparison of the four firms' networks
with those of the main competitors
GALBANI
A) Relative importance of channels used
1983 1986 1988
A B C D A B C D A B C D
Galbani +++ + + -H—t- - + + +++ - + +
Kraft ++ +++ ++ + 10% 30% 55% 5% 10% 30% 55% 5%
Locatelli +++ - ++ + 72% - 17% 5% 50% - 45% 5%
Invemizzi +++ + + + 83% - 9% 8% 83% - 5% 12%
A = retail 
B = wholesale
C = modem distribution directly 
D = catering
+,++,+++ indicates the relative importance when no other data are available 
B) Details of network
1983 1986 1988
A B C D E A B c D E A B c D E
Galbani 3000 - 148 - 3100 - 150 - 4000 4200 - 155 - 4300
Kraft 180 10 200 25 9 - - 200 25 9 - -
Locatelli 1000 - 900 - 100 15 1000 900 - 100 15 1000
Invemizzi 1000 - 1250 - 110 10 1200 940 - 110 6 1150
A = salesman (employed) 
B= agents (independent)
C = deposits 
D = "concessionari"
E = own means of transport 
Source: Databank.
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Table 4.22
DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
Comparison of the four firms' networks
with those of the main competitors
BARILLA - PASTA
B) Details of network
1986
A B C D E
Barilla 380 21 650
Buitoni 70 140 10
De Cecco 40
Agnesi 16 14 90
A = salesman (employed)
B= agents (independent)
C = deposits 
D = "concessionari"
E = own means of transport 
Source: Databank.
Table 4.23
BARILLA - BISCUITS
A) Relative importance of channels used
1988
A B C D
Barilla
Alivar
Nabisco
Parmalat
45% 55% 
50% _ 35% 
31% 69% 
53% 47%
A = retail 
B = wholesale
C = modem distribution directly 
D = catering
B) Details of network
1988
A B C D E
Barilla 400
Alivar
Nabisco 200
Parmalat 650 100
A = salesman iemployed)
B= agents (independent)
C = deposits 
D = "concessionari"
E = own means of transport 
Source: Databank.
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Table 4.24
DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
Comparison of the four firms' networks
with those of the main competitors
PARMALAT
A) Relative importance of channels used
1989
A B C D
Parmalat
CERPL
Polenghi
Ala
50% 40% 10% 
48% 2% 20% 6% 
55% 35% 10%
58% 10% 30% 2%
A = retail 
B = wholesale
C = modem distribution directly 
D = catering
B) Details of network
1989
A B C D E
Parmalat 36 2000 300
CERPL 285 187 10 650 411
Polenghi 250 300 67 330 360
Ala 45 80 26 50 90
A = salesman (employed) 
B= agents (independent)
C = deposits 
D = "concessionari"
E = own means of transport 
Source: Databank.
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Table 4.25
DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
Comparison of the four firms' networks
with those of the main competitors
STAR-STOCK CUBES
A) Relative importance of channels used
1988
A B C
Star 
CPC Monda 
Nestle 
Panzani
15% 25% 60% 
25% 45% 30%
A = retail 
B = wholesale
C = modem distribution directly
B) Details of network
1988
A B C
Star 960
CPC Monda
Nestle 125
Panzani 230
A = salesman (employed) 
B= agents (independent) 
C = deposits 
Source: Databank.
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Table 4.26
DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
Comparison of the four firms' networks
with those of the main competitors
STAR-TUNA
A) Relative importance of channels used
1989
A B C
Star
Trinity
Simmenthal
Mazzola
58% 15% 20%
10% 10% 60% 
9% 40% 50%
A = retail 
B = wholesale
C = modem distribution directly
B) Details of network
1989
A B C
Star
Trinity
Simmenthal
Mazzola
625 
300 20 
150
50
A = salesman (employed) 
B= agents (independent) 
C = deposits 
Source: Databank.
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Table 4.27 
DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS 
Comparison of the four firms' networks 
with those of the main competitors
STAR-TEA
A) Relative importance of channels used
1987
A B C
Star
Nabisco
Bonomelli
D&C
20% 55% 25% 
15% 10% 75%
A = retail 
B = wholesale
C = modem distribution directly
B) Details of network
1987
A B C
Star
Nabisco
Bonomelli
D&C
300 
30 85 
140 
160
A = salesman (employed) 
B= agents (independent) 
C = deposits 
Source: Databank.
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio
(% of total market expenditures)
Table 4.28
CHEESE
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
GALBANI
KRAFT
INVERNIZZI
LOCATELLI
PARMALAT
STAR
Certosa Bel Paese 
Jocca Philadelphia Kraft 
Invemizzi
Pizzaiola Mio Fruttolo
Parmalat
Starlette
7.10
32.05
8.91
20.00
0.00
6.13
4.63
37.41
15.67
16.21
0.00
4.55
8.25
36.36
12.94
14.57
0.00
0.00
5.68
33.45
11.38
13.60
4.13
0.00
6.99
30.96
12.23
11.03
0.00
0.00
6.19
26.85
13.18
10.12
0.00
0.00
2.29
37.77
9.72
11.58
0.00
0.00
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 9,683.4 11,698.4 23,538.3 60,776.1 71,506.7 99,792.1 104,868.6
Source: AGB Italia
Table 4.29
SALUMI
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
CITTERIO Citterio 19.79 23.08 18.69 17.08 13.55 18.66 14.72
FINI Fini 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.49 1.84 3.47
FIORUCCI Fiorucci 0.00 0.00 5.88 6.14 7.45 6.83 3.62
GALBANI ~ 2.38 2.14 3.93 2.79 3.65 2.27 2.43
INVERNIZZI Invemizzi 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.38
NEGRONI Negroni 37.65 14.67 22.88 18.14 21.97 15.23 1.97
VISMARA Vismara 13.56 7.03 18.40 13.58 8.72 18.00 8.77
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 100.00 3,651.2 5,153.3 13,313.2 12,374.2 14,064.3 23,031.6
Source: AGB Italia
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio
(% of total market expenditures)
Table 4.30
PASTA
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
AGNESI Agnesi 5.22 0.00 0.13 0.47 9.13 4.18 17.25
BARILLA BArilla 63.71 68.56 63.66 74.73 58.10 73.92 63.86
IBP Buitoni 7.90 5.98 11.41 0.03 10.15 5.41 0.01
DE CECCO De Cecco 0.53 1.98 0.40 0.92 2.51 0.62 0.08
PONTE Ponte 2.89 0.61 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.10
VOIELLO Voiello 11.40 9.29 10.89 8.83 4.83 7.35 7.33
FEDERICI Federici 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.12 1.18
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 3,456.5 6,548.3 8,780.1 15,701.3 40,137.0 46,495.9 50,646.1
Source: AGB Italia
Table 4.31
BISCUITS
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
DORIA Doria Bucaneve 3.77 3.71 3.35 2.47 3.41 3.98 0.53
ALIVAR Pavesi 24.13 23.93 16.29 15.90 16.33 14.47 17.22
PARMALAT Mister Day 0.00 0.00 3.82 4.38 13.03 5.34 7.98
GALBUSERA Zalet Galbusera 3.21 3.40 4.63 4.49 5.67 0.80 5.43
COLUSSI Colussi 17.41 16.62 7.48 3.12 0.86 2.89 0.33
LAZZARONI Lazzaroni 3.68 6.10 4.19 6.11 4.56 3.22 3.08
BARILLA Mulino Bianco 14.64 6.59 13.04 12.12 16.87 27.36 20.34
SAIWA Saiwa 10.03 7.46 14.18 11.95 7.51 14.56 10.03
SIDALM - 3.53 3.14 2.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 9,990.9 13,703.6 30,779.0 66,412.4 93,772.1 88,484.6 80,338.8
Source: AGB Italia
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio
(% of total market expenditures)
Table 4.32
RUSKS
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
BUITONI
PLASMON
ALIVAR
BARILLA
S.CARLO
STAR
COLUSSI
Buitoni
Cracottes
Croccodi
Mulino Bianco
S.Carlo
Volette
Colussi
30.81
13.13
13.39
25.60
0.16
16.92
0.00
43.01
16.10
0.07
40.59
0.04
0.00
0.00
37.55
11.50
0.00
3.75
0.00
6.36
6.95
0.00
7.85
0.00
92.15
0.00
0.00
0.00
39.94
3.64
0.00
56.43
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.00
0.00
0.00
60.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
58.24
0.00
0.00
41.76
0.00
0.00
0.00
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 4,579.7 4,980.3 6,054.5 4,374.2 8,926.5 9,965.6 10,453.1
Source: AGB Italia
Table 4.33
BREAD STICKS
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
BUITONI-MECO Gioppini* 0.00 0.00 98.33 100.00 94.51 69.68 65.14
BARILLA Mulino Bianco 96.78 0.00 1.54 0.00 5.49 30.32 6.23
DESCO Monviso 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.63
VALLEDORO Valledoro 1.32 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 D.OO
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 372.3 0.0 1,237.3 2,744.9 4,695.0 2,274.5 621.0
♦Owned by Meco before 1984.
Source: AGB Italia
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio
(% of total market expenditures)
Table 4.34
CRACKERS
FIRM BRAND 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
BUITONI Buitoni 0.00 19.03 5.80 4.84 0.95
DORIA Doriano 6.58 7.46 6.17 3.62 6.15
GALBUSERA Frumens Galbusera 21.29 25.13 14.71 7.90 20.24
ALIVAR Gran Pavesi Motta 31.12 16.38 36.33 27.63 17.42
BARILLA Mulino Bianco 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.77 14.35
PLASMON Mi sura 0.00 6.06 10.59 14.51 14.65
SAIWA Premium 9.63 22.71 25.11 10.92 20.18
ITALU Tuc 3.58 0.56 0.03 1.63 4.91
STAR Wasa 0.00 1.39 0.79 0.58 1.15
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 8,863.8 17,925.9 25,947.3 29,152.7 38,714.6
Source: AGB Italia
Table 4.35
READY SAUCES
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
BARILLA Barilla 20.75 0.00 13.31 13.84 5.75 12.73 117.22
STAR Star Grand'Italia 49.18 73.64 53.91 51.11 82.94 61.59 81.85
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 1,468.6 2,143.2 1,176.7 6,059.2 16,286.1 8,846.1 8,426.3
Source: AGB Italia
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio
(% of total market expenditures)
Table 4.36
MILK
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
PARMALAT
CERPL
POLENGHI
ALA
SOLE
GIGLIO
Parmalat Dietalat
Granarolo
Polenghi
Ala
Sole
Giglio
23.04
7.01
9.00
1.94
8.35
29.41
16.10
24.84
10.54
0.83
0.00
32.13
23.43
14.54
5.45
5.38
17.04
19.37
26.37
10.46
13.72
12.22
0.00
22.29
45.00
6.76
27.08
12.27
0.00
0.17
44.63
2.51
17.08
4.55
0.00
0.00
72.01
0.37
13.21
0.26
0.00
0.00
TOTAL (mill. Lit) 3,060.6 2,551.9 6,599.9 7,759.9 7,042.4 11,691.7 13,388.4
Source: AGB Italia
Table 4.37
CREAM
FIRM BRAND 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
PARMALAT Chef 52.58 43.00 100.00 60.18 99.39
SOLE Sole 0.28 43.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
GIGLIO Giglio 33.65 13.34 0.00 39.56 0.00
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 1,012:7 1,492.0 1,349.1 3,322.6 1,050.4
Source: AGB Italia
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio
(% of total market expenditures)
Table 4.38
YOGHURT
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
YOMO 
DANONE 
PARMALAT 
TORRE IN PIETRA 
MANDRIA
Yomo 
Danone 
Parmalat 
Tone in Pietra 
Mandriot
69.77
22.71
6.36
0.00
0.00
65.70
22.39
11.36
0.00
0.00
59.08
17.83
20.70
0.05
0.00
55.74
29.68
4.69
4.71
0.00
50.04
23.71
23.61
2.42
0.00
61.93
19.73
11.68
0.00
2.10
55.89
28.73
13.16
0.00
0.48
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 2,500.0 4,350.2 7,948.8 26,285.7 49,331.3 65,766.6 64,630.2
Source: AGB Italia
Table 4.39
FRUIT JUICES
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
NABISCO Del Monte 0.28 0.00 9.30 8.25 0.07 0.03 4.18
PARMALAT Santal 27.23 9.37 14.18 10.48 18.41 15.24 13.74
ZUEGG Zuegg Skipper 17.68 11.66 8.24 8.64 18.93 34.22 26.92
SALFA Derby 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.20 11.94 5.02
STAR Go' 0.03 40.17 16.58 7.21 0.00 0.00 2.27
COLOMBANI Jolly 11.28 5.00 3.22 4.39 10.42 5.47 6.66
MASSALOMBARDA Yoga 24.40 20.46 11.01 7.93 9.16 9.08 9.69
CONFRUIT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.56 4.67 0.00
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 1,487.6 2,789.2 6,908.3 19,148.2 25,604.7 22,874.7 43,960.2
Source: AGB Italia
2
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ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio
(% of total market expenditures)
Table 4.40
STOCK CUBES
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
CPC MONDA Knorr 20.74 25.80 26.31 14.20 23.11 41.94 50.25
PANZANI Liebig 8.84 3.17 7.70 12.13 5.00 9.14 0.21
NESTLE Maggi 21.17 22.36 29.49 41.91 34.53 16.86 13.60
STAR Star 45.91 43.87 35.67 29.77 36.23 29.89 35.89
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 5,011.1 5,693.3 9,049.4 14,532.1 17,348.4 18,676.8 32,632.6
Source: AGB Italia
Table 4.41
MARGARINE
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
STAR
VAN DEN BERG 
KRAFT
Foglia d'Oro Star 
Gradina Maya Rama 
Valle’
29.43
50.62
19.95
25.68
50.90
23.42
23.91
58.70
17.39
32.50
39.30
28.20
45.31
38.29
16.40
15.30
53.70
31.00
58.89
41.06
0.00
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 3,562.8 3,911.1 4,140.7 9,177.9 7,397.2 8,938.5 12,905.8
Source: AGB Italia
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio
(% of total market expenditures)
Table 4.42
TUNA
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
ALCO Alco 10.52 18.72 13.96 11.51 3.41 4.21 8.25
SIMMENTHAL Mareblu 9.40 4.55 0.05 3.02 22.38 16.27 11.99
MAZZOLA Maruzzella 9.58 7.09 6.52 7.82 6.63 4.18 6.03
SAFICA Nostromo 14.97 10.96 4.25 0.43 4.15 4.91 5.24
PALMERA Palmera 8.47 21.63 11.10 24.23 21.43 15.84 14.39
TRINITY Rio Mare 34.49 22.18 38.18 24.29 19.96 65.05 39.86
STAR Star 13.88 0.00 15.66 6.57 6.56 8.35 7.29
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 4,463.2 5,185.6 7,303.1 19,966.3 37,520.3 57,201.9 62,659.0
Source: AGB Italia
Table 4.43
BABY BISCUITS
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
PLASMON Dieterba 13.12 92.31 51.93 90.13 93.59 91.30 88.85
STAR Mellin 78.52 7.66 5.71 9.09 6.22 8.25 11.15
MILUPA Milupa 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IBP Nipiol 8.36 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 2,132.0 2,767.1 5,315.7 4,100.5 12,781.3 16,507.7 18,240.2
Source: AGB Italia
2
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ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio
(% of total market expenditures)
Table 4.44
CAMOMILE
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
BONOMELLI Bonomelli 31.01 20.58 2.91 36.37 35.52 28.63 49.39
NABISCO Montania 30.41 23.63 28.47 29.56 26.70 24.90 22.28
STAR Sogni d'Oro 38.57 28.28 25.26 24.13 27.06 33.75 23.77
MILUPA Milupa 0.00 0.00 2.40 9.93 10.73 0.00 0.00
TOTAL (mill Lit.) 1,386.2 2,055.4 2,708.3 5,245.3 6,041.9 9,830.0 10,402.2
Source: AGB Italia
Table 4.45
TEA
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
UNIL-IT Lipton 22.52 27.81 0.00 19.60 20.76 20.18 11.68
STAR Star 35.47 34.54 39.58 28.47 21.71 24.63 21.44
NABISCO Ati 21.29 22.20 20.60 4.19 17.14 9.35 21.12
BONOMELLI Bonomelli 0.00 0.00 31.02 38.40 27.41 32.90 35.07
D&C Twinings 15.04 13.89 8.42 7.75 8.66 7.51 8.74
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 2,230.7 2,489.2 2,914.9 10,971.2 15,773.0 20,943.8 23,270.3
Source: AGB Italia
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ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio
(% of total market expenditures)
Table 4.46
COFFEE
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
LAVAZZA
ILLY
CAFE DO BRAZIL 
SAO
PROCTER&GAMBLE
STAR
Lavazza Paulista
Illy
Kimbo
Sao
Spendid
Suerte
34.31
0.03
0.00
9.88
25.17
7.44
36.22
0.31
0.00
12.19
25.37
9.95
34.63
0.19
0.00
7.32
15.23
5.98
36.14
1.54
0.00
7.89
26.95
3.29
35.83
2.87
0.01
9.26
23.97
0.00
39.71
3.56
7.13
3.18
24.00
0.00
28.84
7.60
11.14
4.15
26.80
1.43
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 8,593.3 9,312.6 15,514.2 29,052.0 47,804.1 67,866.1 84,333.3
Source: AGB Italia
Table 4.47
PROCESS. TOMATO
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
STAR Pummaro 30.03 21.71 25.71 23.27 11.89 14.10 14.23
CIRIO Cirio 39.20 44.73 26.83 20.10 18.28 12.76 43.87
DE RICA DeRica 15.04 8.35 10.32 14.54 6.56 0.00 0.00
PARMALAT Poml 0.00 7.45 23.84 9.13 23.46 15.19 8.96
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 4,148.3 5,265.1 7,823.9 19,307.7 39,185.1 25,226.9 18,043.0
Source: AGB Italia
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ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio
(% of total market expenditures)
Table 4.48
SEED OIL
FIRM BRAND 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
QUACKERCHLARIE F.
UNIL-IT
STAR
SALOV
ICIC
Cuore, Topazio 
Maya, Oio 
Olita 
Sagra 
Sigillo
37.63
10.69
18.61
0.72
2.12
46.30
7.43
13.93
0.00
0.81
55.78
0.03
11.13
0.00
1.72
71.80
14.38
12.12
0.00
0.49
46.34
24.00
9.43
0.00
0.53
50.14
33.75
15.73
0.00
0.33
34.18
35.30
9.46
5.80
0.15
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 2,819.6 4,396.1 6,516.8 17,750.7 19,268.2 30,961.0 33,235.4
Source: AGB Italia
Table 4.49
CONDENSED SOUPS
FIRM BRAND 1984 1985 1986 1987
CAMPBELL'S Campbell's 100.00 0.00 8.21 13.98
STAR Grand'Italia 0.00 0.00 12.24 12.64
CPC MONDA Knorr 0.00 100.00 79.55 51.69
NESTLE Maggi 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.23
PARMALAT Pais 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.45
TOTAL (mill. Lit.) 305.2 1,214.6 11,266.0 14,666.0
Source: AGB Italia
226
F i g .  A 5
B A R I L L A
MARKET SHARES VS. ADVERTISING SHARES
PASTA (Barilla)
70 -
6 0 -
50 --
40 -
30 - 
20 lh
10 -
N
00
O s
00Os
NO
00
Os
RUSKS (Mulino Bianco)
100 j
90 -- 
80 -- 
70 - 
60 -- 
50 -- 
40 -■
20 - -  
10 -
ooeoos
<r>
00
Os
00
Os
■market shares
-market shares -advertising shares
-advertising shares
BISCUITS (Mulino Bianco)
70 -
60 -
50 -
40 -
30 -  
20 tV
10 -
'T
0000oo
-market shares -advertising shares
BREAD STICKS (Mulino Bianco)
-market shares -advertising shares
CRACKERS (Mulino Bianco)
14 -
12 -
10 -
6 -
4 -
0000 oo00
market shares —♦ —advertising shares
19
87
 
-L
ff-
---
---
---
-f
t 
1 
19
87
227
Fig. A6
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Fig. A7
STAR
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1. Introduction
Diversification is a widespread phenomenon. A high proportion of firms 
are diversified, including relatively small firms, many o f which are diversified 
in a modest way. In fact diversification seems to be a relatively “natural” step in 
the firm’s growth process.
For these reasons it is important to understand when this process occurs 
during a firm’s life cycle, under what conditions it happens and to ask whether 
this process is consistent with profit maximising behaviour. What effects does 
diversification have on firms’ performance? What are its implications for 
efficiency and welfare?
In the present thesis we concentrated mainly on the former issues. It was 
decided, partly because of lack of data on ownership structure, to focus on 
firms’ internal diversification within a single broad sector, the food and drink 
sector, rather than on conglomerate diversification obtained by means of 
mergers and acquisitions. In other words, we have focused on “narrow” 
diversification strategies.
In what follows we briefly discuss the main findings of the thesis, both 
theoretical and empirical, in the context o f the literature. We review the 
methodological contribution of the thesis and discuss the interpretation of 
results. Some suggestions are made as to further research that is suggested by 
our conclusions.
2. The Motivations for, and Advantages of the Present Approach
The existing literature clearly identifies a number o f reasons for 
diversification. In chapter 1 it was shown that a combination of various supply 
side approaches (economies of scope, transactions costs, theories o f growth) 
generate a coherent “story” as to why firms diversify. Demand side factors - 
such as demand rigidities and/or exogenous constraints on growth or 
profitability - complete this picture. Strategic models have added further 
reasons for diversification.
The empirical literature on motives for diversification, however, has 
developed almost independently of theory and has been based on rather ad hoc 
assumptions aimed at relating levels o f diversification to a list of (mainly 
industry based) variables. There are some exceptions to this approach. A
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limited number of studies explain patterns of diversification by reference to 
variables that describe industries’ “relatedness”.
Most empirical analyses on the relationship between diversification and 
firms’ performance have been based on the (somewhat vaguely defined) 
concept o f synergies across industries, arguing that these should induce better 
performance among diversified firms. With some notable exceptions, the results 
o f such studies seem not to be very robust.
The approach taken here involves two steps: on the one hand we have 
developed an empirical methodology for the analysis o f patterns of 
diversification, which is complemented by case study analysis; on the other 
hand we have developed a theoretical model on the relationship between 
diversification and performance that identifies some possible sources o f bias in 
traditional empirical analyses and offers some suggestions that might lead to 
better founded empirical work.
2.1 Analysing Motives for Diversification Empirically: a New Methodology
The approach developed in the empirical analysis of chapter 3 has been 
based on a number of objectives that, in the light of the preceding discussion of 
the literature, appear relevant.
First, the analysis should be centered on patterns o f diversification rather 
than on levels alone. Even if  this may not allow us to address explicitly the 
issue o f diversification driven by demand constraints (the “push factor” for 
diversification), it nevertheless allows us to analyse theories that relate to the 
supply side: an analysis of patterns should better uncover the motivations 
underlying diversification.
Secondly, an international comparison seemed useful in identifying 
structural reasons for diversification, and in distinguishing these from 
contingent reasons or motivations related to institutional factors. A time 
dimension was added in order to probe further the structural character o f some 
o f these forces. Italy and U.K. are interesting examples because o f certain 
institutional differences (in regard to antitrust legislation and in respect o f the 
structure o f the distribution sector) that might be relevant for our analysis.
Thirdly, it seemed important to use a more detailed dataset than the ones 
usually employed in the literature; in particular, given the definition of 
diversification used here (which is based on a low value o f cross-elasticities of
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demand), it seemed important to use a product definition based on a demand 
side description rather than a production-based measure.
In the light o f these requirements, an extremely detailed dataset was 
constructed, which describes the diversification patterns o f a large number of 
Italian and U.K. food firms in 1986 and, for the U.K., in 1962.
A methodology different from the approach traditionally used in the 
literature was developed to uncover and analyse diversification patterns.
As noted earlier, empirical analyses are usually based on regressions of 
diversification levels against firm and industry characteristics. A very limited 
number of studies concentrate on patterns: these use probit regressions in which 
the dependent variable takes the value 0  or 1 depending on whether the firm is 
diversified or not, or on whether a firm mainly active in industry i is also active 
in industry j.
Here, we developed a new method that allowed us to describe patterns of 
diversification and to measure them. This method was based on the use o f a 
“clustering algorithm” to identify related groups.
On the basis of a preliminary grouping of industries, we developed two 
approaches.
The first approach is an adaptation of a traditional method o f analysis of 
categorical data organised in contingency tables to the analysis of 
diversification. The use of log-linear models allowed us to uncover 
interdependencies among variables and appeared to be an obvious candidate 
method of analysis (though surprisingly it has not been used before in analysing 
diversification).
Some issues had to be resolved in order to permit the use o f this method: 
data had to be rearranged in contingency tables in which the variables were 
taken as the industries. Some degree of arbitrariness was introduced in this 
process in the definition of some cells’ values. Moreover - due to computational 
limitations - we had to limit ourselves in using this method to the analysis o f the 
previously identified groupings.
Despite these limitations, the method proved reasonably powerful - in 
the sense of statistical significance - in describing interdependencies across 
industries and in uncovering potentially complex links. Its use might in 
principle be extended to analyse more “distant” diversification strategies, or 
even occurrences of “multimarket contact”. Even if  the method is applicable 
only to groups that include a fairly small number of industries, it may 
nevertheless be useful in confirming hypotheses formulated on the basis o f ad  
hoc methods.
234
Some of the limitations of this procedure, and in particular both the 
arbitrariness in some steps o f the analysis and the difficulty of giving a 
structural interpretation to the parameters estimated, motivated a search for 
some alternative method. The method developed in chapter 3 is based on a 
simulation of the theoretical models presented in the preceding chapter. In these 
models, diversification is driven by cost correlation or by economies of scope. 
The aim in chapter 3 is to find out whether the patterns we observe can be 
adequately described by reference to these models. If this is the case, we obtain 
an interpretation of estimated parameters in terms o f the degree of cost 
correlation or the relevance of economies o f scope across the industries 
concerned.
The appeal o f both these empirical approaches (the log-linear and the 
simulation methods) lies in the possibility of extending their use to the analysis 
and comparison of different datasets. Both methods offer a useful way of 
comparing datasets and of identifying sources o f relatedness. The second 
method in particular allows us to evaluate separately the pattern o f 
diversification, and the level of diversification.
A complementary analysis of some kind is still needed if  we are to pin 
down the interpretation of the empirical results obtained from this approach. 
Various lines o f attack could be followed. One possibility would have been to 
perform a more detailed statistical analysis of the groupings of industries 
identified, in order to uncover the sources of relatedness (cost correlation or 
economies of scope) in a more precise way. This would have involved 
analysing data at an industry level, looking at the technology used in the various 
industries and the economies of scope it might generate, at the intensity of 
advertising, and at other possible sources o f relatedness. However data on 
industries as defined here, at a very fine level, are extremely difficult to obtain.
A different line of attack was followed here. This involved looking at 
some case studies on specific firms (rather than industries) with a view to 
unravelling their diversification history, uncovering the motivations for 
diversification, and asking whether these are consistent with the findings of the 
statistical analysis.
The design of a case study analysis involves a degree of arbitrariness: it 
was decided to concentrated on one of the two countries in order to assess the 
impact o f some specific institutional factors. It was further decided to focus on 
large firms with widely different diversification strategies.
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The objective of tins approach was to help reveal whether the 
theoretically postulated motivations for diversification could explain differences 
in observed strategies.
As discussed in the first chapter, the case study approach has 
occasionally been used in the empirical literature on diversification but with a 
focus on analysing performance. The case study approach is more common in 
the business literature, where in most cases it has involved an analysis o f 
industry and firm characteristics and of the “type” of diversification moves that 
firms have made in order to evaluate reasons for the success o f such strategies. 
The studies do not usually involve any detailed analysis o f the degree of 
correspondence between theoretically predicted patterns o f diversification and 
firms’ actual choices. Even if  it the case study approach does not allow us to 
generalise results further, it can be an important instrument for the analysis o f 
reasons for diversification since it allows us to understand better underlying 
motivations and to give a clearer content to certain theories.
2.2 A Theoretical Model for the Performance of Diversified Firms
The results of most empirical analyses on the relationship between 
diversification and performance are rather unsatisfactory, in that they do not 
rest on a satisfactory link between theory and testing1.
It is the dissatisfaction with this literature that motivated the theoretical 
model used in chapter 2  to analyse the relationship between diversification and 
firms’ performance.
A simple model was developed in which diversification is driven either 
by the presence of cost correlations across industries or by economies o f scope. 
These are often thought to be circumstances in which diversification enhances 
efficiency or profits. The model was kept as simple as possible in order to 
concentrate on the effects of these two elements. Firms were assumed to be 
characterised by different levels of efficiency, as represented by differences in 
the “fixed” component of costs.
In the literature, the theoretical analysis o f diversification is performed 
either in a perfectly contestable framework, where all firms diversify i f  there 
are economies of scope; or in a strategic framework, where firms diversify also 
in absence of synergies.
As discussed in the thesis, there are some exceptions to this including, for example, the 
studies of Montgomery and Wemerfelt (1988a, 1988b).
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The essential novelty of the present approach is to model entry decisions, 
taking firm characteristics as given. The self selection of firms in the light of 
this intrinsic efficiency differences drives the main results.
The model addresses the relationship between diversification and 
performance and identifies possible reasons why the correlation between the 
two variables might be negative. It shows that, even when diversification is 
driven by the search of synergies (such as cost correlations or economies of 
scope across industries), diversified firms are not necessarily the most 
profitable firms on the market. Diversified firms might appear to perform badly 
if  they are inefficient firms which are able to survive on the market only 
because of the synergies they exploit. If this is so, then it is not diversification 
per se which reduces firms’ profitability.
A negative relationship between diversification and performance is 
observed, in the model developed in chapter 2 , under certain conditions with 
respect to the cost function of the firms on the market, when the synergies 
across the industries are not strong (we might interpret this as being more likely 
in the case o f conglomerate diversification as opposed to “related” 
diversification).
The empirical results reported in the literature might then be explained 
either in terms of missing variables or in terms of selection bias. As to the 
former, the fact that efficiency measures are hard to obtain, and are normally 
excluded in empirical studies means that these studies typically explain bad 
performance by reference to diversification strategies rather than by reference 
to underlying firm characteristics. If the regressions included cost variables, 
these two effects could be disentangled. The selection bias arises from the fact 
that, in terms of the model, almost all “bad performers” who are able to exploit 
the synergies are diversified at equilibrium. If  this were so empirically, we 
could not observe “bad performers” who were not diversified, except by 
following the history of individual firms. These estimation problems may 
explain the negative correlation reported in the literature, while suggesting a 
very different interpretation to that normally offered.
Many interpretations suggested in the literature rely on disequilibrium 
explanations, or are based on non-profit maximising behaviour of firms (in 
particular they are often linked to the supposed behaviour o f managers). The 
appeal o f the results developed here is that they are obtained within an 
equilibrium framework, and assume profit maximising behaviour by firms.
Our results are particularly interesting in the context o f a very recent 
analysis on the wave of de-diversification that occurred in the United States in
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the 1980s. Lang and Stulz (1995) compare the performance o f conglomerate 
firms with that of specialised firms in the 1980s. They use Tobin’s q as a 
measure of performance and adopt a “chop-shop” approach for the comparison: 
the performance of a real conglomerate firm is compared to a weighted average 
o f the performance of specialised firms in all the industries where the former is 
active. The authors find that conglomerates are consistently worse performers 
than specialised firms in the period considered. More interestingly, in the 
context o f the present results, they find some preliminary evidence that firms 
which diversify are poor performers relative to firms that do not. Our 
theoretical result on the negative correlation of diversification with profitability 
holds for firms diversifying into industries that are not too closely related and 
relies on the fact that diversified firms might be the poorest performers. Hence 
the evidence of Lang and Stulz appears to be consistent with our explanation of 
a negative correlation.
2.3 The Empirical Findings
The main findings obtained in chapter 3 are that diversification patterns 
appear to be very similar within the U.K. over a long time period, and 
reasonably similar too between the U.K. and Italy in the reference (1986) year. 
In this respect the two methods (log-linear analysis and simulation) produce 
reasonably consistent results.
However the levels (or, more precisely, the intensity o f the links across 
industries) are quite different in the U.K. and in Italy: in particular the Italian 
levels appear to be lower than in the U.K. even when we compare Italy in 1986 
with the U.K. in 1962.
The broad similarities of patterns observed across countries and time 
suggest that diversification patterns are explained by stable structural factors.
An evaluation of these factors and hence of the sources o f the linkages 
across industries is however difficult without a detailed analysis o f the 
industries involved and of some firms’ diversification patterns. Certain possible 
sources of relatedness (advertising relatedness, R&D relatedness, input/output 
relationships) are identified in the literature, which finds them significant in 
explaining diversification patterns.
The case study analysis developed in chapter 4 allowed us to clarify the 
importance of some further sources of linkages. First, it showed that relatedness 
in production technology and the possibility o f using common inputs are among
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the main sources of relatedness for all firms, and are particularly relevant in 
explaining small firms’ diversification. This factor is not usually stressed in the 
empirical literature both because it is difficult to measure and because it has 
often seemed more important for small firms, which are generally not included 
in the analysis.
Secondly, it showed that additional factors are relevant in explaining 
large firms’ diversification: some of these (the possibility o f exploiting a brand 
name) have been considered in the literature (and have been proxied by 
relatedness in advertising expenditure), while others have not been discussed 
(for example distribution economies).
Hence the empirical analysis of diversification patterns developed here 
offers both a more precise and deeper content to the notions o f economies of 
scope and cost correlation, relative to previous studies, and new methodologies 
to analyse patterns and levels of diversification in a rigorous and easy to 
interpret way.
3. Suggestions for Further Research
The approach taken in this thesis and the results obtained suggest some 
further lines of research that might be investigated, both at the theoretical level 
and at the empirical.
3.1 Theoretical Lines of Analysis
From a theoretical point of view it would be valuable to analyse further 
reasons for diversification beyond those analysed in chapter 2  within the 
context o f a model in which entry decisions are endogenised. In particular, the 
effects o f ownership structure on firms’ diversification strategies were not 
considered here. Some hypotheses have been proposed in the literature in 
relation to conditions where there is a separation between ownership and 
control. It has been suggested that in those cases conglomerate diversification 
(or better diversification not specifically driven by the search of synergies) 
might be driven by managers’ “search for power”. In this context it would be 
interesting to investigate whether different ownership structures (for example 
those in which banks or other firms have large shareholding in the firm)
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generate different incentives for related or conglomerate diversification, or 
indeed for vertical integration.
As to the relationship between diversification and firms’ performance it 
would be worthwhile to extend the theoretical model developed in chapter 2  to 
make it more directly testable. One extension would be to consider more than 
two product markets and to introduce different degrees of correlation across 
markets, with a view to obtaining predictions about the effect o f different 
degrees o f correlation across markets on the relationship between 
diversification and performance. Other generalisations o f the model could be 
considered that allow for strategic interactions within the firm or that take into 
account financial factors.
Finally, as to the welfare effect of diversification - which has not been 
considered here - even if  multimarket contact and its antitrust implications have 
been sufficiently analysed, it remains worth asking about the incentives to grow 
and diversify that are not welfare enhancing, especially in the context o f some 
kinds o f ownership structure. Certain analyses on U.S. conglomerate firms 
suggest that, when ownership is extremely dispersed, diverging interests 
between managers and shareholders might lead to excessive diversification 
(even if  it is extremely difficult convincingly to demonstrate a link between 
unprofitable diversification strategies and the influence of managerial interests).
One valuable approach would be to look at different ownership and 
control structures, such as the pyramidal group structure. When a pyramidal 
group is used by a parent company to raise external capital from minority 
shareholders (without loss of control), this might be a serious problem. The 
interests o f the parent company, which coincide with those of the group as a 
whole, might conflict with those of minority shareholders of single companies. 
One relevant hypothesis here would be that, in hierarchical groups, the 
controlling shareholder might be able to divert funds from one company to 
another and that this might be more easily done in groups where vertical 
integration or related diversification make transfers o f financial resources 
easier.
3.2 Empirical Lines of Analysis
Further work would also be interesting on the empirical side. The present 
analysis has been limited in certain respects by a lack of suitable data. The 
availability of new micro-data on firms that allow the break down of each firm
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sales by product markets would enable us to apply the method developed in 
chapter 3 to different measures of diversification and to check the robustness of 
results.
A particularly interesting development of that analysis would consist o f a 
time comparison for the Italian case, in order to evaluate more precisely the 
effect o f the two main institutional factors that differentiate the Italian case 
from the U.K. industry. In 1990 an antitrust law was introduced in Italy. 
Moreover in the second half of the 1980s and at the beginning o f the 1990s 
concentration has risen rapidly in the distribution sector. The results on the 
1986 diversification patterns might be usefully compared with those o f a more 
recent year to evaluate the effects of those changes.
The method developed might also be used to analyse “less narrow” 
diversification strategies across wider sectors. It could be applied to cases of 
conglomerate diversification (for example across two-digit industries) in order 
to evaluate whether in these cases we also observe some common patterns and 
links across industries. These might be due to a correlation across industries in 
terms o f different positions of the products in their life cycle, or by the search 
for multimarket contact.
Much could be learned from a theoretically well-founded empirical 
analysis of diversification and profitability. To uncover the effects of 
diversification, it is appropriate to take into account all those variables that 
affect performance, and especially those that might be correlated with 
diversification (and would induce a bias in the estimation), such as firms’ 
intrinsic efficiency levels. Were such factors measurable, regression analyses 
could be performed with data on firms’ costs. Failing that, it might, at least, be 
possible to reduce the effect of firm-specific efficiency through the use o f panel 
data. Another possibility would be to look at firms’ profitability over time, in 
particular in the years preceding the diversification move, and to compare this 
with those of “matching” single product firms that do not diversify.
Much of the work that now seems attractive demands datasets containing 
richer information than those now available. Progress in this area is likely to 
depend very heavily on the laborious construction of new and more 
comprehensive datasets. The joint efforts o f researchers and institutions is 
making this aim closer.
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